In 1965, the Brest Fortress was awarded the honorary title "Fortress-Hero". Today, on a memorable anniversary, we dedicate an article to the feat of the defenders of the Brest Fortress. It would seem that many books and articles have been written about the Brest Fortress, but even today the authorities prefer to remain silent about the real causes of the tragedy of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

DECREE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR
ON AWARDING THE HONORARY TITLE "HERO FORTRESS" TO THE BREST FORTRESS

Repelling the perfidious and sudden attack of the Nazi invaders on the Soviet Union, the defenders of the Brest Fortress, in exceptionally difficult conditions, showed outstanding military prowess, mass heroism and courage in the fight against the Nazi aggressors, which became a symbol of unparalleled stamina. Soviet people.

Noting the exceptional services of the defenders of the Brest Fortress to the Motherland and in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, to award the Brest Fortress with the honorary title of "Fortress-Hero" with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
A. MIKOYAN

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
M. GEORGADZE

The chronology of the events that took place in the Brest Fortress is well known and we do not aim to present these events - which can be read on the Internet, we just want to focus on what led to these events.

"June, 22. The Truth of the Generalissimo” (Moscow, “Veche”, 2005) is the title of the book by A.B. Martirosyan, which provides the most adequate explanation of the reasons for the military catastrophe of the USSR in the summer of 1941 published to date.

The publisher's review that accompanies the imprint of this book states: “For the first time, the revealed fact of the tacit substitution by the USSR high military command of the official national defense plan for a strikingly similar to the “Plan for the defeat of the USSR in the war with Germany” (Marshal Tukhachevsky) “illiterate scenario of entry into war, based on the criminal idea of ​​​​an immediate counter-frontal counter-blitzkrieg with a static front with a “narrow ribbon”.

This review sets out clearly and extremely briefly the guilt of the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (it was headed by S.K. Timoshenko, now mostly remembered only by historians) and the General Staff (it was headed by G.K. Zhukov, now elevated to the rank of "Marshal of Victory" for the crowd ), who behind the scenes, largely on the basis of their oral directives and agreements with “their people” in the districts, replaced the official plan to repel aggression from Germany with their own gag in the spirit of M.N. Tukhachevsky - creatures of L.D. Trotsky.

The official plan was based on the ideas of B.M. Shaposhnikov about covering the border line with relatively small forces concentrated directly on it, and about deploying the main forces in echeloned battle formations at some distance from the border line, which excluded both the possibility of defeating them with one massive surprise strike, and the possibility of breaking through a fairly wide front and quick exit of the aggressor "to the operational space" in unprotected rear areas.




Although the de jure plan based on the ideas of B.M. Shaposhnikov continued to operate until June 22, 1941, inclusive, but in fact, a different plan was put into practice, according to which, during the threatened period, under various pretexts, the troops of the border districts were massively transferred from their places of deployment closer to the state border for actions according to the plan of an immediate response "blitzkrieg ".

This plan supposedly provided for the defeat of the aggressor groupings in a meeting engagement "in an open field" and at the lines of deployment of the aggressor's main forces, and not on pre-prepared lines of defense, followed by a counteroffensive after the defeat of the aggressor groupings.

Due to the fact that the official plan for preparing to repel aggression was sabotaged, and a mafia-corporate plan was put into practice allegedly preparing for a reciprocal "blitzkrieg", the groups of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army deployed in the immediate vicinity of the state border were put under attack and defeated massive Wehrmacht strikes in the very first hours of the war, and the Soviet front as a whole became disorganized and uncontrollable for the next few weeks.

This led to the military-strategic catastrophe of the USSR in the summer of 1941. A skeptic may object that the substitution of one plan for another could not be carried out without appropriate documentary support for the activities of the mafia-corporate plan, alternative to the official one.

However, even if the plan actually implemented was not officially approved, this does not mean that the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff did not develop various alternatives to the official plan that existed in the rank of "drafts" and "working materials".

Such documents in the system of secret office work during the work of headquarters, research institutes, design bureaus, etc. organizations are produced in abundance, but since they are neither official nor accounting documents, they are mostly destroyed when they are no longer needed. And from them there are only entries in the registers of accounting for secret documents and acts on their destruction, saying practically nothing about their content.

Therefore, in the system of office work of the General Staff, one of such, as it were, alternative options in relation to the official plan could be developed legally and could become an actually implemented plan, and then was destroyed as some kind of “working material”. In addition, the skeptic should know that about 40 years later, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was launched on the basis of a decision by the leadership of the USSR, and at the same time, the relevant operational documents were not previously developed at the General Staff.

The operation was carried out as an improvisation and the appropriate orders were given at the pace of the development of the situation, on the basis of reports on the situation. Of course, the introduction of troops into Afghanistan at the end of 1979 was “not the same” scale, since it affected only part of the troops of one of the military districts of the USSR, and in the spring and summer of 1941, all military districts of the country were involved in preparations for the war and, in features along the western border.

However, this is not the case when a large-scale effect is felt: in 1941, in all border military districts, on the basis of identical instructions from the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, actions identical in nature were carried out.

But as for the mobilization plans of the state, they could be a common component for the official plan based on the ideas of B.M. Shaposhnikov, and for the mafia-corporate plan based on the fabrications of M.N. Tukhachevsky. At the same time, I.V. Stalin about the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense evading the official plan was essentially no one:

Firstly, both plans (official - sabotaged and unofficial - implemented on the basis of mafia-corporate principles) were generally known only to the top military leaders in Moscow who were directly involved in each of the plans, and in the military districts to commanders of units and other officials persons, the official and unofficial plans were communicated only “as regards” each of them, and therefore, for the most part, they were not able to correlate one plan with another and distinguish between the practically implemented measures corresponding to each of the plans.




Secondly, the behavior of the command of the districts was determined not only by official discipline, but also by their personal relations with representatives of the higher command in Moscow. In other words, key positions were held by “their own people” bound by some kind of mutual responsibility, although they were approved in positions by I.V. Stalin and the leadership of the country as a whole.




Thirdly, if someone on the ground even guessed that something was being done to the detriment of the country's defense capability, then by his official position he could know only particulars, and not the whole picture as a whole.




Fourthly, on February 3, 1941, special departments of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR in parts of the armed forces were liquidated, and their functions were transferred to the Third Directorate of People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy (this decision suggests that I.V. Stalin was more likely overly trusting rather than maniacally suspicious; or else not as powerful as most people think).

Those. as a result of the third and fourth, there was no one to bring all deviations from the official plan together, to identify and expose sabotage and sabotage in the People's Commissariat of Defense and in the General Staff. And as a result of the fourth, report that S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov sabotage the official plan for preparing the country to repel aggression and put into practice some kind of gag, it was only possible, in essence, by S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov with all the ensuing consequences for the reporter.

Investigation by A.P. Pokrovsky

A.B. Martirosyan reports that after the end of the war, a survey of commanding officers of the western military districts was begun (as of June 22, 1941) on the topic of what and from whom they received instructions immediately before the start of the war and immediately after it began.

Those. although during the war Stalin took the position of S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov about placing full responsibility for the catastrophe in the summer of 1941 on General D.G. Pavlov and considered it good "not to change horses at the crossing", organizing the Headquarters, through which he personally managed the war in addition to the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense, perhaps sharing only with B.M. Shaposhnikov (while he was in power), and not all others dedicating to his vision the matrix of possibilities and the course of matrix-egregorial processes.

However, after the war I.V. Stalin returned to the topic of responsibility for June 22, 1941 and taking measures to avoid the repetition of something similar in the future.

The investigation was conducted by the head of the military-scientific department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky.

Alexander Petrovich Pokrovsky (1898 - 1979), was born on October 21, 1898 in Tambov. At the age of 17, he was drafted into the Russian army, graduated from ensign school, served in spare parts and in the Novokiev Infantry Regiment on the Western Front. In 1918 he joined the Red Army. During the Civil War, he commanded a company, battalion and regiment.

In 1926 he graduated from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, in 1932 - the operational department of this academy, and in 1939 - the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. In between studies, he served at the headquarters of divisions and military districts. In 1935 he headed the headquarters of the 5th Rifle Corps, in 1938 he became deputy chief of staff of the Moscow Military District, from October 1940 - adjutant, then adjutant general of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal Budyonny.

In the Great Patriotic War: Chief of Staff of the Main Command of the South-Western Direction (at Budyonny: July 10 - September 1941)). After the removal of Budyonny and Timoshenko's arrival there, he was appointed to the North-Western Front as chief of staff of the 60th (from December 1941 - 3rd shock) army (October-December 1941), commanded by Purkaev.

And from there he was transferred to the headquarters Western Front, on which (later - on the Third Belarusian), he worked throughout the war. First, in the role of chief of operations, then for some time as chief of staff of the 33rd Army, and then again in operations and deputy chief of staff of the front at Sokolovsky.

And then (after the dismissal of Konev, when Sokolovsky became commander of the front), he became the chief of staff of the front and already remained in this position from the winter of 1943 until the end of the war.

After the war, chief of staff of the military district, since 1946 head of the Main Military Scientific Directorate - assistant chief of the General Staff, in 1946 - 1961 deputy chief of the General Staff.

This is a manifestation of I.V. Stalin's interest in what actually happened in 1941 in the pre-war period and in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, could be one of the reasons why the bureaucracy (including the military) liquidated I.V. Stalin and L.P. Beria, although the ongoing investigation into the algorithms of the 1941 disaster was not the only reason for their liquidation.

Post-war words and a hint of I.V. Stalin that the principle of "the winners are not judged" may know exceptions - frightened and activated many who "have a stigma in the cannon."

Until now, the materials of the commission of A.P. Pokrovsky were not published.

Still, it was not the personal factor that played the decisive role: in one place of his book, A.B. Martirosyan writes that the tragedy of the summer of 1941 was programmed by prehistory. A.B. Martirosyan points to this sometimes very verbosely, and repeating himself.

But if we state what he describes in his own words, correlating with the factology of that era, then we get such a picture. All higher military education (academic) in the 1920s was usurped by the Trotskyists and this situation continued until the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

They, with their idea of ​​a world revolution and a revolutionary war as a means of exporting the revolution, were supporters of what later became known as the "blitzkrieg" and was implemented by Hitler repeatedly over the period from September 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941 inclusive.

With these ideas of "blitzkrieg" they punched the brains of students of military academies. And some of the students of the academies, becoming teachers in military schools, composted the brains of their cadets with the same ideas - future commanders of the level from a platoon and above.

The problem of neutralizing aggression in the form of a blitzkrieg against their country and its armed forces was not worked out by them and was not allowed in training courses as supposedly not relevant for the USSR during the period they were in power, since they intended to attack first, bringing "world revolution »; and after the Trotskyists began to be "pressed", from the beginning of the 1930s. and even more so after the defeat of the conspiracy of M.N. Tukhachevsky and Co. at the end of the 1930s, for them the resolution of this problem was not only not relevant, but became hostile to their conspiratorial policy, since the possible defeat of the Red Army during the blitzkrieg carried out against the USSR was a prerequisite for them to coup d'etat and coming to power.

As a result of this, the layers of the military conspiracy, which were more deeply conspiratorial and not liquidated in 1937, purposefully prepared the military defeat of the USSR in the war with Germany: and for starters, they needed to ensure the inability of the Red Army to withstand the first blow of the blitzkrieg. Therefore, consideration of the essence of the problem of repelling aggression in the form of a blitzkrieg was replaced by idle talk in the spirit of the concept of a counter-reciprocal blitzkrieg promoted by M.N. Tukhachevsky, his associates and followers.

An analysis of various kinds of "strangeness" in the course of hostilities on the Soviet-German fronts shows that sabotage of the conduct of the war and sabotage by some of the staff officers and senior officers stopped only after Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk, when it became clear that the victory of the USSR and the defeat of Germany was a question time, regardless of the number of casualties on both sides.

In addition, the training system in military schools and academies of the Red Army was built on the principles of coding pedagogy and was predominantly textual and bookish, rather than practical (at least in educational and game forms), as a result of which it massively produced zombies with basic and higher military education on on the basis of the ideas of blitzkrieg and the actualization of the illusion of the supposedly real possibility of suppressing aggression in the form of a blitzkrieg with one's counter-oncoming blitzkrieg.

Stuffed with such nonsense, zombies in ranks from colonels to generals made up the majority of the top command staff of the Red Army in the pre-war period. And this military-ideological environment was a good means of disguising the structures of the Trotskyist conspiracy that continued to operate, since both the participants in the conspiracy and their uninitiated entourage were carriers of the same false-false worldview.

So both the initiated and the non-initiated acted uniformly in line with the same algorithm of the development of the situation, which had no alternative for that period of historical time. The exceptions were people who think independently, both in the highest echelon of the command staff, and in the middle and lower. But they were a minority that "didn't make the weather." In the highest command staff, these were S.M. Budyonny, K.E. Voroshilov, B.M. Shaposhnikov and some others whom we do not know.

