Of the three directions under the Barbarossa plan, the most important was the direction Minsk-Smolensk - Moscow. A breakthrough to Moscow and its capture was to be carried out by the Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal von Bock.

G. Blumentritt reports that Army Group Center was the strongest of the three army groups, while noting that "Hitler sought to achieve economic goals: he wanted to capture Ukraine, the Donets Basin and, finally, the Caucasus," and he was least interested in Moscow (15). The question arises why, then, the most powerful of the German groups was the Army Group Center, and not the Army Group South?

As early as September 16, the command of Army Group Center sent directive N1300/41 to the troops on the immediate preparation of the operation to capture Moscow (16). According to the plan, the offensive was to begin no later than the beginning of October and the strike of three armies and three tank groups, with the support of the second air fleet under the command of Field Marshal

A. Kesselring.

During the second half of September, the High Command of the German Ground Forces, or Oberkommando des Heeres) and the High Command of the German Armed Forces, or the OKW (Oberkommando der Wermacht) transmitted to the headquarters of Army Group Center additional instructions for preparing for the offensive, which spoke of ensuring the secrecy of regroupings of the wax, the timing of the arrival of mobile formations and troops of the OKH reserve, the timing of the transition to the offensive and clarifying the tasks of the 2 Army and 2 th tank group (17).

Operation "Typhoon" was supposed to "certainly go successfully, in the shortest possible time, before the start of the autumn thaw and winter, and end in victory" (18). For this, armies and divisions were transferred from Army Groups "North" and "South" to the Moscow direction, and the troops were understaffed.

Thus, by the end of September - the beginning of October, there were 74.5 divisions in Army Group Center, including 14 tank, 8 motorized and 1 cavalry, or 64% of all German formations operating on the Soviet-German front (19). By October 1, Army Group Center had 1,800 thousand people (20), more than 14 thousand.

guns and mortars, 75% of the tanks of their total number located on the Soviet-German front. About 1,390 aircraft (21) were allocated to support the attack on Moscow.

On September 26, the command of Army Group Center issued order N1620/41 to advance. The action plan of the armies on it was as follows: the 4th Army (commander - G. von Kluge) and the 4th Panzer Group (commander E. Gepner) are advancing from the direction of Roslavl to Vyazma; 9th aria (commander A. Strauss) and 3rd tank group (commander G. Got) - from the Dukhovshchina region towards the Vyazma - Rzhev railway; The 2nd Army (commander M. von Weichs) is to cover the 4th from the south and is sent to the Sukhinichi area; The 2nd tank group (commander G. Guderian) should launch an offensive two days earlier before the armies go on the offensive and strike in the direction of Orel and Bryansk (22). In addition to the main advancing three armies and three tank groups, the reserve of Army Group Center included

one tank division, one infantry regiment and one motorized brigade (23) were allocated.

Assuming options for possible enemy actions, the Soviet command was not inactive. On September 10, the Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov, on behalf of the SVGK, ordered the transition of the troops of the Western Front to the defense. On September 20, the headquarters of the Western Front presented a plan for the defensive operation of the troops, which determined the tasks of the front and armies, as well as the probable directions of the enemy’s actions, and in connection with this

various options for the actions of the armies of the front (24). On September 27, by order of B.M. Shaposhnikov, reconnaissance of all types was organized in the troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts (25).

On September 30, 1941, 15 divisions of the 2nd Panzer Group under the command of G. Guderian went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. The defensive stage of the battle for Moscow began.

What could the Soviet command oppose to the attackers at that time? The Western Front, commanded by Colonel General I.S. Konev since September 12, with the forces of six armies (16th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 29th and 30th) defended a strip of 340 kilometers from Ostashkov to Yelnya. The reserve front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny, his main forces, consisting of four armies (31st, 32nd,

49th) took up defense in the rear of the Western Front west of Rzhev, Vyazma and Spas-Demensk. The rest of his armies, the 24th and 43rd, continuing the southern wing of the Western Front, covered the junction of the Bryansk and Western Fronts. The Bryansk Front under the command of Colonel General A.I. Eremenko, consisting of three armies (3rd, 13th and 50th) and the operational group of Major General A.I.

Glukhov, i.e. defended the eastern bank of the Desna from Frolovka to Putivl. All three fronts had about 1250 thousand people (i.e. about 30% of the active army), 7600 guns and mortars, 990 tanks (of which only 140 are medium and heavy), 677 aircraft (about 80% of them are obsolete types). Thus, the German troops outnumbered them 1.4 times in manpower, 1.8 times in artillery, 1.7 times in tanks, and 2 times in aircraft (26).

The measures taken by the Soviet command to strengthen the defense and organize intelligence were belated and by the beginning of the German offensive, the construction of defensive lines and the regrouping of troops had not been completed and, therefore, the Soviet army was not ready to meet the enemy attack.

So, on September 30, simultaneously with the 2nd Panzer Group in the Bryansk Front, the 2nd Field Army also went on the offensive. In the evening, the commander of the Bryansk Front, A.I. Eremenko, reported to the Chief of the General Staff about the enemy going on the offensive and using about 250 tanks (27) in battle.

On October 2, the remaining troops of Army Group Center went on the offensive against the Reserve and Western Fronts. By the directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of October 1 and 2, additional units of aviation and rifle corps were sent to the Glukhov and Sevsk region to help the Bryansk Front in order to defeat the enemy (28). Thus, the Soviet High Command considered it more correct to strengthen the defense of the Oryol-Bryansk direction, while only a distracting blow was inflicted there, the main German offensive was unfolding in the Vyazma region. It was in this direction that the main events of the battle for Moscow unfolded.