However, since they did not form the worldview in general and the understanding of the nature of the war among the command staff of the 1920s-1930s. and directly in the pre-war period, then in the initial period of the war they found themselves without a social base in the troops, as a result of which, relying on zombies stuffed with all kinds of nonsense, they could not realize their ideas adequate to life and the course of the war, since the psyche of those fed by the Tukhachevites was stuffed with military algorithms , incompatible with ideas adequate to that war.

In addition, in the summer of 1941, a fair proportion of the personnel were demoralized and sought to surrender in the hope of sitting out in German concentration camps, as the parents of many of them successfully did during the war of 1914-1918.

Forced defense of the Brest Fortress

"Hushing up" is a fair word in relation to the Khrushchev times and the present.

This does not mean that from the time of Khrushchev to today no one talks about the feat of the defenders of the Brest Fortress. Nevertheless, neither Russia nor Belarus are rising real reasons forcing the Fortress to defend - about the replacement of the strategy of a systematic withdrawal to the fortified areas by the Trotskyist strategy of blitzkrieg, about the education of appropriate personnel by the Trotskyists in the army.

They are silent about those who drove 4 divisions into a plot of 20 square meters. kilometers at a distance of several hundred meters from the border. No one planned to defend, to defend this very citadel. The very purpose of the fortress - not to let the enemy inside makes it a mousetrap for the garrison. It is as difficult to leave the fortress as it is for the enemy to get into it.

The garrison of the city of Brest at the beginning of the war consisted of three rifle divisions and one tank division, this is not counting parts of the NKVD troops.

The approximate number of personnel is 30-35 thousand people. In the fortress itself there were: the 125th rifle regiment without the 1st battalion and a sapper company, the 84th rifle regiment without 2 battalions, the 333rd rifle regiment without the 1st battalion and rifle company, the 75th separate reconnaissance battalion, 98th separate anti-tank division, 131st artillery regiment, headquarters battery, 31st automobile battalion, 37th separate communications battalion and a number of other formations of the 6th rifle division; 455th rifle regiment without the 1st battalion and engineer company (one battalion was in a fort 4 km northwest of Brest), 44th rifle regiment without 2 battalions (were located in a fort 2 km south of the fortress) 158th automobile battalion and rear units of the 42nd division.

In addition, the fortress housed the headquarters of the 33rd district engineer regiment, the district military hospital on Hospital Island, a border outpost and a separate 132nd NKVD battalion. In total, there were about 9,000 military personnel in the fortress.

Naturally, the troops did not have the task of defending the fortress, their task was to occupy the fortified defense lines (like all other troops of the Western Front) and prevent the Germans from breaking through along the highway to Minsk, three rifle and one tank divisions could defend a sector of the front in 30-40 kilometers. The troops began to defend the Brest Fortress, which was used as winter quarters, because they could not leave the citadel.

Question: who is to blame for the fact that such a mass of troops was crowded in the closed space of the fortress? Answer: Commander of the Western Special Military District, General of the Army D.G. Pavlov. It cannot be said that no one understood all the danger hanging over the garrison of Brest.

From the memoirs of General Sandalov, the former chief of staff of the 4th Army:

“After all, according to the district plan, only one rifle battalion with an artillery division was intended to defend the fortress itself. The rest of the garrison had to quickly leave the fortress and take up prepared positions along the border in the army zone. But the capacity of the fortress gates was too small. It took at least three hours to withdraw the troops and institutions located there from the fortress ... Of course, such a placement of the corps must be considered temporary, caused by a lack of housing stock. With the construction of the barracks, we will reconsider this issue ...

Pavlov probably managed to convince the Chief of the General Staff. A few days later we received an official written order confirming everything that Pavlov had said orally. The only "concession" to us was permission to deploy one rifle regiment of the 42nd division outside the Brest Fortress and place it in the Zhabinka area.

- Well, - Fyodor Ivanovich Shlykov sighed heavily, - now we have neither the second echelon nor the reserves in our army. We no longer need to travel east of Kobrin: nothing of ours is left there ...

In the spring of 1941, the Brest garrison was replenished with a new rifle division. Yes, the tank brigade that was there before, having turned into a tank division, increased numerically four times. In a word, a huge number of troops accumulated in Brest. And the district hospital still remained in the fortress.

Part of the storage facilities had to be adapted to accommodate the personnel and even some of the forts of the fortress, blown up in 1915, had to be restored. In the lower floors of the barracks, four-tiered bunks were arranged.

On the night of June 14, I alerted the 6th Infantry Division. The day before, the commander of the 28th Rifle Corps, Major General V. S. Popov, conducted the same alarm in the 42nd Rifle Division. Summing up the results of these two alarms, we unanimously expressed the desire for the withdrawal of the 42nd Infantry Division to the Zhabinka area and for the construction of two or three emergency exits within the walls of the fortress.

Later, when our proposal was rejected by the district commander, General Popov spoke in favor of withdrawing the 42nd division to the camp on the territory of the Brest artillery range, but the district leadership prevented this as well.

General Pavlov, commander of the 4th Army Korobkov and others were shot in July 1941, and after N.S. Khrushchev was rehabilitated due to the absence of corpus delicti in their actions. It is curious that one of the charges was the death of the garrison of the Brest Fortress, moreover, Pavlov himself admitted his guilt:

From the protocol

"one. Defendant Pavlov. The accusation against me is understandable. I do not plead guilty to participating in an anti-Soviet military conspiracy. I have never been a member of an anti-Soviet conspiratorial organization.

I plead guilty to the fact that I did not have time to check the fulfillment by the commander of the 4th Army, Korobkov, of my order to evacuate troops from Brest. As early as the beginning of June, I gave the order to withdraw units from Brest to the camps. Korobkov did not fulfill my order, as a result of which three divisions were defeated by the enemy when leaving the city.

Here's how, it turns out that the order to leave the fortress was given at the beginning of June, which is not surprising, because. measures to bring troops to combat readiness began to be taken precisely at the beginning of June 1941.

Surprisingly different. General Korobkov denies that he received such an order at all, it seems to be true (see Sandalov's memoirs.)

"Defendant Korobkov. The order to withdraw units from Brest was not given by anyone. I personally have not seen such an order.

Defendant Pavlov. In June, on my orders, the commander of the 28th Rifle Corps, Popov, was sent with the task of evacuating all troops from Brest to the camps by June 15th.

Defendant Korobkov. I didn't know about it. This means that Popov should be prosecuted for not following the order of the commander.”

Conclusion:

Thus, specific perpetrators have not yet been identified, both for the Brest Fortress and for the entire Western Front. Materials of the investigation by A.P. Pokrovsky remain unpublished because the Trotskyists are still in power. Also, the root of the problem is not revealed. Trotskyism is not publicly described as a phenomenon by official psychology.

In the education system, historians do not give an idea of ​​the psychology of Trotskyism, which led to huge human losses at the beginning of the war and in general throughout the history of Russia.

Ordinary people did everything they could in the conditions of the ideological inconsistency of the Trotskyist commanders, the outright betrayal of some of them. The defense of the Brest Fortress remains an unprecedented feat in the eyes of grateful descendants in the most difficult conditions of the onset of the fascist aggressor and the betrayal of the Trotskyist elite.

Youth Analytical Group

Introduction

In June 1941, much indicated that Germany launched preparations for war against the Soviet Union. German divisions were moving up to the border. The preparations for the war became known from intelligence reports. In particular, the Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge even reported the exact day of the invasion and the number of enemy divisions that would be involved in the operation. In these difficult conditions, the Soviet leadership tried not to give the slightest reason to start a war. It even allowed "archaeologists" from Germany to look for "the graves of soldiers who died during the First World War." Under this pretext, German officers openly studied the area, outlined the paths of a future invasion.

At dawn on June 22, one of the longest days of the year, Germany began the war against the Soviet Union. At 0330 hours, units of the Red Army were attacked by German troops along the entire length of the border. In the early predawn hour of June 22, 1941, night squads and patrols of border guards who guarded the western state border of the Soviet country noticed a strange celestial phenomenon. There, in front, beyond the border line, above the land of Poland captured by the Nazis, far away, on the western edge of the slightly brightening pre-morning sky, among the already dimmed stars of the shortest summer night suddenly appeared some new, unseen stars. Unusually bright and colorful, like fireworks - sometimes red, sometimes green - they did not stand still, but slowly and non-stop sailed here, to the east, making their way among the fading night stars. They dotted the entire horizon, as far as the eye could see, and together with their appearance from there, from the west, came the rumble of many engines.

On the morning of June 22, Moscow radio broadcast the usual Sunday programs and peaceful music. Soviet citizens learned about the beginning of the war only at noon, when Vyacheslav Molotov spoke on the radio. He said: “Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country. brest fortress capture german

Three powerful German army groups moved east. In the north, Field Marshal Leeb directed the blow of his troops across the Baltic to Leningrad. In the south, Field Marshal Rundstedt was aiming his troops at Kyiv. But the strongest grouping of enemy forces deployed its operations in the middle of this huge front, where, starting at the border city of Brest, a wide belt of asphalt highway goes eastward - through the capital of Belarus Minsk, through the ancient Russian city of Smolensk, through Vyazma and Mozhaisk to the heart of our Motherland - Moscow. For four days, German mobile units, operating on narrow fronts, broke through to a depth of 250 km and reached the Western Dvina. The army corps were 100-150 km behind the tank ones.

The command of the North-Western Front, at the direction of the Headquarters, made an attempt to organize defense at the turn of the Western Dvina. From Riga to Liepaja, the 8th Army was to defend. To the south, the 27th Army advanced, whose task was to cover the gap between the inner flanks of the 8th and 11th armies. The pace of deployment of troops and defense on the line of the Western Dvina was insufficient, which allowed the enemy's 56th motorized corps to cross on the move to the northern bank of the Western Dvina, capture Daugavpils and create a bridgehead on the northern bank of the river. The 8th Army, having lost up to 50% of its personnel and up to 75% of its materiel, began to withdraw to the northeast and north, to Estonia.

Due to the fact that the 8th and 27th armies were retreating in divergent directions, the path for the enemy's mobile formations to Pskov and Ostrov turned out to be open. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet was forced to leave Liepaja and Ventspils. After that, the defense of the Gulf of Riga was based only on the islands of Sarema and Khiuma, which were still held by our troops. As a result of the hostilities from June 22 to July 9, the troops of the North-Western Front did not fulfill their tasks. They left the Baltic, suffered heavy losses and allowed the enemy to advance up to 500 km.

The main forces of Army Group Center were advancing against the Western Front. Their immediate goal was to bypass the main forces of the Western Front and encircle them with the release of tank groups in the Minsk area. The enemy offensive on the right wing of the Western Front in the direction of Grodno was repulsed. The most difficult situation developed on the left wing, where the enemy struck with the 2nd tank group at Brest, Baranovichi. With the beginning of the shelling of Brest at dawn on June 22, the units of the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions located in the city were alerted. At 7 o'clock the enemy broke into the city. Part of our troops withdrew from the fortress. The rest of the garrison, by this time numbering up to an infantry regiment in total, organized the defense of the citadel and decided to fight encircled to the end. The heroic defense of Brest began, which lasted over a month and was an example of the legendary valor and courage of Soviet patriots.

1. Defense of the Brest Fortress

The Brest Fortress is one of 9 fortresses built in the 19th century. to strengthen the western border of Russia. April 26, 1842 the fortress became one of the active fortresses Russian Empire. All Soviet people were well aware of the feat of the defenders of the Brest Fortress. As the official version said, a small garrison fought for a whole month against an entire division of the Germans. But even from the book by S.S. Sergeyev "Brest Fortress" you can find out that "in the spring of 1941, units of two rifle divisions were stationed on the territory of the Brest Fortress Soviet army. They were hardy, hardened, well-trained troops. One of these divisions - the 6th Oryol Red Banner - had a long and glorious military history. Another - the 42nd Rifle Division - was created in 1940 during the Finnish campaign and has already shown itself well in the battles on the Mannerheim Line. That is, in the fortress there were still not several dozen infantrymen armed only with rifles, as many Soviet people who looked art films about this defense. On the eve of the war, more than half of the units were withdrawn to the camps for exercises from the Brest Fortress - 10 out of 18 rifle battalions, 3 out of 4 artillery regiments, one of two anti-tank and air defense divisions, reconnaissance battalions and some other units. On the morning of June 22, 1941, there was actually an incomplete division in the fortress - without 1 rifle battalion, 3 sapper companies and a howitzer regiment. Plus the NKVD battalion and border guards. On average, the divisions had about 9,300 personnel, i.e. 63%. It can be assumed that in total there were more than 8 thousand soldiers and commanders in the fortress on the morning of June 22, not counting the staff and patients of the hospital. The German 45th Infantry Division (from the former Austrian army), which had combat experience in the Polish and French campaigns, fought against the garrison. The regular strength of the German division was to be 15-17 thousand. So, the Germans probably still had a numerical superiority in manpower, but not 10-fold, as Smirnov claimed. It is hardly possible to speak of superiority in artillery. Yes, the Germans had two 600-mm self-propelled mortars 040 (the so-called "Karls"). The ammunition load of these guns is 8 rounds. And the two-meter walls of the casemates did not make their way through divisional artillery.

The Germans decided in advance that the fortress would have to be taken only by infantry - without tanks. Their use was hindered by forests, swamps, river channels and canals that surrounded the fortress. On the basis of aerial photographs and data obtained in 1939 after the capture of the fortress from the Poles, a model of the fortress was made. However, the command of the 45th division of the Wehrmacht did not expect to suffer such high losses from the defenders of the fortress. The divisional report dated June 30, 1941 says: "The division took 7,000 prisoners, including 100 officers. Our losses are 482 killed, including 48 officers, and over 1,000 wounded." It should be noted that the number of prisoners undoubtedly includes the medical staff and patients of the district hospital, and these are several hundred, if not more, people who were physically unable to fight. The proportion of commanders (officers) among the prisoners is also indicatively small (military doctors and patients in the hospital are obviously counted among the 100 captured). The only senior commander (senior officer) among the defenders was the commander of the 44th regiment, Major Gavrilov. The fact is that in the first minutes of the war, the houses of the command staff were subjected to shelling - naturally, not as strong as the buildings of the citadel.

For comparison, during the Polish campaign in 13 days, the 45th division, having traveled 400 kilometers, lost 158 ​​killed and 360 wounded. Moreover, the total losses of the German army on the eastern front by June 30, 1941 amounted to 8886 killed. That is, the defenders of the Brest Fortress killed more than 5% of them. And the fact that there were about 8 thousand defenders of the fortress, and not at all a handful, does not detract from their glory, but, on the contrary, shows that there were many heroes. More than for some reason trying to inspire Soviet power. And until now, in books, articles and websites about the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress, the words "small garrison" are constantly found. Another common option is 3,500 defenders. 962 warriors are buried under the slabs of the fortress.

Of the troops of the first echelon of the 4th Army, those stationed in the citadel of the Brest Fortress suffered the most, namely: almost the entire 6th Rifle Division (with the exception of the howitzer regiment) and the main forces of the 42nd Rifle Division, its 44th and 455th rifle regiments.

At 4:00 am on June 22, heavy fire was opened on the barracks and on the exits from the barracks in the central part of the fortress, as well as on the bridges and entrance gates of the fortress and the houses of the command staff. This raid caused confusion among the Red Army staff, while the command staff, which was attacked in their apartments, was partially destroyed. The surviving part of the command staff could not penetrate the barracks due to strong barrage fire. As a result, the Red Army soldiers and junior command personnel, deprived of leadership and control, dressed and undressed, in groups and singly, independently left the fortress, overcoming the bypass canal, the Mukhavets River and the rampart of the fortress under artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. It was impossible to take into account the losses, since the personnel of the 6th division mixed with the personnel of the 42nd division. Many could not get to the conditional gathering place, since the Germans fired concentrated artillery fire at it. Some commanders still managed to get to their units and subunits in the fortress, but they could not withdraw the units and remained in the fortress themselves. As a result, the personnel of the units of the 6th and 42nd divisions, as well as other units, remained in the fortress as its garrison, not because they were given tasks to defend the fortress, but because it was impossible to leave it. Almost simultaneously, fierce battles unfolded throughout the fortress. From the very beginning, they acquired the character of the defense of its individual fortifications without a single headquarters and command, without communication and almost without interaction between the defenders of different fortifications. The defenders were led by commanders and political workers, in some cases by ordinary soldiers who took command. In the shortest possible time, they rallied their forces and organized a rebuff to the Nazi invaders. After a few hours of fighting, the command of the German 12th Army Corps was forced to send all available reserves to the fortress. However, as the commander of the German 45th Infantry Division, General Schlipper, reported, this “also did not change the situation. Where the Russians were driven back or smoked out, after a short period of time, new forces appeared from cellars, drainpipes and other shelters that fired so excellent that our losses increased significantly." The enemy unsuccessfully transmitted calls for surrender through radio installations, sent truce envoys.

The resistance continued. The defenders of the Citadel held an almost 2-kilometer ring of a defensive 2-story barracks belt under conditions of intense bombardment, shelling and attacks by enemy assault groups. During the first day, they repulsed 8 fierce attacks of enemy infantry blocked in the Citadel, as well as attacks from outside, from the bridgeheads captured by the enemy on the Terespol, Volyn, Kobrin fortifications, from where the Nazis rushed to all 4 gates of the Citadel. By the evening of June 22, the enemy entrenched himself in the part of the defensive barracks between the Kholmsky and Terespolsky gates (later used it as a bridgehead in the Citadel), captured several compartments of the barracks at the Brest Gates. However, the enemy's calculation of surprise did not materialize; defensive battles, counterattacks, Soviet soldiers pinned down the enemy forces, inflicted heavy losses on him. Late in the evening, the German command decided to withdraw its infantry from the fortifications, create a blockade line behind the outer ramparts, so that on the morning of June 23, again, with shelling and bombardment, begin the assault on the fortress.

The battles in the fortress took on a fierce, protracted character, which the enemy did not expect at all. The stubborn heroic resistance of the Soviet soldiers was met by the Nazi invaders on the territory of each fortification. On the territory of the Terespol border fortification, the defense was held by the soldiers of the driver courses of the Belarusian border district under the command of the head of the courses, senior lieutenant F.M. Melnikov and course teacher Lieutenant Zhdanov, transport company of the 17th border detachment, led by commander senior lieutenant A.S. Cherny, together with fighters of cavalry courses, a sapper platoon, reinforced outfits of the 9th frontier post, a veterinary hospital, and training camps for athletes. They managed to clear most of the territory of the fortification from the enemy that had broken through, but due to the lack of ammunition and heavy losses in personnel, they could not hold it. On the night of June 25, the remnants of the groups of Melnikov, who died in battle, and Chernoy crossed the Western Bug and joined the defenders of the Citadel and the Kobrin fortification.

By the beginning of hostilities, the Volyn fortification housed the hospitals of the 4th army and the 28th rifle corps, the 95th medical battalion of the 6th rifle division, there was a small part of the regimental school for junior commanders of the 84th rifle regiment, outfits of the 9th and frontier posts. On the earthen ramparts at the South Gate, the duty platoon of the regimental school held the defense. From the first minutes of the enemy invasion, the defense acquired a focal character. The enemy sought to break through to the Kholm Gate and, having broken through, to join the assault group in the Citadel. Warriors of the 84th Infantry Regiment came to the aid from the Citadel. Within the boundaries of the hospital, the defense was organized by the battalion commissar N.S. Bogateev, military doctor of the 2nd rank S.S. Babkin (both died). German submachine gunners who burst into hospital buildings brutally dealt with the sick and wounded. The defense of the Volyn fortification is full of examples of the dedication of soldiers and medical staff who fought to the end in the ruins of buildings. Covering the wounded, nurses V.P. Khoretskaya and E.I. Rovnyagin. Having captured the sick, the wounded, medical staff, children, on June 23 the Nazis used them as a human barrier, driving machine gunners ahead of the attacking Kholmsky Gate. "Shoot, don't pity us!" shouted the Soviet patriots. By the end of the week, the focal defense on the fortification had faded. Some fighters joined the ranks of the Citadel's defenders, few managed to break through from the enemy ring. By decision of the command of the combined group, attempts were made to break through the encirclement. On June 26, a detachment (120 people, mostly sergeants) headed by Lieutenant Vinogradov, went on a breakthrough. 13 soldiers managed to break through the eastern line of the fortress, but they were captured by the enemy. Other attempts to break out of the besieged fortress turned out to be unsuccessful, only separate small groups were able to break through. The remaining small garrison of Soviet troops continued to fight with extraordinary stamina and perseverance. Their inscriptions on the fortress walls speak of the unshakable courage of the fighters: “There were five of us Sedov, Grutov, Bogolyub, Mikhailov, V. Selivanov. There were three of us, it was difficult for us, but we did not lose heart and die like heroes," the remains of 132 soldiers discovered during excavations of the White Palace and the inscription left on the bricks testify to this: "We die without shame."

On the Kobrin fortification, since the moment of hostilities, several areas of fierce defense have developed. On the territory of this largest fortification there were many warehouses, hitching posts, artillery parks, personnel were housed in barracks, as well as in casemates of an earthen rampart (with a perimeter of up to 1.5 km), in a residential town - families of command personnel. Through the Northern and Northwestern, Eastern Gates of the fortification, in the first hours of the war, part of the garrison, the main forces of the 125th Infantry Regiment (commander Major A.E. Dulkeit) and the 98th Separate Anti-tank Artillery Battalion (commander Captain N.I. Nikitin).

The hard cover of the exit from the fortress through the North-Western Gate of the soldiers of the garrison, and then the defense of the barracks of the 125th Infantry Regiment, was headed by the battalion commissar S.V. Derbenev. The enemy managed to transfer from the Terespol fortification to the Kobrin pontoon bridge across the Western Bug (the defenders of the western part of the Citadel fired on it, disrupting the crossing), seize a bridgehead in the western part of the Kobrin fortification and move infantry, artillery, tanks there.

The defense was led by Major P. M. Gavrilov, Captain I. N. Zubachev and Regimental Commissar E. M. Fomin. The heroic defenders of the Brest Fortress successfully repulsed the attacks of the Nazi troops for several days. On June 29-30, the enemy launched a general assault on the Brest Fortress, he managed to capture many fortifications, the defenders suffered heavy losses, but continued to resist in incredibly difficult conditions (lack of water, food, medicine). For almost a month, the heroes of the Brest Fortress fettered an entire German division, most of them fell in battle, some managed to break through to the partisans, some of the exhausted and wounded were captured. As a result of bloody battles and losses incurred, the defense of the fortress broke up into a number of isolated pockets of resistance. Until July 12, a small group of fighters led by Gavrilov continued to fight in the Eastern Fort, later, breaking out of the fort, in a caponier behind the outer rampart of the fortification. The seriously wounded Gavrilov and the secretary of the Komsomol bureau of the 98th separate anti-tank artillery battalion, deputy political instructor G.D. Derevianko was taken prisoner on July 23. But even later on the 20th of July, Soviet soldiers continued to fight in the fortress.

The last days of the struggle are covered with legends. These days include the inscriptions left on the walls of the fortress by its defenders: "We will die, but we will not leave the fortress", "I am dying, but I do not give up. Farewell, Motherland. 11/20/41". None of the banners of the military units that fought in the fortress went to the enemy. The banner of the 393rd separate artillery battalion was buried in the Eastern Fort by Senior Sergeant R.K. Semenyuk, privates I.D. Folvarkov and Tarasov. On September 26, 1956, it was excavated by Semenyuk.

In the cellars of the White Palace, the Engineering Department, the club, the barracks of the 333rd regiment, the last defenders of the Citadel held out. In the building of the Engineering Directorate and the Eastern Fort, the Nazis used gases, against the defenders of the barracks of the 333rd regiment and the 98th division, the caponier in the zone of the 125th regiment - flamethrowers. Explosives were lowered from the roof of the barracks of the 333rd Infantry Regiment to the windows, but Soviet soldiers wounded by explosions continued to fire until the walls of the building were destroyed and razed to the ground. The enemy was forced to note the steadfastness and heroism of the fortress defenders. It was during these black, bitter days of retreat that the legend of the Brest Fortress was born in our troops. It is difficult to say where it first appeared, but, passed from mouth to mouth, it soon passed along the entire thousand-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Black Sea steppes. It was an exciting legend. It was said that hundreds of kilometers from the front, deep behind enemy lines, near the city of Brest, within the walls of an old Russian fortress standing on the very border of the USSR, our troops had been heroically fighting the enemy for many days and weeks. It was said that the enemy, having surrounded the fortress in a dense ring, violently stormed it, but at the same time suffered huge losses, that neither bombs nor shells could break the stubbornness of the fortress garrison, and that the Soviet soldiers defending there swore an oath to die, but not to submit to the enemy and they respond with fire to all the offers of the Nazis for surrender.

It is not known how this legend originated. Either the groups of our fighters and commanders brought it with them, making their way from the Brest region along the rear of the Germans and then making their way through the front. Either one of the captured Nazis told about this.

They say that the pilots of our bomber aviation confirmed that the Brest Fortress was fighting. Going out at night to bomb the rear military targets of the enemy, located on Polish territory, and flying near Brest, they saw below the flashes of shell explosions, the trembling fire of firing machine guns and the flowing streams of tracer bullets.