Already in the first days of the offensive, the German troops managed to achieve significant results. On October 2, enemy troops struck in the Dukhovshchina region against units of the 19th and 30th armies and wedged into the defenses of the Soviet troops for 15-30 km. Despite the counterattacks undertaken by the Soviet command, by October 7, units of the 19th and 20th armies of the Western Front were surrounded west of Vyazma. At a rapid pace, the enemy continued to break through to Moscow and in other directions: by October 5, the areas of Spas-Demensk, Yukhnov, Yelnya, Zhizdra, Orel, Karachev, and Bryansk were captured.

During the first days of October, a difficult situation developed in the western direction, which created the danger of a breakthrough by the Wehrmacht troops to Moscow. Parts of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts were surrounded, as there was no continuous line of defense, as well as reserves capable of assisting them. The main task was to create a new line of defense in order to stop the enemy on the outskirts of the capital. The Mozhaisk line, which ran from north to south from Volokolamsk to Kaluga, became such a line of defense.

Having lost confidence in the abilities of the commanders of the Western and Reserve fronts, I.S. Konev and S.M. Budyonny, to save the situation in the western direction, I.V. Stalin urgently calls G.K. Zhukov from Leningrad.

Operation Typhoon

At the end of September 1941, a tense situation continued on the Soviet-German front. Soviet troops retreated to Leningrad, left Smolensk and Kyiv. The initiative of action continued to remain in the hands of the German troops, but they met with unexpectedly stubborn and selfless resistance from the Red Army and suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment. The pace of advance turned out to be significantly lower than planned, and the attempt to break through to Moscow on the move failed.

Already in early September, the German command ordered the transition of troops in the Moscow direction to temporary defense and began preparing an operation to capture Moscow, code-named "Typhoon". Large groups were concentrated in the areas of Dukhovshchina, Roslavl and Shostka. With powerful blows, they were supposed to surround the main forces of the Red Army, covering the capital; destroy them in the areas of Bryansk and Vyazma, and then rapidly bypass Moscow from the north and south in order to capture it.

To fulfill this plan, in the Army Group Center (commander - Field Marshal F. Bock), 77 divisions were assembled, including 14 tank and 8 motorized divisions, in which there were over 1 million people, over 14,000 guns and mortars, 1,700 tanks, 950 aircraft. The defense against the troops of the Army Group "Center" was held by the troops of the Western (commander - Colonel General I.S. Konev), Bryansk (commander - Colonel General A.I. Eremenko) and the Reserve (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union SM Budyonny) fronts.

The Soviet troops numbered about 800 thousand people, 6800 guns and mortars, 780 tanks (of which 140 were heavy and medium) and 545 aircraft. Thus, the superiority of the German troops was: in terms of the number of people - 1.2, artillery and mortars - 2.1 times, tanks - 2.2 times, combat aircraft - 1.7 times. Possessing a significant fleet of vehicles and tractors, the German troops had a significant advantage in mobility.

Despite the fact that many Soviet divisions, especially the newly formed ones, as well as the 12 rifle divisions of the people's militia of the Reserve Front, did not have combat experience and proper weapons, the Soviet Supreme High Command hoped to gain time by stubborn defense to form and concentrate new reserves. To do this, it was necessary to quickly create defensive lines on the far and near approaches to Moscow, consisting of 8-9 defensive lines and occupying over 300 km along the front and 200-250 km in depth.

In the preparation of these lines, troops of reserve formations, divisions of the Moscow People's Militia, as well as the population of Smolensk, Bryansk, Tula, Kalinin, Moscow regions and Moscow took part. In the rear of the country, reserves were formed at an accelerated pace.

Due to the high pace of the German offensive and the lack of time and forces, a significant part of the measures to strengthen the defense was not completed. The construction of engineering barriers was not completed everywhere, the fronts needed to be replenished, there was a shortage of ammunition.

On September 24, Hitler and Brauchitsch held the last meeting of all the commanders of the tank and field armies. Two days later, the Fuehrer issued an offensive order. The German command believed that Operation Typhoon would end no later than mid-November.

On September 30, von Bock's army group went on the offensive in two directions - on Vyazma and Bryansk. At his disposal were the 2nd, 4th and 9th armies and the 2nd, 3rd and 4th tank armies. Tank units passed through the positions of the 13th Soviet Army. On October 2, the main forces of Army Group Center went on the offensive from the Yartsevo and Roslavl regions against the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts. The Soviet troops stubbornly resisted, but the enemy broke through the defenses on the very first day and advanced 40-50 km with mobile formations in the directions of Orel, Yukhnov and Vyazma. Attempts by the fronts to launch counterattacks with weak reserves did not produce results.

On October 3, the advanced units of the 2nd Panzer Group cut off the escape routes of the 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front and broke into Orel at the end of the day. The breakthrough of the defense of the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts in the Yartsevo and Roslavl directions and the withdrawal of part of the forces of the fronts created a dangerous situation in the Vyazemsky direction. On October 4, the enemy captured Spas-Demensk and Kirov, on October 5 - Yukhnov and went to the Vyazma region.

On October 6, Bryansk was in the hands of the enemy. In the Vyazma region, formations of the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies were surrounded. With stubborn resistance, the encircled troops pinned down significant enemy forces. Part of the forces managed to break out of the encirclement by mid-October. The unfavorable development of events in the region of Vyazma and Bryansk posed a significant threat to Moscow. Under these conditions, the Soviet command took measures to strengthen the Mozhaisk line of defense, where troops were urgently transferred from the reserve and from other fronts. To unite the troops of the western direction and organize a more precise control of them, the remaining troops of the Reserve Front were transferred on October 10 to the Western Front. On the same day, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov was appointed commander of the front. Two days later, the troops of the Mozhaisk line of defense were also subordinated to the Western Front.