However, these were all just stories and rumors. Whether our troops were really fighting there and what kind of troops they were, it was impossible to verify: there was no radio communication with the fortress garrison. And the legend of the Brest Fortress at that time remained only a legend. But, full of exciting heroics, this legend was very necessary for people. In those difficult, harsh days of retreat, she deeply penetrated the hearts of the soldiers, inspired them, gave birth to vigor and faith in victory in them. And many who heard this story then, as a reproach to their own conscience, the question arose: "And we? Can't we fight just like they do there, in the fortress? Why are we retreating?"

It happened that in response to such a question, as if guiltily looking for an excuse for himself, one of the old soldiers would say: “After all, a fortress! It is more convenient to defend in a fortress. There are probably a lot of walls, fortifications, cannons. "it was impossible to approach here, having only infantry means, since excellently organized rifle and machine-gun fire from deep trenches and a horseshoe-shaped courtyard mowed down everyone approaching. There was only one solution left - to force the Russians to surrender by hunger and thirst ... ". The Nazis methodically attacked the fortress for a whole week. Soviet soldiers had to repel 6-8 attacks a day. There were women and children next to the soldiers. They helped the wounded, brought cartridges, took part in hostilities. The Nazis used tanks, flamethrowers, gases, set fire to and rolled barrels of combustible mixture from external shafts. Casemates burned and collapsed, there was nothing to breathe, but when enemy infantry attacked, hand-to-hand fights began again. In short intervals of relative calm, calls to surrender were heard in the loudspeakers.

Being completely surrounded, without water and food, with an acute shortage of ammunition and medicines, the garrison bravely fought the enemy. Only in the first 9 days of fighting, the defenders of the fortress put out of action about 1.5 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. By the end of June, the enemy captured most of the fortress, on June 29 and 30 the Nazis launched a continuous two-day assault on the fortress using powerful (500 and 1800-kilogram) bombs. On June 29, he died covering the breakthrough group, Kizhevatov, with several fighters. In the Citadel on June 30, the Nazis seized the seriously wounded and shell-shocked Captain Zubachev and the regimental commissar Fomin, whom the Nazis shot near the Kholmsky Gate. On June 30, after a long shelling and bombing, which ended in a fierce attack, the Nazis captured most of the structures of the Eastern Fort, captured the wounded. In July, the commander of the 45th German Infantry Division, General Schlipper, in his "Report on the occupation of Brest-Litovsk" reported: "The Russians in Brest-Litovsk fought exceptionally stubbornly and persistently. They showed excellent infantry training and proved a remarkable will to resist." Stories like the defense of the Brest Fortress would become widely known in other countries. But the courage and heroism of the defenders of the Brest Fortress remained unsung. Until the death of Stalin in the USSR - as if they did not notice the feat of the garrison of the citadel.

The fortress fell, and many of its defenders surrendered - in the eyes of the Stalinists, this was seen as a shameful phenomenon. That is why there were no heroes of Brest. The fortress was simply deleted from the annals of military history, erasing the names of privates and commanders. In 1956, the world finally learned who led the defense of the citadel. Smirnov writes: "From the found combat order No. 1, we know the names of the commanders of the units that defended the center: Commissar Fomin, Captain Zubachev, Senior Lieutenant Semenenko and Lieutenant Vinogradov." The 44th Infantry Regiment was commanded by Pyotr Mikhailovich Gavrilov. Commissar Fomin, Captain Zubachev and Lieutenant Vinogradov were part of the battle group that escaped from the fortress on June 25, but it was surrounded and destroyed on the Warsaw highway.

Three officers were taken prisoner. Vinogradov survived the war. Smirnov tracked him down in Vologda, where he, unknown to anyone in 1956, worked as a blacksmith. According to Vinogradov: “Before going on a breakthrough, Commissar Fomin put on the uniform of a killed private. In the prisoner of war camp, one soldier betrayed the commissar to the Germans, and Fomin was shot. Zubachev died in captivity. Major Gavrilov survived captivity, despite being seriously wounded. He did not want surrender, threw a grenade and killed a German soldier." A lot of time passed before the names of the heroes of Brest were inscribed in Soviet history. They have earned their place there. The way they fought, their unwavering perseverance, devotion to duty, the courage they showed in spite of everything - all this was quite typical of Soviet soldiers.

The defense of the Brest Fortress was an outstanding example of the exceptional stamina and courage of Soviet soldiers. It was a truly legendary feat of the sons of the people, who infinitely loved their Motherland, who gave their lives for it. The Soviet people honor the memory of the brave defenders of the Brest Fortress: Captain V. V. Shablovsky, senior political officer N. V. Nesterchuk, lieutenants I. F. Akimochkin, A. M. Kizhevatov, A. F. Naganov, junior political officer A. P. Kalandadze , deputy political instructor S. M. Matevosyan, a pupil of the regiment P. S. Klypa, and many others. In memory of the heroic deed of the heroes of the Brest Fortress, on May 8, 1965, she was awarded the honorary title "Fortress-Hero" with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

Conclusion

For a long time, the country did not know anything about the defense of the Brest Fortress, as well as about many other exploits of Soviet soldiers in the early days of the war, although, perhaps, it was precisely such pages of its history that could inspire faith in the people who found themselves on the verge of mortal danger. The troops, of course, talked about the border battles on the Bug, but the very fact of the defense of the fortress was perceived rather as a legend. Surprisingly, the feat of the Brest garrison became known thanks to the very same report from the headquarters of the 45th German division. The entire archive of the division also fell into the hands of Soviet soldiers. For the first time, the defense of the Brest Fortress became known from a German headquarters report captured in the papers of the defeated unit in February 1942 in the Krivtsovo area near Orel when trying to destroy the Bolkhov group of German troops. In the late 1940s the first articles about the defense of the Brest Fortress appeared in the newspapers, based solely on rumors; in 1951 the artist P. Krivonogov draws famous painting"Defenders of the Brest Fortress". The merit of restoring the memory of the heroes of the fortress largely belongs to the writer and historian S. S. Smirnov, as well as to K. M. Simonov, who supported his initiative. The feat of the heroes of the Brest Fortress was popularized by Smirnov in the book The Brest Fortress (1957, expanded edition 1964, Lenin Prize 1965). After that, the theme of the defense of the Brest Fortress became an important symbol of official patriotic propaganda. Sevastopol, Leningrad, Smolensk, Vyazma, Kerch, Stalingrad - milestones in the history of the resistance of the Soviet people to the Nazi invasion. The first in this list is the Brest Fortress. She determined the whole mood of this war - uncompromising, stubborn and, ultimately, victorious. And most importantly, probably not in awards, but orders and medals were awarded to about 200 defenders of the Brest Fortress, two became Heroes of the Soviet Union - Major Gavrilov and Lieutenant Andrei Kizhevatov (posthumously), but that it was then, in the first days of the war, Soviet soldiers proved to the whole world that courage and duty to their country, people, can resist any invasion. In this regard, it sometimes seems that the Brest Fortress is a confirmation of the words of Bismarck and the beginning of the end of Nazi Germany.

On May 8, 1965, the Brest Fortress was awarded the title of Hero Fortress. Since 1971 it has been a memorial complex. On the territory of the fortress, a number of monuments were built in memory of the heroes, and there is a museum of the defense of the Brest Fortress.

"Brest Fortress-Hero", a memorial complex, created in 1969-71. on the territory of the Brest Fortress to perpetuate the feat of the participants in the defense of the Brest Fortress. The master plan was approved by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the BSSR dated 06.11.1969. The memorial was solemnly opened on September 25, 1971. The sculptural and architectural ensemble includes surviving buildings, conserved ruins, ramparts and works of modern monumental art. The complex is located in the eastern part of the Citadel. Each compositional element of the ensemble carries a large semantic load and has a strong emotional impact. The main entrance is designed as an opening in the form of a five-pointed star in a monolithic reinforced concrete mass, based on the shaft and walls of the casemates. The cleavages of the star, intersecting, form a complex dynamic shape. The propylea walls are lined with black labradorite. On the outer side of the foundation, a plaque with the text of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 05/08/1965 on conferring the honorary title "Hero-Fortress" on the Brest Fortress was reinforced. From the main entrance, a solemn alley leads across the bridge to the Ceremonial Square. To the left of the bridge is the sculptural composition "Thirst" - the figure of a Soviet soldier, who, leaning on a machine gun, reaches for the water with a helmet. In the planning and figurative decision of the memorial important role belongs to the Square of Ceremonials, where mass celebrations take place. It is adjoined by the building of the Museum of the Defense of the Brest Fortress and the ruins of the White Palace. compositional center of the ensemble is the main monument "Courage" - a chest sculpture of a warrior (made of concrete, height 33.5 m), on its reverse side - relief compositions telling about individual episodes of the heroic defense of the fortress: "Attack", "Party meeting", "Last grenade", "Feat of gunners", "Machine gunners". A bayonet-obelisk dominates over a vast area (an all-welded metal structure lined with titanium; height 100 m, weight 620 tons). The remains of 850 people are buried in the 3-tiered necropolis, compositionally related to the monument, and the names of 216 people are on the memorial plates installed here.

In front of the ruins of the former engineering department, in a recess lined with black labradorite, the Eternal Flame of Glory burns. In front of him are the words cast in bronze: "We stood to the death, glory to the heroes!" Not far from the Eternal Flame is the Memorial Site of the Hero Cities of the Soviet Union, opened on 05/09/1985. Under the granite slabs with the image of the Gold Star medal, there are capsules with the soil of the hero cities brought here by their delegations. On the walls of the barracks, ruins, bricks and blocks of stone, on special stands, there are memorial plaques in the form of loose sheets of the 1941 calendar, which are a kind of chronicle of heroic events.

The observation deck presents artillery weapons of the mid-19th century and the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. The ruins of the barracks of the 333rd Infantry Regiment (former arsenal), the ruins of the defensive barracks, the destroyed building of the club of the 84th Infantry Regiment have been preserved. Along the main alley there are 2 powder magazines, in the ramparts there are casemates, a field bakery premises. On the way to the Northern Gate, the Eastern Fort, the ruins of the medical unit and residential buildings stand out. Pedestrian paths and the area in front of the main entrance are covered with red plastic concrete. Most of the alleys, the Ceremonial Square and part of the paths are lined with reinforced concrete slabs. Thousands of roses, weeping willows, poplars, spruces, birches, maples, and arborvitae have been planted. In the evening, artistic and decorative lighting is switched on, consisting of a variety of spotlights and lamps in red, white and green colors. At the main entrance, A. Aleksandrov's song "The Holy War" and the governments, a message about the treacherous attack on our Motherland by the troops of Nazi Germany (read by Y. Levitan) are heard, at the Eternal Flame - R. Schumann's melody "Dreams".

Bibliography

• 1. Materials of the site LEGENDS AND MYTHS OF MILITARY HISTORY were used in the preparation
• 2. Anikin V.I. Brest Fortress is a hero-fortress. M., 1985.
• 3. Heroic defense / Sat. memories of the defense of the Brest Fortress in June - July 1941 Mn., 1966.
• 4. Smirnov S. S. Brest Fortress. M., 1970.
• 5. Smirnov S. S. In search of the heroes of the Brest Fortress. M., 1959.
• 6. Smirnov S. S. Stories about unknown heroes. M., 1985.
• 7. Brest. Encyclopedic reference book. Mn., 1987.

Soviet border guards were the first to meet the enemy.

The Nazis took minutes to take the outposts. The border guards held out for hours, days, weeks...

This article is dedicated to the immortal feat of the defenders of the Brest Fortress.

Brest Fortress. On June 22, 1941, at dawn, the first German shells and bombs exploded here. And here, for the first time, the Nazis learned what Soviet fortitude and Soviet courage are.

In August 1915, Russian troops left the Brest Fortress without a fight. The impudent Nazi generals were sure that the very first blow to Brest would force the garrison of the fortress to capitulate. The Nazis were in for a severe disappointment.

June 22, 1941. The enemy is throwing the 12th Army Corps into Brest, consisting of the 31st, 34th and 45th divisions with attached tank, sapper and other special units of the 4th Army. Hundreds of guns from heavy artillery batteries are firing at the city and the fortress.

At about one o'clock in the afternoon, the Nazis on pontoons are trying to cross the Bug. To capture the fortress, they need to take possession of a nameless island between the old and new riverbeds. The island is an outpost of the fortress. A bridge connects it to the western gate of the citadel.

Here is what the defender of the Brest Fortress told about the first minutes of the enemy’s attack - at that time, M. I. Myasnikov, an ordinary course of drivers of the Belarusian border district, who was later awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union:

“From June 21 to 22, I, together with ordinary border guard Shcherbina I.S., were assigned to the squad for guarding the State Border of the USSR ...

Frontier guard on the western island.