On October 12, the State Defense Committee (GKO) decided to build defensive lines directly in the area of ​​​​the capital. At 15-20 km from Moscow, it was planned to build the main line, and the city line was to pass along the district railway. 450 thousand residents of the capital were mobilized for the construction of defensive structures, 75% of them were women.

It was decided to evacuate from Moscow part of the party and government institutions, large defense plants, scientific and cultural institutions. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, part of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SVG) remained in Moscow. In a short time, an external defensive belt was built and fortifications were erected inside the city. Of the volunteers in Moscow, 3 divisions of the people's militia were formed.

The energetic measures taken by the command made it possible to create a new front of defense in the Moscow direction. However, the position of the troops of the Western Front, who took up defensive positions on the Mozhaisk line, remained extremely difficult. The number of troops of the Western Front, which defended the front from the Moscow Sea to Kaluga, was only about 90 thousand people.

Only the most important directions leading to Moscow were sufficiently firmly covered: Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga, on which, respectively, the 16th Army of Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, the 5th Army of Major General of Artillery L.A. Govorov, the 43rd Army of Major General K.D. Zakharkin. German aviation had complete air supremacy. The work of the front-line rear and command and control of the troops were complicated, because. the roads were filled with motor vehicles, streams of refugees, horse-drawn carts, herds of cattle.

In mid-October, fierce battles unfolded on the Mozhaisk line of defense. Soviet troops offered fierce resistance to superior enemy forces, but Kaluga fell on October 13, Borovsk on October 16, and Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets fell on October 18. Only by the greatest exertion of forces was it possible to stop the German offensive at the turn of the Protva and Nara rivers. No less fierce fighting took place in other sectors of the front. On October 17, Kalinin was abandoned. To cover the capital from the north-west, on October 17, the Kalinin Front was created on the basis of the troops of the right wing of the Western Front (commander - Colonel General I.S. Konev).

The enemy's attempt to strike from the Kalinin area to the rear of the front was thwarted, and his offensive in the Tula direction was stopped by the actions of the troops of the 50th Army and the Tula militia, supported by the Stavka reserves. On October 19, by order of the State Defense Committee, a state of siege was introduced in Moscow and adjacent areas. German aviation made 31 raids on Moscow, during which 273 aircraft were shot down. Thanks to the successful actions of the Moscow Air Defense Forces, major destruction in the city was avoided.

The opposition of the Soviet troops gradually intensified, but the enemy introduced new formations into the battle and retained numerical superiority in the directions of the main attacks. It was not possible to stabilize the defense on the distant approaches to Moscow, and at the end of October the fighting was already going on 80-100 km from Moscow. An immediate threat loomed over the capital.

At the beginning of November, the German offensive stopped. The stubborn defense of the Soviet troops, of course, was a decisive factor, but the influence of the autumn thaw cannot be denied, because. because of it, the German troops lost their maneuverability, and their supply deteriorated significantly. In addition, aviation lost the ability to operate from unpaved airfields, and by order of Hitler, the 2nd Air Corps and the 2nd Air Fleet were sent to Sicily.

Be that as it may, the German command decided to resume the offensive after the onset of frost, and until that time they had pulled up reserves and regrouped. To resume the attack on Moscow, it deployed 51 divisions, including 13 armored and 7 motorized. The superiority in forces remained on the side of the enemy: in people - 2 times, in artillery - 2.5 times, in tanks - 1.5 times. On the Volokolamsk and Tula directions, the superiority of the enemy was even more significant. According to the plan of the Nazi command, Army Group Center was to break the flank units of the defense of the Soviet troops and surround Moscow,

The Soviet command tried to make full use of the few weeks of respite. During this time, Zhukov created a defense in depth, which passed through the forests adjacent to the Nara River, from Serpukhov in the south to Naro-Fominskaya and further north. The command was able to transfer fresh army corps from Siberia and mobilize the Moscow militias. Now the troops of von Bock, exhausted in previous battles and completely unprepared for the frosts that soon struck, had to advance on new enemy armies that had come from nowhere, which was already considered completely defeated. On November 13, a meeting of the chiefs of staff of the army groups was held in Orsha with the participation of Brauchitsch, Halder and von Bock. The changed situation called into question the advisability of continuing the offensive. Leeb and Rundstedt insisted on calling off the offensive, and Hitler seems to have been inclined to the same opinion. But Brauchitsch, Halder and von Bock managed to insist on a renewal. Under their pressure, Hitler gave the order to launch the offensive on 15 November.

The attack on Moscow was planned to be carried out by the forces of the 4th Army of von Kluge. The right flank of von Bock from the Oka to the Nara was significantly weakened and constantly attacked by the Red Army. South of Nara, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army and Weichs' 2nd Field Army were to advance towards Tula, capture it, and outflank Moscow. The main blow of the 4th Army was directed to the Moscow-Smolensk highway. To the north of this road, the 4th Panzer Army was advancing, concentrated between Ruza and Volokolamsk. She was supposed to strike to the left of the Moscow-Smolensk highway, then turn and attack the capital of the USSR from the west and northwest.

Snow fell on November 15 and frost hit almost immediately. The German artillery proved to be completely useless, since it did not have the necessary lubricants to protect the moving parts of the guns. Only 30% of mobile equipment was in working order. Most of the tanks were also idle, as their optical sights were unsuitable for such low temperatures. The infantry, which did not have appropriate winter uniforms, moved forward with difficulty.