I was appointed chief of staff. On duty, observing the border, we noticed from 12.00 on June 21 a lot of noise, the movement of cars, horse traction and the noise of tanks near the border. I reported to the outpost about the observed actions of the Germans. I have received orders to increase vigilance and surveillance.
On June 22, at approximately 3.40, we discovered an armored train advancing to the railway bridge across the Bug River, which, approximately five minutes after it had approached the bridge, opened artillery fire on the fortress and the railway station. At the same time, German artillery fire was opened on the fortress and the railway station and the barracks of the border outpost, moreover, artillery fire on the outpost was carried out by direct fire, as a result of which the roof of the barracks immediately collapsed and the barracks caught fire. German aviation bombarded the city of Brest, the fortress, the island and the station areas simultaneously with artillery preparation. After artillery and aviation preparation, the Germans, after about 15-20 minutes, began to cross the Bug in several directions and use the railway bridge for crossing troops, along which trains and tanks were transported. At the same time, motor boats with landing forces crossed the Bug in several places.

The border guards shielded the fortress with their chests.

Flames and smoke enveloped the island. The roar and howl of aircraft covered everything. Bomb after bomb, shell after shell. But the outpost did not flinch. In the black smoke, the command of the head of the outpost sounded authoritatively, and people in green caps, sitting in blockhouses, met the advancing with machine-gun fire, threw grenades, rushed into counterattacks.

The group of the junior political officer of the Komsomol member Yakovlev threw back the Nazis three times, who were trying to take possession of the island.

Were running out of ammo. The fighters collected combat stock from the dead. We reloaded the machine gun belts, got ready ... Here again the figures of enemy soldiers appeared on the pontoons.

Do not shoot! - commanded by Yakovlev.

Fascists are being let in very close. But as soon as they approached the island, the machine guns and machine guns of the border guards spoke again. Hurricane fire for the fourth time forced the enemy to return to their shore. And the river carried down dozens of corpses in green overcoats.

The island was protected by an outpost. Almost all of its fighters were members of the Komsomol. But not only the "Komsomol outpost" - all the fighters who defended Brest fought with amazing courage.

The documents speak of the machine gunner Sablin: seriously wounded in both legs, clenching his teeth, losing consciousness, he fired a machine gun at the advancing Nazis.

Another fighter, Grigoriev, right hand was shattered by an explosive bullet, but he continued to shoot.

Severely wounded Kuzmin, bleeding, threw grenade after grenade into the thick of the Nazis. His last words were: "You bastards will never take us!"

Among the defenders of the fortress was the wife of one of the border guards, Katya Tarasyuk, a village teacher, a Komsomol member. She came to her husband to spend her holidays. In the first days of the battle, Katya looked after the wounded. She carefully watered them from kettles, trying not to spill a single drop of precious moisture, bandaging their wounds. Her husband, a machine gunner, died during another raid on the fortress by fascist dive bombers. When Katya found out about her husband's death, she said:

Give me his machine gun.

Katya Tarasyuk equipped a machine-gun nest in the branches of an old willow that grew in the fortress yard. I saw this rakita. Black, with withered broken branches, it proudly stands among the stones. The inhabitants of Brest called the rakita the "Tree of War". Katya Tarasyuk and her comrades-in-arms fought here to the last drop of blood...

The second week of defense has come to an end. The red banner still fluttered over the citadel. The German command set one deadline for the capture of the fortress after another.

The defenders of the fortress still had ammunition, but food became scarce and scarce, and water supplies ran out. To quench their thirst, they took raw sand into their mouths. In the cellars, the wounded rushed about on the straw: “Drink!” They searched for wells but did not find them. Some ice was found in one basement, it was divided into small pieces...

Neither the pangs of hunger and thirst, nor the bombing, nor the provocative proposals of the Nazis - nothing could break the spirit of the Soviet soldiers!

The 9th border outpost, headed by its chief, Lieutenant A. M. Kizhevatov, was located directly in the Brest Fortress. Every day the position of its defenders became more and more difficult, there was not enough ammunition, there was no food and water. The Nazis almost continuously shelled the fortress with guns and mortars, one attack followed another. The fortress did not surrender, its garrison fought to the death.

Repeatedly, the border guards made daring sorties, destroyed the enemy. They fought to the last bullet, as long as they could hold a weapon in their hands. The wounded remained in the ranks and continued to beat the enemy, and an example for them was Lieutenant Kizhevatov, who was wounded more than once ...

On the wall of one of the casemates, where the border guards of the 9th outpost were located, an inscription was found: “I am dying, but I do not give up! Farewell, Motherland! And the date is "20.VII.41". For almost a month, the Soviet border guards held back the enemy in the Brest Fortress, fettered his forces, and made it difficult to move forward.

In the combat report of the 45th German infantry division "On the capture of the Brest-Litovsk fortress", captured in the area of ​​​​the village of Vysokoe, it is said:
“In order to destroy the flanking from the house of command staff (as the Germans called this building) of the central island to the northern island, which acted very unpleasantly, the 81st engineer battalion was sent there with the assignment: to clear this house and other parts with a subversive party. Explosives were lowered from the roof of the house to the windows, and the fuses were lit; the groans of the wounded Russians from the explosion were heard, but they continued to shoot ... "

Until the last bullet, until the last drop of blood, the defenders of the fortress, led by senior lieutenant Potapov and lieutenant Kizhevatov, fought. Without breaking the resistance of the Soviet soldiers, the Nazis blew up the building.

The hero of the defense of the fortress A. M. Kizhevatov died.

His family did not have to wait for Victory Day either. Lieutenant Kizhevatov's mother, wife and children - Nyura, Vasya, Galya were brutally shot by the Nazis.

High courage and heroism were shown by the soldiers of the border, who were on the border island, which covered the Brest Fortress. There were about 300 people here: cadets of the school of drivers, cavalry courses, the national team sport Team Brest detachment and border detachments of the outpost of Kizhevatov. For the most part, they were young fighters who had just donned border uniforms.

The wives of border guard commanders turned out to be courageous. Together with their husbands, they were in the line of fire, bandaging the wounded, bringing ammunition, water for machine guns. Some themselves fired at the advancing Nazis.

The ranks of the border guards were melting, their strength was weakening. At the outposts, barracks and residential buildings were burning, set on fire by enemy artillery. But the border guards fought to the death. They knew: behind them, in the predawn fog, troops were hurrying to the border, artillery was being pulled up. And when the first echelons of the divisions of our corps approached, the border guards continued to fight shoulder to shoulder with them.

Another testimony of a participant in the defense of the fortress - the head of the 20th frontier post, now retired colonel Georgy Filippovich Manekin:

“The 20th border outpost guarded a section of the state border at the junction of the Belarusian and Ukrainian border districts. Our site was considered active. We knew that one of the German intelligence centers was located on the adjacent side, not far from the border. On the eve of the war, enemy reconnaissance intensified its activities. Almost daily, she sent her agents to our side in order to establish the location of defensive structures in the border zone and the points of deployment of Soviet troops in the direction of Brest, Kobrin, Minsk. We had a chance to fight with these agents long before the open armed attack of fascist Germany. Only in the sector of our outpost, 16 scouts were detained in a short time.
On the eve of the war, the movement of German troops increased on the other side of the Western Bug. We saw how their units erected engineering structures, day and night they monitored our side. Literally, there were observers on every tree. Cases of threats and even shelling of our border guards have become more frequent. German planes continually invaded our airspace, but we were strictly forbidden to respond to these provocations. Local residents who ran across to us from the other side reported that Nazi Germany was preparing to attack our country. Yes, and we felt: the air smells of war.
Taking into account the current situation ... we managed to strengthen the strongholds and dig about 500 meters of trenches and communications. This helped us later, in the first battles.
At about 3:00 am on June 22, the Germans cut off telephone communications with the headquarters of the border detachment and neighbors, and at 4:00 am at dawn, a flurry of artillery and mortar fire hit the outpost (as well as others on a wide front). Machine guns and machine guns of the enemy with tracer bullets shot through the entire coast, creating a solid wall of fire. Because of the Bug, the fascist "Junkers" flew eastward. Enemy shells scattered the border towers.
The border guards entered into an unequal battle. The outfits that arrived from the flanks reported that large enemy units crossed the Bug and began to advance deep into our territory.
We had nothing to prevent the Germans from crossing. Buildings caught fire in the garrison.
Neighboring outposts suffered heavy losses from enemy fire. Located in open areas, they were destroyed and burned by artillery shells.
At my command, the personnel occupied strongholds. A reinforced enemy battalion, which crossed to the eastern bank of the Bug near the railway bridge, acted against us. Three chains, firing on the move from machine guns, the Nazis rushed to our positions. We let them in at 250-300 meters and met with fire from two heavy and three light machine guns. The Nazis lay down, and then retreated to the coastal thickets. Seeing that the attack had failed, the Nazis resumed shelling from artillery and mortars. The border guards took refuge in the bunkers, leaving the observers at the positions. As soon as the artillery shelling stopped, the fighters again took their places.
The Nazis repeated the attack in the same direction. This time we let them get even closer. From a distance of 100 meters, machine-gun fire was opened on enemy chains. Dozens of corpses were left by the enemy on the outskirts of the outpost. The attack faltered again.
The border guards successfully repulsed the third attack, which the Germans launched after a powerful mortar and artillery shelling. Only after the fifth attack did individual enemy groups manage to crawl close to our trenches. Then the border guards launched grenades. Nevertheless, about a platoon of the Nazis wedged into our defenses. Sergeant Major Zheltukhin and Corporal Sergushev, moving forward, threw grenades at them.
The fierce battle continued. At that moment, I was informed that the head of the 5th reserve outpost, Lieutenant V.V. Kiryukhin, had been killed (this outpost fought next to us). His wife A.T. Maltseva at that time was bandaging the wounded in the trenches, bringing cartridges, picking up a rifle herself and shooting at the attacking Nazis.
During the battle, machine gunners often changed their positions and opened fire on the enemy from short distances. The Germans hunted every machine gunner. One of the enemy groups entered the rear of the machine-gun crew of junior sergeant Alexander Filatov, wanted to throw grenades at him. But at that time, border guards Inozemtsev and Burekhin, who came to the rescue, opened fire on her.
The Nazis again stepped back and began to fire on us with incendiary shells. The forest caught fire in the defense area. Thick smoke enveloped the defenses. It became difficult to observe the actions of the enemy. But the border guards, accustomed to serving in conditions of limited visibility, nevertheless noticed the maneuver of the enemy. We quickly regrouped our forces and prepared to repel new attacks.
The heated battle broke out again. Two companies attacked our positions from the north and northwest, the third attacked from the southeast. Under a hail of bullets, the border guards rose from the trenches and destroyed the Nazis point-blank. Despising the mortal danger, the secretary of the Komsomol organization, junior sergeant Filatov, rolled out an easel machine gun over the parapet of the trench. In long bursts, he shot the attacking German soldiers. When an enemy bullet hit the hero, his place at the machine gun was taken by the border guard Yermakov.
Machine gunners, constantly changing firing positions, brought down fire on the enemy from those directions from which he did not expect. The Germans had the impression that the entire area in front of the defense of the outpost was being shot through with continuous crossfire.
In the art of firing, in tactical skill, the shooters were not inferior to the machine gunners - foreman Zheltukhin, junior sergeant Shangin, private Abdulla Khairutdinov, snipers Vladimir and Ivan Afanasyev.
For eleven hours of continuous fighting, the border guards repulsed seven enemy attacks. The enemy forces were much superior to ours, the encirclement was shrinking more and more. Another terrible enemy also acted against us - a forest fire (our trenches were in a pine forest). Buildings and buildings were on fire. Many border guards received severe burns. People were suffocating from the acrid smoke.
Together with senior political officer Belokopytov and junior political officer Shavarin, they decided to withdraw the personnel from the encirclement.
To cover the retreat, the crews of the heavy machine gun led by Ermakov and the light machine guns of Buryokhin and Inozemtsev were allocated. The machine gunners took up firing positions 50–70 meters from the communication line. While the Germans were preparing for another attack, we withdrew into the forest.
By the way the fire of the defenders weakened, the Nazis guessed that we had begun to withdraw. They decided to catch up with us, but were rebuffed by the machine gunners left in the barrier. The Nazis did not dare to pursue through the burning forest.
On the second day, we went to the city of Lyuboml, where the headquarters of the 98th border detachment was located.
Thus ended the first unequal battle with the enemy. The outpost destroyed over 100 fascists.
Soon we connected with the neighboring outposts of our commandant’s office, then, together with the Red Army units, we fought fierce defensive battles for Lyuboml, Kovel and other strongholds

The German command planned to capture the Brest Fortress in the first hours of the war. By the time of the German attack on the USSR, 7 rifle battalions and 1 reconnaissance, 2 artillery battalions, some special forces of rifle regiments and units of corps units, training camps of the 6th Oryol Red Banner and 42nd rifle divisions of the 28th rifle corps 4- th Army, units of the 17th Red Banner Brest Border Detachment, 33rd Separate Engineer Regiment, part of the 132nd Battalion of the NKVD troops. That is, from 7 to 8 thousand Soviet soldiers and 300 families of military personnel.

From the first minutes of the war, the fortress was subjected to massive bombardment and artillery fire. The German 45th Infantry Division (about 17 thousand soldiers and officers) stormed the Brest Fortress, which delivered frontal and flank attacks in cooperation with part of the forces of the 31st Infantry Division. On the flanks of the main forces, the 34th Infantry and the rest of the 31st Infantry Divisions of the 12th Army Corps of the 4th German Army, as well as 2 tank divisions of Guderian's 2nd Tank Group, operated. For half an hour, the enemy fired at all the entrance gates to the fortress, bridgeheads and bridges, at artillery and a vehicle fleet, at warehouses with ammunition, medicines, food, at the barracks, at the houses of the commanding staff. Next came the enemy assault groups.

German troops attack the Brest Fortress.

As a result of shelling and fires, most of the warehouses and the material part were destroyed or destroyed, the water supply system stopped working, communications were interrupted. A significant part of the fighters and commanders was put out of action at the very beginning of hostilities, the garrison of the fortress was divided into separate groups. In the first minutes of the war, border guards on the Terespol fortification, Red Army soldiers and cadets of regimental schools of the 84th and 125th rifle regiments, located near the border, on the Volyn and Kobrin fortifications, entered into battle with the enemy. Stubborn resistance made it possible on the morning of June 22 to leave the fortress for about half of the personnel, withdraw several guns and light tanks to the areas of concentration of their units, and evacuate the first wounded. 3.5-4 thousand Soviet soldiers remained in the fortress.

The enemy had almost 10-fold superiority in forces. On the first day of fighting, by 9 o'clock in the morning, the fortress was surrounded. The advanced units of the 45th German division tried to capture the fortress on the move (according to the plan of the German command by 12 noon). Through the bridge at the Terespol Gates, enemy assault groups broke into the Citadel, in the center of it they captured the building of the regimental club, which dominated other buildings, where spotters of artillery fire immediately settled. At the same time, the enemy developed an offensive in the direction of the Kholmsky and Brest Gates, hoping to link up there with groups advancing from the direction of the Volyn and Kobrin fortifications. This plan was thwarted.

At the Kholmsky Gate, soldiers of the 3rd battalion and headquarters units of the 84th Infantry Regiment entered into battle with the enemy, at the Brest Gates, soldiers of the 455th Infantry Regiment, the 37th Separate Communications Battalion, and the 33rd Separate Engineer Regiment launched a counterattack. With bayonet attacks, the enemy was crushed and overturned. The retreating Nazis were met with dense fire by Soviet soldiers at the Terespol Gate, which by this time had been recaptured from the enemy. Border guards of the 9th frontier post and staff units of the 3rd border commandant's office - the 132nd NKVD battalion, soldiers of the 333rd and 44th rifle regiments, and the 31st separate autobattalion entrenched here. They held the bridge over the Western Bug under aimed rifle and machine-gun fire, and prevented the enemy from setting up a pontoon crossing.

Only a few of the German submachine gunners who broke through to the Citadel managed to hide in the club building and in the adjacent canteen building. The enemy here was destroyed on the second day. Subsequently, these buildings repeatedly passed from hand to hand. Almost simultaneously, fierce battles unfolded throughout the fortress. From the very beginning, they acquired the character of the defense of its individual fortifications without a single headquarters and command, without communication and almost without interaction between the defenders of different fortifications. The defenders were led by commanders and political workers, in some cases by ordinary soldiers who took command.

After a few hours of fighting, the command of the German 12th Army Corps was forced to send all available reserves to the fortress. However, as the commander of the German 45th Infantry Division, General Schlipper, reported, this “also did not change the situation. Where the Russians were thrown back or smoked out, new forces appeared from cellars, drainpipes and other shelters in a short period of time, which shot so excellently that our losses increased significantly. The enemy unsuccessfully transmitted calls for surrender through radio installations, sent truce envoys. The resistance continued.

The defenders of the Citadel held an almost 2-kilometer ring of a defensive 2-story barracks belt under conditions of intense bombardment, shelling and attacks by enemy assault groups. During the first day, they repulsed 8 fierce attacks of enemy infantry blocked in the Citadel, as well as attacks from outside, from the bridgeheads captured by the enemy on the Terespol, Volyn, Kobrin fortifications, from where the Nazis rushed to all 4 gates of the Citadel. By the evening of June 22, the enemy entrenched himself in the part of the defensive barracks between the Kholmsky and Terespolsky gates (later used it as a bridgehead in the Citadel), captured several compartments of the barracks at the Brest Gates. However, the enemy's calculation of surprise did not materialize; defensive battles, counterattacks, Soviet soldiers pinned down the enemy forces, inflicted heavy losses on him.

The morning of June 23 again began with shelling and bombardment of the fortress. The battles took on a fierce, protracted character, which the enemy did not expect at all. The stubborn heroic resistance of the Soviet soldiers was met by the Nazi invaders on the territory of each fortification.

On the territory of the Terespol border fortification, the defense was held by the soldiers of the driver courses of the Belarusian border district under the command of the head of the courses, senior lieutenant F.M. Melnikov and course teacher Lieutenant Zhdanov, transport company of the 17th border detachment, led by commander senior lieutenant A.S. Cherny, together with fighters of the cavalry courses, a sapper platoon, reinforced outfits of the 9th frontier post. They managed to clear most of the territory of the fortification from the enemy that had broken through, but due to the lack of ammunition and heavy losses in personnel, they could not hold it. On the night of June 25, the remnants of the groups of Melnikov, who died in battle, and Chernoy crossed the Western Bug and joined the defenders of the Citadel and the Kobrin fortification.

By the beginning of hostilities, the Volyn fortification housed the hospitals of the 4th army and the 28th rifle corps, the 95th medical battalion of the 6th rifle division, there was a small part of the regimental school for junior commanders of the 84th rifle regiment, outfits of the 9th and frontier posts. On the earthen ramparts at the South Gate, the duty platoon of the regimental school held the defense. From the first minutes of the enemy invasion, the defense acquired a focal character. The enemy sought to break through to the Kholm Gate and, having broken through, to join the assault group in the Citadel. Warriors of the 84th Infantry Regiment came to the aid from the Citadel. Within the boundaries of the hospital, the defense was organized by the battalion commissar N.S. Bogateev, military doctor of the 2nd rank S.S. Babkin (both died). German submachine gunners who burst into hospital buildings brutally dealt with the sick and wounded.

The defense of the Volyn fortification is full of examples of the dedication of soldiers and medical staff who fought to the end in the ruins of buildings. Covering the wounded, nurses V.P. Khoretskaya and E.I. Rovnyagin. Having captured the sick, the wounded, medical staff, children, on June 23 the Nazis used them as a human barrier, driving machine gunners ahead of the attacking Kholmsky Gate. "Shoot, don't pity us!" the prisoners shouted.

By the end of the week, the focal defense on the fortification had faded. Some fighters joined the ranks of the Citadel's defenders, few managed to break through from the enemy ring.

In the Citadel - the largest defense center - by the end of the day on June 22, the command of individual defense sectors was determined: in the western part, in the area of ​​​​the Terespol Gates, it was headed by the head of the 9th frontier post A.M. Kizhevatov, lieutenants from the 333rd Infantry Regiment A.E. Potapov and A.S. Sanin, Senior Lieutenant N.G. Semenov, commander of the 31st autobattalion Ya.D. Minakov; soldiers of the 132nd battalion - junior sergeant K.A. Novikov. A group of fighters who took up defense in the tower above the Terespol Gates was led by Lieutenant A.F. Naganov. To the north of the 333rd Infantry Regiment, in the casemates of the defensive barracks, soldiers of the 44th Infantry Regiment fought under the command of Captain I.N. Zubachev, senior lieutenants A.I. Semenenko, V.I. Bytko (since June 23). At the junction with them at the Brest Gates, the soldiers of the 455th Infantry Regiment under the command of Lieutenant A.A. fought. Vinogradov and political instructor P.P. Koshkarova. In the barracks of the 33rd separate engineer regiment, the assistant chief of staff of the regiment, senior lieutenant N.F. Shcherbakov, in the area of ​​the White Palace - Lieutenant A.M. Nagai and Private A.K. Shugurov - executive secretary of the Komsomol bureau of the 75th separate reconnaissance battalion. In the area where the 84th Rifle Regiment is located and in the building of the Engineering Directorate, the deputy commander of the 84th Rifle Regiment for political affairs, Regimental Commissar E.M. Fomin. The course of the defense required the unification of all the forces of the defenders of the fortress.

On June 24, a meeting of commanders and political workers was held in the Citadel, where the issue of creating a consolidated battle group, forming units from soldiers of different units, and approving their commanders who emerged during the hostilities was decided. Order No. 1 was issued, according to which the command of the group was assigned to Captain Zubachev, and Regimental Commissar Fomin was appointed his deputy.

In practice, they were able to lead the defense only in the Citadel. And although the command of the consolidated group failed to unify the leadership of the battles throughout the fortress, the headquarters played a big role in intensifying the hostilities. By decision of the command of the combined group, attempts were made to break through the encirclement. On June 26, a detachment (120 people, mostly sergeants) headed by Lieutenant Vinogradov, went on a breakthrough. 13 soldiers managed to break through the eastern line of the fortress, but they were captured by the enemy. Other attempts to break out of the besieged fortress turned out to be unsuccessful, only separate small groups were able to break through.

The remaining small garrison of Soviet troops continued to fight with extraordinary stamina and perseverance.

The inscriptions on the fortress walls speak of the unshakable courage of the fighters:

"There were five of us Sedov, Grutov, Bogolyub, Mikhailov, Selivanov V. We took the first battle on June 22, 1941. We will die, but we will not leave here ...";

This is also evidenced by the remains of 132 soldiers discovered during the excavations of the White Palace and the inscription left on the bricks: "We die without shame."

Since the beginning of hostilities, several areas of fierce defense have developed on the Kobrin fortification. The hard cover of the exit from the fortress through the North-Western Gate of the soldiers of the garrison, and then the defense of the barracks of the 125th Infantry Regiment, was headed by the battalion commissar S.V. Derbenev. In the area of ​​​​the Western Fort and the houses of the command staff, where the enemy penetrated, the defense was led by the commander of the battalion of the 125th Infantry Regiment, Captain V.V. Shablovsky and secretary of the party bureau of the 333rd rifle regiment, senior political instructor I.M. Pochernikov. The defense in this zone faded by the end of the third day.

The battles were tense in the area of ​​the Eastern Gate of the fortification, where the soldiers of the 98th separate anti-tank artillery battalion fought for almost two weeks. The enemy, having crossed Mukhavets, moved tanks and infantry into this part of the fortress. The fighters of the division were faced with the task of detaining the enemy in this zone, preventing him from penetrating the territory of the fortification and disrupting the exit of units from the fortress. The defense was led by the chief of staff of the division, Lieutenant I.F. Akimochkin, in the following days, together with him and the deputy commander of the division for political affairs, senior political instructor N.V. Nesterchuk.

In the northern part of the main shaft in the area of ​​the North Gate, a group of fighters from different units fought for two days (of those who covered the exit and were wounded or did not have time to leave) under the leadership of the commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment, Major P.M. Gavrilov. On the third day, the defenders of the northern part of the main rampart withdrew to the Eastern Fort. Here in the shelter were the families of the commanders. There were about 400 people in total. The defense of the fort was led by Major Gavrilov, Deputy Political Officer S.S. Skripnik from the 333rd Infantry Regiment, Chief of Staff - Commander of the 18th Separate Communications Battalion Captain K.F. Kasatkin.

Trenches were dug in the earthen ramparts surrounding the fort, machine-gun points were installed on the ramparts and in the courtyard. The fort became impregnable for the German infantry. According to the enemy, “it was impossible to approach here, having only infantry means, since the excellently organized rifle and machine-gun fire from deep trenches and a horseshoe-shaped courtyard mowed down everyone approaching. There was only one solution left - to force the Russians to surrender by hunger and thirst ... "

The Nazis systematically attacked the fortress for a whole week. Soviet soldiers had to fight off 6-8 attacks a day. Next to the fighters were women and children. They helped the wounded, brought cartridges, participated in hostilities.

The Nazis set in motion tanks, flamethrowers, gases, set fire to and rolled barrels with a combustible mixture from the outer shafts. The casemates burned and collapsed, there was nothing to breathe, but when the enemy infantry went on the attack, hand-to-hand fights began again. In short intervals of relative calm, calls to surrender were heard in the loudspeakers.

Being completely surrounded, without water and food, with an acute shortage of ammunition and medicines, the garrison bravely fought the enemy. Only in the first 9 days of fighting, the defenders of the fortress put out of action about 1.5 thousand enemy soldiers and officers.