The German troops delivered the main blows in the directions of Klin - Rogachevo, trying to bypass Moscow from the north, and to Tula - Kashira, bypassing the capital from the south. At the cost of heavy losses at the end of November, the Germans managed to capture the Klin-Solnechnogorsk-Istra region, reach the Moscow-Volga canal in the Yakhroma region and occupy Krasnaya Polyana (27 km from Moscow). Here the enemy was stopped and forced to go on the defensive.

On November 24, Guderian arrived at von Bock's headquarters in Smolensk and demanded that the field marshal immediately stop the offensive. The field marshal urgently contacted Brauchitsch, who agreed to temporarily postpone the capture of Moscow from the east. But Hitler ordered the offensive to continue.

The Soviet command pulled up additional forces to the most threatened areas. On November 27, Soviet troops launched a counterattack on General Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army and drove it back from Kashira. Having suffered a defeat near Kashira, the 2nd German Panzer Army tried to bypass Tula from the northeast and cut the Serpukhov-Tula railways and highways. With a counterattack, the Soviet troops pushed the enemy back to their original positions.

On December 1, the command of Army Group Center made a new attempt to break through to Moscow in the Aprelevka area, but it also ended in failure. On December 2, the advanced units of the 1st shock and 20th armies repelled all enemy attacks north of Moscow in the Dmitrov region and to the south and forced him to stop the offensive. On December 3-5, the 1st shock and 20th armies launched several strong counterattacks in the area of ​​Yakhroma and Krasnaya Polyana.

The left-flank divisions of the 16th Army, in cooperation with the 5th Army, pushed the enemy back from the large bend of the Moskva River northeast of Zvenigorod. The shock group of the 33rd Army, having defeated the German units on December 4-5, restored the situation on Nara. The 50th and 49th armies repelled all attacks north of Tula. Thus, as a result of the counterattacks of the Soviet troops in early December, the last attempts of the German troops to break through to Moscow were thwarted. German losses near Moscow for the period from November 16 to December 5 are estimated at 155 thousand people killed and wounded, about 800 tanks, 300 guns and about 1500 aircraft. During the defense of the capital, prerequisites were created for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive.

Even during the battle near Kyiv, when the success of the Nazi troops was indicated, The German General Staff developed a plan for an attack on Moscow. This plan approved by Hitler caused the full approval of the generals and field marshals at a meeting held in September 1941 near Smolensk. Fascist command, who believed that with the victory, Kyiv opened up new opportunities for deep rapid operations on the entire Soviet-German front, no doubt in the rapid capture of Moscow and complete victory. By the end of September, the strategic situation changed dramatically in favor of the Nazi army. Hitler's General Staff gave operations Name "Typhoon", believing that Army Group Center, like a typhoon, would sweep away the Soviet defenses with a swift offensive and capture Moscow. According to the plans of the enemy, the war was to end with his victory before the onset of winter.

Operation Typhoon plan

Army Group Center now included 2nd, 4th, 9th field armies, 2nd, 4th and 3rd tank groups. This group included 77 divisions, including 14 armored and 8 motorized. This amounted to 38% of the infantry and 64% of the enemy tank and motorized divisions operating on the Soviet-German front.
The entire mass of the troops of the "Center" group deployed for an offensive on the front from Andreapol to Glukhov in a zone bounded by the Kursk direction from the south, and Kalinin from the north. In the area of ​​Dukhovshchina, Roslavl and Shostka three strike groups concentrated, which were based on tank groups. One of these groups after breaking through the enemy defenses near Roslavl it was necessary to advance in a northeasterly direction towards Vyazma and there connect with another strike group advancing on Vyazma from the northwest. Thus, it was planned to encircle and destroy the enemy east of Smolensk. The 2nd Panzer Group was tasked with advancing from the Glukhov area to Orel and between Novgorod-Seversky and Bryansk go to the rear of the enemy, whose actions were constrained by the frontal offensive of the 2nd Army. Thus, to strike at Moscow, Army Group Center had significant forces at its disposal: three field armies and three tank groups.

On the way to our capital, they were opposed by the Western(commander - I.S. Konev), Spare(commander - S.M. Budyonny) and Bryansk(commander - A.I. Eremenko) fronts, which numbered about 1,250,000 people, more than 10.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1044 tanks. The reserve front was located mostly in the second echelon, only its left wing occupied positions on the front line.

The Battle of Moscow is one of the most significant battles in World War II. For the first time, Soviet troops managed to stop the massive offensive of the German troops and create the prerequisites for a further counteroffensive. In today's article, the battle for Moscow will be briefly reviewed, with all its features, subtleties and contradictions.

The battle for Moscow began on September 30, 1941. It was on this day that the German command began the implementation of the Typhoon plan. In the direction of the main attack, the German command created a powerful fist, which, in terms of the number of people, equipment and guns, several times exceeded the resources of the Soviet command. Thanks to this, at the initial stage of the offensive, Germany managed to encircle 5 Soviet armies. More than 600 thousand people were surrounded. It happened on October 5 and 6, 1941 in the Vyazma region. The encircled troops continued their resistance, pinning down up to 20 German divisions.

Vyazemsky boiler - events of October 1941

Vyazma, a provincial and small town, became one of the symbols of the greatest tragedy not only of 1941, but of the entire Great Patriotic War. 5 Soviet armies (16, 19, 20, 24, 32) fell into the German encirclement. A huge number of people were taken prisoner. Different sources give different data, but there are two generally accepted versions:

• 663,000 soldiers and officers of the Soviet army were surrounded.
• 883,000 soldiers and officers were surrounded.

Which figure of these not to take, it is amazing. As for those who managed to escape from the encirclement, this is only 85,000 people. This, of course, is also a lot, but it is incomparable with the number of people who were eventually captured.

Surprisingly, very few domestic historians focus their attention on these events of 1941. Although, in terms of its scale, in terms of the number of victims, in terms of the number of people who were captured, the Vyazemsky cauldron is second only to the Kyiv cauldron.

Operation Typhoon is developing in a classic way. Guderian's Panzer Group advances through the Orel and encounters no resistance along the way. Getner's army went to Mozhaisk. The Soviet troops still continue to hold their positions, as a result of which it becomes possible to create an encirclement.

Later, in his autobiography, Marshal Zhukov wrote that after the Vyazemsky cauldron, by the end of October 7, 1941, all roads to Moscow were open.

Just think about it, the battle for Moscow was still only in the plans, the Typhoon operation had just begun, and against this background, the Soviet command, due to its slowness, is losing 5 full-fledged armies. These are armies that could be used to solve various problems, including the defense of Moscow. But they just got caught. This is the great tragedy of the Vyazemsky cauldron.

Zhukov's appointment as commander of the Western Front

On October 5, Stalin urgently calls Zhukov to Moscow. Zhukov's arrival in the capital took place on October 7 (the general arrived from Leningrad). Stalin informed him about the very difficult situation that had developed at the front, and which threatened the city. The problem was that the Headquarters did not have information about the true state of affairs at the front. Therefore, Zhukov was forced to personally go to the front in order to assess the overall picture and see the mood of the army. After this trip, on October 10, 1941, General Zhukov was appointed commander of the Western Front and assumed responsibility for the defense of Moscow.

The main task at this stage was simply gaining time. Time was necessary for Zhukov in order to receive reinforcements. The reserves were promised to General Stalin, and these reserves were to be delivered from the eastern regions of the country. The reserves were eventually delivered, but the main blow still fell on the people's militia. It is important to note that Zhukov, thanks to his natural talents, managed to organize a really strong defense and instill confidence in people. As for the reserves, they were delivered on 19 October. These were mainly troops from Siberia and the Far East. They made it in time, when the battle for Moscow was just entering its decisive stage.

One of the first decisions to strengthen the defense in preparation for the possible entry of German troops into the city was the mining of Moscow. Almost the entire city was mined, including the Kremlin. Today, many historians see these events as panic and betrayal. But here we can recall, for example, 1812, when Moscow almost completely burned down. The fact is that sometimes historical events are so irrational that they do not require a school assessment of “good” or “bad”.

First attacks on Moscow

The main events of the battle for Moscow, if we consider them briefly, refer to the end of October 1941. At this time, the Germans managed to make significant progress:

• On October 18, Mozhaisk was taken.
• Volokolamsk was taken on October 27.

After that, the road to Moscow was opened and fighting began directly within the city. Moreover, the state of siege of Moscow was announced on October 20, 1941. Before and after the state of siege was declared, hundreds of thousands of Muscovites dug trenches around the city. The situation was such that the German troops could launch their attack on the capital from any area. And here even the weather came to the aid of the Soviet army ...

It is little customary to talk about this, but in the second half of October the weather deteriorated badly. Almost all roads were rendered unusable. The German units advanced along one road, in line. Tank units of Guderian began to get bogged down in the mud, and the German general himself regularly sent a message to the rear that the advance of troops was extremely difficult. This was difficult, both due to bad roads and the losses that were hung on the screen. After that, literally a few days later, severe frosts hit, and it began to snow. I am not saying this to belittle the importance of the defense of Moscow, or to justify the failure of the German army. In the end, the conditions were the same for everyone, but you just need to understand the realities that were characteristic of that time. Although, if you study only German historical documents, then literally everyone there says that only mud and early winter did not allow Germany to capture Moscow. Naturally, this is a lie.

The first attempts to capture Moscow were made at the end of October 1941, but they were unsuccessful. Guderian, for example, subsequently wrote that on October 29 his tank units reached the city of Tula, but were stopped by strong anti-tank defenses, having suffered heavy losses.

Events of November 1941

The 50th Army stopped Guderian in the Tula region. Thus, it was possible to slightly stop the German offensive on the southern front. The impossibility of capturing Tula forced Guderian's army to bypass the city and continue its attack on Moscow. However, there were no significant events in the first days of November at the front. As for the Soviet command, Stalin decided that the traditional November 7 parade would take place. In his speech at the parade, Stalin turned to the Russian people, who were supposed to become a liberator for other Slavic peoples. The Soviet leader recalled the events of 1918, focusing his attention on the intervention. Meanwhile, the battle for Moscow was in full swing. Troops went directly from the parade to the front line. It was the so-called "parade of troops leaving for the front."

The new attack on Moscow was undertaken mainly from two directions:

• Through the northern direction (city of Klin)
• Through the southern direction (Tver city)

We have already partially spoken about the events on the southern front, it should only be noted once again that the advance along the southern front was stopped, thereby stopping the advance on Moscow. General Guderian noted in his letters that the army was in distress as the Russians were gaining time and the Germans faced the inevitability of waging a winter war.

It is noteworthy that on November 29, German Armaments Minister Fritz Todt, in a conversation with Hitler, recommended that the Fuhrer stop the war with the Soviet Union, since, in his opinion, the war had already been lost in the military and economic sense. Hitler did not reply to this. He understood that the battle for Moscow would decide everything, and it was too early to draw any brief conclusions.