By the end of June, the enemy captured most of the fortress, on June 29 and 30 the Nazis launched a continuous two-day assault on the fortress using powerful (500 and 1800-kilogram) bombs. On June 29, he died covering the breakthrough group, Kizhevatov, with several fighters. In the Citadel on June 30, the Nazis seized the seriously wounded and shell-shocked Captain Zubachev and the regimental commissar Fomin, whom the Nazis shot near the Kholmsky Gate.

On June 30, after a long shelling and bombing, which ended in a fierce attack, the Nazis captured most of the structures of the Eastern Fort, captured the wounded. As a result of bloody battles and losses incurred, the defense of the fortress broke up into a number of isolated pockets of resistance.

Until July 12, a small group of fighters led by Gavrilov continued to fight in the Eastern Fort. Having escaped from the fort, the seriously wounded Gavrilov and the secretary of the Komsomol bureau of the 98th separate anti-tank artillery battalion G.D. Derevyanko, were taken prisoner. But even later on the 20th of July, Soviet soldiers continued to fight in the fortress. The last days of the struggle are covered with legends.

These days include the inscriptions left on the walls of the fortress by its defenders: "We will die, but we will not leave the fortress", "I am dying, but I do not give up. Farewell, Motherland. 11/20/41".

None of the banners of the military units that fought in the fortress went to the enemy. The banner of the 393rd separate artillery battalion was buried in the Eastern Fort by Senior Sergeant R.K. Semenyuk, privates I.D. Folvarkov and Tarasov. On September 26, 1956, it was excavated by Semenyuk. In the cellars of the White Palace, the Engineering Department, the club, the barracks of the 333rd regiment, the last defenders of the Citadel held out. In the building of the Engineering Directorate and the Eastern Fort, the Nazis used gases, against the defenders of the barracks of the 333rd regiment and the 98th division, in the zone of the 125th regiment - flamethrowers ... The enemy was forced to note the steadfastness and heroism of the defenders of the fortress. In July, the commander of the 45th German Infantry Division, General Schlipper, in his “Report on the occupation of Brest-Litovsk” reported: “The Russians in Brest-Litovsk fought exceptionally stubbornly and persistently. They showed excellent infantry training and proved a remarkable will to resist.

The defense of the Brest Fortress is an example of the courage and steadfastness of the Soviet people in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the motherland. The defenders of the fortress - warriors of more than 30 nationalities - fulfilled their duty to the Motherland to the end, accomplished one of the greatest feats in the history of the Great Patriotic War. For exceptional heroism in the defense of the fortress, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to Major Gavrilov and Lieutenant Kizhevatov. About 200 defense participants were awarded orders and medals. On May 8, 1965, the Brest Fortress was awarded the honorary title "Fortress-Hero" with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.
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References:

Kislovsky Yuri Grigorievich From the first day to the last: Behind the line of a combat report and the message of the Soviet Information Bureau
- Samsonov Alexander Mikhailovich The collapse of fascist aggression 1939-1945
- Fedyuninsky Ivan Ivanovich Alerted
- Mikhail Zlatogorov Defenders of the Brest Fortress

Some of the sources claim that the history of the Brest Fortress began a century before its heroic deed in 1941. This is somewhat untrue. The fortress has existed for a long time. The complete reconstruction of the medieval citadel in the town of Berestye (the historical name of Brest) began in 1836 and lasted 6 years.

Immediately after the fire of 1835, the tsarist government decided to modernize the fortress in order to give it the status of a western outpost of national importance in the future.

Medieval Brest

The fortress arose in the 11th century, references to it can be found in the well-known "Tale of Bygone Years", where the chronicle depicted episodes of the struggle for the throne between two great princes - Svyatopolk and Yaroslav.

Having a very favorable location - on a cape between two rivers, and Mukhavets, Berestye soon acquired the status of a major trading center.

In ancient times, rivers were the main routes for merchant movement. And here, as many as two waterways made it possible to move goods from east to west and vice versa. It was possible to travel along the Bug to Poland, Lithuania and Europe, and along the Mukhavets, through the Pripyat and the Dnieper, to the Black Sea steppes and the Middle East.

One can only guess how picturesque the medieval Brest Fortress was. Photos of illustrations and drawings of the fortress of the early period are a rarity, it is possible to meet them only as museum exhibits.

In view of the constant transition of the Brest Fortress under the jurisdiction of one or another state and the arrangement of the town in its own way, the plan of both the outpost and the settlement underwent minor changes. Some of them were inspired by the demands of the time, but for more than half a thousand years the Brest Fortress managed to maintain its original medieval flavor and atmosphere.

1812. French in the citadel

The border geography of Brest has always been the reason for the struggle for the town: for 800 years, the history of the Brest Fortress has captured the dominion of the Turov and Lithuanian principalities, the Commonwealth (Poland), and only in 1795 Brest became an integral part of Russian lands.

But before the invasion of Napoleon Russian government did not attach of great importance ancient fortress. Only during the Russo-French War of 1812, the Brest Fortress confirmed its status as a reliable outpost, which, as the people said, helps its own people and destroys its enemies.

The French also decided to leave Brest behind, but the Russian troops recaptured the fortress, having won an unconditional victory over the French cavalry units.

Historic decision

This victory served as the starting point for the decision of the tsarist government to build a new and powerful fortification on the site of a rather flimsy medieval fortress, corresponding to the spirit of the times in architectural style and military significance.

And what about the heroes of the Brest Fortress of the seasons? After all, any military action involves the appearance of desperate daredevils and patriots. Their names remain unknown wide circles the then public, but it is possible that they received their awards for courage from the hands of Emperor Alexander himself.

Fire in Brest

The fire that engulfed the ancient settlement in 1835 accelerated the process of the general reconstruction of the Brest Fortress. The plans of the then engineers and architects were to destroy the medieval buildings in order to erect in their place completely new structures in terms of architectural character and strategic significance.

The fire destroyed about 300 buildings in the settlement, and this, paradoxically, turned out to be in the hands of the tsarist government, the builders, and the population of the town.

Reconstruction

Having issued compensation to the victims of the fire in the form of cash and building materials, the state convinced them to settle not in the fortress itself, but separately - two kilometers from the outpost, thus providing the fortress with the only function - protective.

The history of the Brest Fortress has not known such a grandiose restructuring before: the medieval settlement was demolished to the ground, and in its place a powerful citadel with thick walls, a whole system of drawbridges connecting three artificially created islands, with bastion forts equipped with ravelins, with impregnable a ten-meter earthen rampart, with narrow embrasures, allowing the defenders to remain as protected as possible during the shelling.

The defensive capabilities of the fortress in the 19th century

In addition to defensive structures, which, of course, play a leading role in repelling enemy attacks, the number and well-trainedness of the soldiers serving in the border fortress are also important.

The defensive strategy of the citadel was thought out by the architects to the subtleties. Otherwise, why attach the importance of the main fortification to an ordinary soldier's barracks? Living in rooms with walls two meters thick, each of the servicemen was subconsciously ready to repel possible enemy attacks, literally jumping out of bed - at any time of the day.

500 casemates of the fortress easily accommodated 12,000 soldiers with a full set of weapons and provisions for several days. The barracks were so successfully disguised from prying eyes that the uninitiated could hardly have guessed their presence - they were located in the thickness of that same ten-meter earthen rampart.

A feature of the architectural design of the fortress was the inextricable connection of its structures: towers protruding forward covered the main citadel from fire, and targeted fire could be fired from the forts located on the islands, protecting the front line.

When the fortress was fortified with a ring of 9 forts, it became practically invulnerable: each of them could accommodate a whole soldier garrison (which is 250 servicemen), plus 20 guns.

Brest Fortress in peacetime

During the period of calm on the state borders, Brest lived a measured, unhurried life. An enviable regularity reigned both in the city and in the fortress, services were performed in churches. There were several churches on the territory of the fortress - nevertheless, one temple could not fit a huge number of military men.

One of the local monasteries was rebuilt into a building for meetings of officer ranks and was named the White Palace.

But even in calm periods, it was not so easy to get into the fortress. The entrance to the "heart" of the citadel consisted of four gates. Three of them, as a symbol of their impregnability, have been preserved by the modern Brest Fortress. The museum begins with the old gates: Kholmsky, Terespolsky, Northern ... Each of them was ordered to become the gate to paradise for many of their defenders in future wars.

Equipping the fortress on the eve of the First World War

During the period of unrest in Europe, the fortress of Brest-Litovsk remained one of the most reliable fortifications on the Russian-Polish border. The main task of the citadel is "to facilitate the freedom of action of the army and navy", which did not have modern weapons and equipment.

Of the 871 weapons, only 34% met the requirements for combat in modern conditions, the rest of the guns were obsolete. Among the cannons, old models prevailed, capable of firing shots at a distance of no more than 3 versts. At this time, the potential enemy had mortars and artillery systems.

In 1910, the aeronautic battalion of the fortress received its first airship, and in 1911 the Brest-Litovsk fortress was equipped with its own radio station by a special royal decree.

First war of the 20th century

I found the Brest Fortress in a rather peaceful occupation - construction. Attracted villagers from nearby and distant villages actively built additional forts.

The fortress would have been perfectly protected if the military reform had not erupted the day before, as a result of which the infantry was disbanded, and the outpost lost its combat-ready garrison. At the beginning of the First World War, only the militia remained in the Brest-Litovsk fortress, who, during the retreat, were forced to burn down the strongest and most modern of the outposts.

But the main event of the first war of the 20th century for the fortress was not connected with military actions - the Brest peace treaty was signed within its walls.

The monuments of the Brest Fortress have a different appearance and character, and this treaty, significant for those times, remains one of them.

How the people learned about the feat of Brest

Most contemporaries know the Brest citadel from the events of the first day of the treacherous attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. Information about this did not appear immediately, it was published by the Germans themselves in a completely unexpected way: showing restrained admiration for the heroism of the defenders of Brest in personal diaries, which were subsequently found and published by military journalists.

This happened in 1943-1944. Until that time about the feat of the citadel wide audience was unknown, and the heroes of the Brest Fortress who survived in the "meat grinder", according to the highest military officials, were considered ordinary prisoners of war who surrendered to the enemy out of cowardice.

The information that local battles took place in the citadel in July, and even in August 1941, also did not immediately become public. But, now historians can say for sure: the Brest Fortress, which the enemy expected to take in 8 hours, held out for a very long time.

Hell start date: June 22, 1941

Before the war, which was not expected, the Brest Fortress looked completely unthreatening: the old earthen rampart sank, overgrown with grass, flowers and sports grounds on the territory. In early June, the main regiments stationed in the fortress left it and went to summer training camps.

The history of the Brest Fortress for all centuries has not yet known such treachery: the predawn hours of a short summer night became for its inhabitants. Suddenly, out of nowhere, artillery fire was opened on the fortress, taking everyone in it by surprise, and 17,000 ruthless "well done" broke into the territory of the outpost. from the Wehrmacht.

But neither blood, nor horror, nor the death of comrades could break and stop the heroic defenders of Brest. They fought for eight days according to official figures. And another two months - according to unofficial.

It was not so easy and not so fast to give up its positions in 1941, which became an omen of the entire further course of the war and showed the enemy the ineffectiveness of his cold calculations and superweapons, which are defeated by the unpredictable heroism of the poorly armed, but passionately loving the fatherland of the Slavs.

"Talking" stones

What is the Brest Fortress silently screaming about now? The museum has preserved numerous exhibits and stones on which you can read the records of its defenders. Short phrases in one or two lines are taken to the quick, touching representatives of all generations to tears, even though they sound sparingly, masculinely dry and businesslike.

Muscovites: Ivanov, Stepanchikov and Zhuntyaev chronicled this terrible period - with a nail on the stone, with tears in the heart. Two of them died, the remaining Ivanov also knew that he did not have much time left, he promised: “The last grenade remained. I won’t surrender alive,” and immediately asked: “Revenge us, comrades.”

Among the evidence that the fortress held out for more than eight days, there are dates on the stone: July 20, 1941 is the most distinct of them.

To comprehend the significance of the heroism and stamina of the fortress defenders for the whole country, you just need to remember the place and date: Brest Fortress, 1941.

Creation of a memorial

For the first time after the occupation, representatives of the Soviet Union (official and from the people) were able to enter the territory of the fortress in 1943. Just at that time, publications of excerpts from the diaries of German soldiers and officers appeared.

Before that, Brest was a legend passed from mouth to mouth on all fronts and in the rear. In order to give the events officiality, to stop all kinds of fiction (even positive) and capture the feat of the Brest Fortress over the centuries, it was decided to reclassify the western outpost as a memorial.

The implementation of the idea took place several decades after the end of the war - in 1971. Ruins, burnt and shelled walls - all this has become an integral part of the exposition. The wounded buildings are unique, and they form the main part of the evidence of the courage of their defenders.