Despite the significant problems that Germany faced at this stage of the war, its advance continued. General von Bock skillfully managed the troops, which, however, were already fighting to the limit. Guderian, in particular, spoke about this, in whose army a real panic began on November 17, which they managed to contain with difficulty.

December 41 events

In early December 1941, the German command already clearly understood that the blitzkrieg in Russia had failed. The German Army Group Center went on the offensive on December 1 and 2. It is important to note that this was the last global offensive of the army group center. At that time, according to German sources, the air temperature dropped to minus 40 degrees, which stopped the equipment and prevented the advance of troops. This is not even important, but the fact that the German command has lost touch with reality. On December 2, the Chief of the General Staff of Germany wrote that the Soviet side no longer had reserves, it had lost the ability to effectively defend itself, the peak of its defensive capabilities had been overcome, and the question of taking Moscow was only a matter of time. This once again emphasizes that the battle near Moscow, even with a brief summary, emphasizes that the German command has ceased to adequately perceive what is happening. But we are talking about Halder, one of the best German officers.

On December 5, the counteroffensive of the Soviet army began. The performance was accompanied by preliminary artillery preparation. The Germans did not expect a counterattack and were not ready to go on the defensive. This actually led to elements of panic in the German army, which led to the fact that the troops began to retreat, leaving the equipment. Hitler at this time ordered that the German troops continue to advance at all costs, but this was no longer possible.

On December 5-6, 1941, the Red Army went on the offensive along 900 kilometers of the front. This offensive took place from Kalinin in the north to Yelets in the south. It is important to note that initially these were only counterattacks, but which later developed into a counteroffensive. From this offensive, the main goal was achieved - the German armies were moved away from Moscow to a safe distance. In different sectors of the front, the Germans were thrown back from 100 to 250 kilometers to the western borders. This was the first defeat of the German army in World War II. For the first time, the myth of the invincibility of Germany, in particular, the invincibility of its tank units, was dispelled.

End of the Moscow battle

Despite the obvious successes of the beginning of December 1941, the Red Army failed to make significant progress, for which there were objective reasons. Despite this, the counter-offensive developed into a simple offensive, and in April 1942 Moscow and the Moscow Region were completely liberated from German troops.

The meaning of victory in the battle of Moscow:

• The final breakdown of the blitzkrieg.
• Infliction of Germany's first major defeat.
• Strengthening the moral and psychological spirit in the ranks of the Soviet army.
• The beginning of the liberation of Soviet territory from the German invaders.

This article briefly reviewed the battle for Moscow. This is one of the most important historical events in the entire Second World War, which, if not leading to a radical change in affairs at the front, then helped to strengthen the idea that the Soviet Union could win the war.

Battles near Bryansk. Army Group Center launched Operation Typhoon on schedule. On a clear and sunny autumn day on September 30, the troops of the 2nd Panzer Group broke through the positions of the Bryansk Front, defeated the parts of the operational group of General Ermakov that did not have time to take up defense, repelled the counterattacks of the 13th Army and the Yermakov group, undertaken on Stalin's orders with the aim of simultaneously cutting off the broken parts of the German 24th Panzer Corps from the south and north, and occupied the city of Orel on October 3.

Due to the mistakes made by the local command, the city was not prepared for defense. As a result of the actions of German aviation, the command and control system was violated. Eremenko had no connection at all with the armies subordinate to him and could not properly use the reserves located near Bryansk. This was explained by the fact that the 2nd Panzer Army, with its left flank, launched an attack on Bryansk and thereby pinned down the Russian forces stationed there. However, the German tank formations, 51 covering a large industrial city from the east, were not assisted by another grouping, which should have consisted of the troops of the 2nd Army.

This army, which launched the offensive on the move after almost two months of continuous fighting, ran into unexpectedly strong resistance from the Russian 3rd and 50th armies. Only the breakthrough of the formations of the 4th Panzer Group in the defense zone of the 43rd Army of the Reserve Front allowed the formations of the 2nd Army to wedge into the Russian defenses at the junction between the 43rd and 50th Soviet armies and thereby reach the rear of the Bryansk Front with their right flank. On October 5, the advanced German units occupied Zhizdra, on October 6, the escape and supply routes were cut off for Eremenko's troops, all three of his armies were surrounded, and the remnants of the Yermakov group were pushed back to the south. On the same day Bryansk fell. On October 6, the Russian Headquarters approved Yeremenko's proposal to turn the front and break through to the east. On October 7, an appropriate order was issued to the armies.

The German command, seeking to speed up the course of the operation, was already thinking not only about encirclement, but also about a quick breakthrough to the east in order to finally cut off the Russian escape route. These goals were served by the order of Bock Guderian to capture Mtsensk, and if possible, the Volkhov and conduct reconnaissance in the direction of Tula. But the Soviet command unraveled the danger of a breakthrough near Orel through Tula to Moscow. The headquarters promptly took countermeasures in this direction, but at first the German offensive "on the Bryansk Front was somehow not yet taken seriously, although it was dangerous."

The Soviet command tried to quickly transfer fresh forces to Mtsensk with the help of aviation. Despite the superiority of the enemy in the air, the Russians managed to transfer 5,500 people from the Yaroslavl region with the necessary weapons and equipment within three days. From fresh forces, the 1st Guards Rifle Corps ™ was formed, whose task was to stop the German advance. Guderian's formations were opposed primarily by the 4th tank brigade of Colonel M. E. Katukov, who was armed with T34 tanks, which significantly outnumbered German tanks. The German 4th Panzer Division had to go through severe trials. With the help of quickly taken countermeasures, the Russians managed to stop the advance of the main forces of the 24th Panzer Corps and inflict such heavy losses on it that Guderian wrote about this: “Heavy fighting gradually had its effect on ours and soldiers ...