In addition, during the peaceful years, the Brest Fortress memorial acquired several thematic monuments and obelisks of a later origin, which harmoniously fit into the original ensemble of the fortress-museum and, with their rigor and conciseness, emphasized the tragedy that occurred within these walls.

Brest Fortress in Literature

The most famous and even somewhat scandalous work about the Brest Fortress was the book by S. S. Smirnov. Having met with eyewitnesses and surviving participants in the defense of the citadel, the author decided to restore justice and whitewash the names of real heroes, whom the then government blamed for being in German captivity.

And he succeeded, although the times were not the most democratic - the mid-50s of the last century.

The book "Brest Fortress" helped many to return to a normal life, not despised by fellow citizens. Photos of some of these lucky ones were widely published in the press, the names were heard on the radio. Even a cycle of radio broadcasts was established, dedicated to the search for the defenders of the Brest stronghold.

Smirnov's work became the saving thread along which, like a mythological heroine, other heroes emerged from the darkness of oblivion - the defenders of Brest, privates and commanders. Among them: Commissar Fomin, Lieutenant Semenenko, Captain Zubachev.

The Brest Fortress is a monument of valor and glory of the people, quite tangible and material. Many mysterious legends about its fearless defenders still live among the people. We know them in the form of literary and musical works, sometimes we meet them in oral folk art.

And live these legends for centuries, because the feat of the Brest Fortress is worthy of being remembered in the 21st, and in the 22nd, and in subsequent centuries.

Heroes of the Soviet Union - defenders of the Brest Fortress Major Gavrilov Commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment of the 42nd Infantry Division Major GAVRILOV Petr Mikhailovich for 2 days led the defense in the area of ​​the North Gate of the Kobrin fortification, and on the third day of the war he moved to the Eastern Fort, where commanded a consolidated group of fighters from various units in the amount of about 400 people. According to the enemy, “... it was impossible to approach here with infantry means, since excellently organized rifle and machine-gun fire from deep trenches and from a horseshoe-shaped courtyard mowed down everyone approaching. There was only one solution left - to force the Russians to surrender by hunger and thirst ... "On June 30, after a long shelling and bombing, the Nazis captured most of the Eastern Fort, but Major Gavrilov continued to fight there with a small group of fighters until July 12. On the 32nd day of the war, after an unequal battle with a group of German soldiers in the North-Western caponier of the Kobrin fortification, he was taken prisoner in an unconscious state. Released by Soviet troops in May 1945. Until 1946 he served in the Soviet Army. After demobilization he lived in Krasnodar. In 1957, for courage and heroism in the defense of the Brest Fortress, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He was an honorary citizen of the city of Brest. Died in 1979. He was buried in Brest, at the Garrison Cemetery, where a monument was erected to him. Streets in Brest, Minsk, Pestrachi (in Tataria - in the homeland of the hero), a motor ship, a collective farm in the Krasnodar Territory are named after him. Lieutenant KIZHEVATOV The head of the 9th outpost of the 17th Brest Red Banner Border Detachment, Lieutenant Andrey Mitrofanovich KIZHEVATOV was one of the leaders of the defense in the area of ​​the Terespol Gates. On June 22, Lieutenant Kizhevatov and the soldiers of his outpost from the first minutes of the war took the fight against the Nazi invaders. Was wounded several times. On June 29, with a small group of border guards, he remained to cover the breakthrough group and died in battle. The border post was named after him, where a monument was erected to him, streets in Brest, Kamenets, Kobrin, Minsk. In 1943, the family of A.M. was brutally shot by fascist executioners. Kizhevatova - wife Ekaterina Ivanovna, children Vanya, Nyura, Galya and an elderly mother. ORGANIZERS OF THE DEFENSE OF THE CITADEL Captain ZUBACHEV Assistant commander for the economic part of the 44th Infantry Regiment of the 42nd Infantry Division Captain ZUBACHEV Ivan Nikolaevich, a participant in the civil war and battles with the White Finns, from June 24, 1941 became the commander of the consolidated battle group of the defense of the Citadel. On June 30, 1941, seriously wounded and shell-shocked, he was captured. He died in 1944 in the Hammelburg camp. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class. Streets in Brest, Zhabinka, Minsk are named after him. Regimental Commissar FOMIN Deputy Commander for Political Affairs of the 84th Rifle Regiment of the 6th Oryol Rifle Division, Regimental Commissar FOMIN Efim Moiseevich led the defense at first at the location of the 84th Rifle Regiment (near the Kholmsky Gate) and in the building of the Engineering Directorate (now its ruins remain in the area of ​​the Eternal Flame), organized one of the first counterattacks of our soldiers. On June 24, by order N1, the fortress defense headquarters was created. The command was assigned to Captain I.N. Zubacheva, regimental commissar E.M. Fomin was appointed his deputy. Order No. 1 was found in November 1950 during the dismantling of the rubble of the barracks near the Brest Gates among the remains of 34 Soviet soldiers in the tablet of an unidentified commander. The banner of the regiment was also found here. Fomin was shot by the Nazis at the Kholmsky Gate. He was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin. Buried under the slabs of the Memorial. Streets in Minsk, Brest, Liozna, a garment factory in Brest are named after him. THE DEFENDER OF THE TERESPOL GATES LIEUTENANT NAGANOV The platoon commander of the regimental school of the 333rd rifle regiment of the 6th Oryol rifle division, Lieutenant NAGANOV Alexei Fedorovich at dawn on June 22, 1941, with a group of fighters, took up defense in a three-story water tower above the Terespol Gates. Killed in action on the same day. In August 1949, the remains of Naganov and his 14 fighting friends were discovered in ruins. Urn with ashes of A.F. Naganova is buried in the Necropolis of the memorial. Posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War 1st class. Streets in Brest and Zhabinka are named after him. A monument was erected to him in Brest. DEFENDERS OF THE KOBRIN FORTIFICATION CAPTAIN SHABLOVSKY Defender of the Kobrin bridgehead Captain SHABLOVSKY Vladimir Vasilyevich, commander of the battalion of the 125th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Oryol Infantry Division, stationed in the Brest Fortress, at dawn on June 22, 1941, led the defense in the area of ​​the Western Fort and the houses of the command staff on Kobrinsky strengthening. For about 3 days, the Nazis besieged residential buildings. Women and children took part in their defense. The Nazis managed to capture a handful of wounded soldiers. Among them was Captain Shablovsky, along with his wife Galina Korneevna and children. When the prisoners were being led across the bridge over the bypass canal, Shablovsky pushed the guard away with his shoulder and shouted: “Follow me! ', jumped into the water. Automatic burst cut short the life of a patriot. Captain Shablovsky was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class. Streets in Minsk and Brest are named after him. In the winter of 1943/44, the Nazis tortured Galina Korneevna Shablovskaya, the mother of four children. LIEUTENANT AKIMOCHKIN, POLITRUCK NESTERCHUK The chief of staff of the 98th separate anti-tank artillery division, Lieutenant AKIMOCHKIN Ivan Filippovich, together with the deputy commander of the division for political affairs, senior political officer Nikolai Vasilyevich NESTERCHUK, organized defensive positions on the Eastern ramparts of the Kobrin fortification (near the Zvezda). Surviving cannons and machine guns were installed here. For 2 weeks, the heroes held the Eastern Walls, defeated the column of enemy troops moving along the highway. On July 4, 1941, the Nazis seized the seriously wounded Akimochkin and, having found a party card in his tunic, shot him. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class. A street in Brest is named after him. DEFENSE OF THE TERESPOL FORTIFICATION lieutenant MELNIKOV, LIEUTENANT ZHDANOV, Art. Lieutenant CHERNY Under the cover of artillery fire at dawn on June 22, the advance detachment of the 45th Infantry Division of the enemy managed to break through the Terespol Gate into the Citadel. However, the defenders stopped the further advance of the enemy in this area and firmly held their positions for several days. A group of the head of the courses for drivers, Art. Lieutenant MELNIKOV Fedor Mikhailovich, 80 border guards led by Lieutenant Zhdanov and soldiers of the transport company led by Senior Lieutenant Cherny Akim Stepanovich - about 300 people in total. The losses of the Germans here, by their own admission, "especially officers, took on deplorable proportions ... Already on the first day of the war, the headquarters of two German units were surrounded and defeated at the Terespol fortification, and the commanders of the units were killed." On the night of June 24-25, the joint group of Art. Lieutenant Melnikov and Cherny made a breakthrough to the Kobrin fortification. The cadets, led by Lieutenant Zhdanov, continued to fight on the Terespol fortification and on June 30 made their way to the Citadel. On July 5, the soldiers decided to join the Red Army. Only three managed to break out of the besieged fortress - Myasnikov, Sukhorukov and Nikulin. Myasnikov Mikhail Ivanovich, a cadet of the district courses of drivers of the border troops, fought on the Terespol fortification and in the Citadel until July 5, 1941. With a group of border guards, he broke through from the enemy ring and, retreating through the Belarusian forests, joined with units of the Soviet Army in the Mozyr area. For the heroism shown in the battles during the liberation of the city of Sevastopol, Senior Lieutenant Myasnikov M.I. was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Senior Lieutenant Cherny Akim Stepanovich, commander of the transport company of the 17th Red Banner Border Detachment. One of the leaders of the defense at the Terespol fortification. On the night of June 25, together with a group of senior lieutenant Melnikov, he made his way to the Kobrin fortification. June 28 shell-shocked was captured. Passed fascist camps: Biala Podlaska, Hammelburg. He took part in the activities of the underground anti-fascist committee in the Nuremberg camp. Released from captivity in May 1945. DEFENSE OF THE VOLYNIA FORTIFICATION MILITARY DOCTOR 1st rank BABKIN, ST. POLITRUK KISLITSKY, COMMISSIONER BOGATEEV The hospitals of the 4th Army and the 25th Rifle Corps, the 95th Medical Battalion of the 6th Rifle Division and the regimental school of the 84th Rifle Regiment were located on the Volyn fortification. At the South Gate, the fortifications were held back by the cadets of the regimental school of the 84th Infantry Regiment under the leadership of senior political instructor L.E. KISLITSKY. The Germans captured the building of the hospital by noon on June 22, 1941. The head of the hospital, military doctor of the 2nd rank BABKIN Stepan Semenovich and battalion commissar BOGATEEV Nikolai Semenovich, saving the sick and wounded, died heroically, shooting back from the enemy. A group of cadets of the regimental school of junior commanders, with some of the patients from the hospital and fighters who arrived from the Citadel, fought until June 27. STUDENTS OF THE MUSIC PLATONS PETIA VASILYEV From the first minutes of the war, the pupil of the musician platoon Petya VASILEV helped to pull out ammunition from destroyed warehouses, delivered food from a dilapidated store, carried out reconnaissance tasks, and obtained water. Participating in one of the attacks on the liberation of the Red Army club (church), he replaced the deceased machine gunner. Petya's well-aimed fire forced the Nazis to lie down, and then run back. In this battle, the seventeen-year-old hero was mortally wounded. He was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class. Buried in the Memorial Necropolis. PETER KLYPA Pupil of the musician platoon of KLYPA Petr Sergeevich fought at the Terespol Gates of the Citadel until July 1st. He delivered ammunition and food to the fighters, obtained water for children, women, the wounded and the fighting defenders of the fortress. Conducted reconnaissance. For fearlessness and ingenuity, the fighters called Petya "Gavroche of Brest". During a breakout from the fortress, he was taken prisoner. Escaped from prison, but was captured and taken to work in Germany. After his release he served in the Soviet Army. For courage and heroism shown during the days of the defense of the Brest Fortress, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree. WOMEN IN THE DEFENSE OF THE BREST FORTRESS Vera KHORECKAYA "Verochka" - that's what everyone in the hospital called her. On June 22, a girl from the Minsk region, together with the battalion commissar Bogateev, carried the sick out of the burning building. When she found out that there were many wounded in the thick bushes where the border guards were stationed, she rushed there. Dressings: one, two, three - and the soldiers again go to the line of fire. And the Nazis are still squeezing the ring. A fascist emerged from behind a bush with an overweight machine gun, followed by another, Khoretskaya leaned forward, covering the exhausted warrior with herself. The crackle of automatic fire merged with the last words of a nineteen-year-old girl. She died in battle. She was buried in the Memorial Necropolis. Raisa ABAKUMOVA A dressing station was organized in a shelter in the Eastern Fort. It was headed by military assistant Raisa Abakumova. From under enemy fire, she carried seriously wounded soldiers on herself, in shelters she provided them with medical care. PRASKOVIYA TKACHEVA Nurse Praskovya Leontievna TKACHEVA from the first minutes of the war throws herself into the smoke of the hospital on fire. From the second floor, where postoperative patients lay, she managed to save more than twenty people. Then, after being seriously wounded, she was taken prisoner. In the summer of 1942, she became a liaison officer in the Chernak partisan detachment.