And it was not a physical, but a mental shock that could not be overlooked. And the fact that our best officers were so heavily suppressed as a result of recent battles was amazing. Instead of a quick advance, heavy battles had to be fought, which allowed the Soviet command to wait for the salutary mudslide and so delay the German offensive that the advanced advancing units approached Tula only at the end of October ™.

Thus, the maneuvering actions of the southern wing of Army Group Center were decisively paralyzed, which subsequently had a very sensitive effect on the actions of the entire German army. Further difficulties were brought by the battles directly in the Bryansk pocket, which pulled back the main forces of the 2nd combined arms and 2nd tank armies until the end of October. According to German data, the fighting in this pocket officially ended on 19 October.

In fact, they continued until October 23, that is, until a breakthrough from the encirclement of the 3rd and 50th Soviet armies1821. The order of the command of Army Group Center of October 4, ordering the 2nd Army not to take part in the battles for Bryansk, but to move forward, could not be carried out, since the following days showed that the 2nd Panzer Army did not have sufficient forces to independently complete the battles against the encircled grouping.

Therefore, a new order was given to the 2nd Combined Arms Army: moving east with its left flank, take part in part of the forces surrounded by the enemy near Bryansk. In connection with the attempts of the troops of the Bryansk Front to break through the encirclement, it was impossible to even think about using the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army to reinforce the formations advancing on Mtsensk.

The extended offensive front of the Guderian army, which initially cost Bock so many worries, no longer caused concern to the German command, since the Russians 53 failed to organize interaction between the Southwestern and Bryansk fronts. The 13th Army Corps of the 2nd Army was able to quickly move east. In addition, on October 9, it was possible to achieve a connection between the 2nd Army and the 2nd Tank Army advancing from the northeast.

The encircled Bryansk grouping of the enemy was divided into two parts - the northern one, in the area of ​​Bryansk, Zhizdra, and the southern one, in the area of ​​Trubchevsk. On the same day, the command of the army group issued an order according to which the 2nd Army was tasked with defeating the northern part of the encircled grouping, and the 2nd Panzer Army - the southern part. On October 12, northeast of Bryansk, the encirclement ring around the northern part of the enemy grouping was finally closed.

However, significant forces of the Soviet troops managed to break through on October 8 and, despite heavy losses (front commander Eremenko was also wounded), on October 12, 13 and 14, get out of the encirclement. At the same time, the Russian 3rd Army first tried to break through the German positions in the Navlya sector, the 13th Army near Khomutovka, and the 50th Army at Resseta. Since the attempts to break through the 50th Army were unsuccessful, it, having suffered heavy losses, turned to the northeast in the direction of Belev in order to break through there. Bock was concerned about heavy fighting in the area of ​​encirclement and hurried with the advance of both German armies.

On October 12, he wrote in his diary: “Guderian is not moving forward; he, like Weichs, got stuck in the Bryansk cauldron. However, Bock soon learned that, despite the regrouping of the 2nd Field and 2nd Tank Armies that had begun, moving forward to the northeast as a result of stubborn resistance by the enemy became possible only after the end of the fighting in the area of ​​​​the Bryansk pocket. The Soviet troops, which broke through the German positions on October 22 and 23 and, in accordance with Eremenko’s order, reached the Belev-Fatezh line, paralyzed the advance of the southern wing of Army Group Center with their resistance to a decisive extent and did not allow organizing a quick pursuit.

The battles in the Bryansk cauldron did not bring the desired success to the Germans. Battles near Vyazma. On October 2, the “last big and decisive battle of this year” was joined by all the other troops of the “Center” group, from which Hitler demanded that they “with the last 54 powerful blow ... defeat the enemy before the onset of winter.” Good weather favored the massive use of aviation, which provided especially active support to the 4th and 9th Armies, which operated in the direction of the main attack.

1387 aircraft participated in the fighting. The breakthrough of the 3rd tank group in the defense zone of the 24th and 43rd Russian armies was successful. The erroneous idea of ​​the Soviet command about the inexpediency of carrying out defensive measures in this area, which was located between the Western and Bryansk fronts and was under the jurisdiction of the Reserve Front, led to catastrophic consequences for the Soviet troops. When both armies began to withdraw as a result of a German attack, the southern flank of the Western Front and the northern flank of the Bryansk Front were exposed. On October 5, Budyonny reported on this matter: “The situation on the left flank of the Reserve Front has become extremely serious. There is nothing to close the resulting gap along the Moscow highway"1131. In addition, the command of the Red Army initially thought that there was an offensive with limited goals and that everything was not so tragic.

The divisions of the first echelon, which fought defensive battles with the advancing enemy, did not know what to do, since the Russian command was paralyzed for some time. Already on the second day of the offensive, the southern wing of the German troops reached Kirov, crossed the river. Oka and on October 5 advanced units went to Yukhnov. The mobile units of the Germans bypassed the left flank of the Western Front and went to its rear. On October 5, the tank wedge of the 4th Panzer Group turned north and reached Vyazma two days later.

As a result of communication disruption, both the unit commanders and the Soviet high command had no clear idea of ​​the situation at the front until that day. K.F. Telegin, who was then a member of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District, paints a figurative picture of the situation that developed in connection with the offensive of the German troops: “Until October 5, all the attention of the Central Committee of the Party, the High Command and the Military Council of the district is focused on the sharply complicated situation near Tula. On October 4, employees of the Political Directorate brought a translation of Hitler's speech on the radio. The Fuhrer declared that the last decisive offensive had begun on the Eastern Front and that "the Red Army was defeated and would not be able to restore its strength." It was not clear what kind of "decisive offensive" and "rout" of the Red Army was being discussed. The General Staff did not receive such data from the Western and Reserve Fronts ... But still, the night of October 5 passed in anxious worries. Telephone communication with the Western Front was interrupted, and our communications officer did not report anything ...

But at 12 o’clock in the afternoon, the pilots of the 120th Fighter Regiment, flying out on barrage, reported that a column of tanks and motorized infantry up to 25 km long was moving along the highway from SpasDemensk to Yukhnov, and they did not find our troops in front of it. Telegin ordered to double-check this report by means of air reconnaissance. This time the Russian fighters were even fired upon, but again Telegin did not believe it. The High Command simply could not imagine that the Germans could break through to a depth of 100-120 km. The best pilots were sent to reconnaissance for the third time. They reported that the Germans had already occupied Yukhnov during this time. Only after this did the Russian High Command recognize the situation as serious, and Stalin ordered the Moscow defensive region to be brought to full combat readiness. The Military Council received an order to take positions near Mozhaisk with all the troops at its disposal and "by all means to delay the enemy that had broken through in front of the Mozhaisk border for five to seven days, until the Stavka reserves approached."

On the northern wing of the German troops, the 3rd Panzer Group launched an offensive on October 2 and broke through the Russian front at the junction between the 19th and 30th armies, advancing in the direction of Kholm and partly in the direction of Bely. A day later, the Hill was in the hands of the Germans, in addition, east of the city, on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, it was possible to create two bridgeheads, from which the next day the offensive was to begin in the direction of Beliy. This offensive, however, failed due to the poor supply of the 3rd Panzer Group. Due to difficult road conditions on October 4, the 3rd Panzer 56th Group found itself almost without fuel, and the offensive of the panzer divisions bogged down. The offer of the command of the 2nd Air Fleet to deliver fuel to the 3rd Panzer Group was rejected, since the tankers believed that they could organize the supply on their own. However, when the transport columns finally got stuck on impassable roads, on the evening of October 4, the command of the tank group was still forced to turn to aviation for help. Thus, more than a day was lost, and the formations of the 3rd Panzer Group were only able to fight in the afternoon of October 5th. The Russians immediately took advantage of this. Konev, who reported to Stalin about the threat of encirclement on October 4, 1861, on October 5 received an order from the Headquarters to withdraw to the Vyazma-Rzhev line of defense prepared in advance. At the same time, the 31st and 32nd armies of the Reserve Front were transferred to him in order to ensure unified command and control of troops in the Vyazma region. At first, the Russian troops stubbornly defended themselves, but then began to retreat to the east, trying to avoid encirclement. On October 3, Army Group Center's journal of operations recorded: "The general impression of these battles, based on air reconnaissance data, was that the enemy was determined to defend himself and there were no other orders from the Russian high command." Only on October 7 did the 10th Panzer Division of the 3rd Panzer Group link up with the 7th Panzer Division of the 4th Panzer Group.

The encirclement ring east of Vyazma was closed. However, as German air reconnaissance reported, "significant enemy forces have escaped encirclement and large columns of Russian troops are moving in the direction of Moscow." The Russians again, despite heavy losses, managed to timely withdraw large forces from the threat of encirclement. At the same time, leaving the encirclement, the Russians inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans. As the commander of the 7th Panzer Division reported, on October 11 and 12, the division lost 1,000 people, one battalion was literally destroyed. Between the two tank wedges, which had the task of creating an outer encirclement ring, the 2nd and 4th armies moved towards each other in the direction of Sukhinichi and Yukhnov, and to the north the 4th and 9th armies advanced with their left flank with the task of closing the encirclement ring from the west and northwest. The main goal was to release the tanks as soon as possible so that they could participate in a further offensive against Moscow.

In the offensive zone of the 9th Army, the enemy put up such stubborn resistance that the left-flank formations were able to move forward only at the cost of heavy losses. These difficulties were exacerbated by the daily stoppage of the 3rd Panzer Group, as a result of which the pressure on the encircled from the north was not as strong as expected. The beginning of the persecution and the first countermeasures of the Russians. On October 7, when the encirclement was finally completed, the high command of the ground forces and the command of the army group came to the conclusion that the enemy no longer had significant forces at his disposal with which he could resist the further advance of Army Group Center towards Moscow, and therefore it was possible to immediately begin the pursuit of the enemy in the direction of Moscow. The German command was optimistic and thought “that you can take a few risks” and that this time everything will look different than near Minsk and Smolensk, when the enemy managed to build new defensive lines in a timely manner and slow down the advance of the German troops.

Bock wanted to immediately release as many forces as possible and immediately connect them to the new operation. And although the fighting was in full swing in the encirclement ring and it was still unclear which enemy forces were surrounded, Bock believed that he now had enough forces to solve both problems - to finish with the encircled enemy and at the same time begin pursuit by the forces of his existing formations. Since it seemed that the enemy did not have any serious reserves, the opinions of various instances of the German command agreed that these chances should be used immediately and quickly break through to Moscow. On October 7, 1941, at a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group Center, in which Brauchitsch and the head of the 58th operational department of the headquarters of the ground forces, Colonel of the General Staff Adolf Heusinger, took part, it was noted that the orders given to the armies testified to how favorably the existing situation was assessed. Based on the successes achieved and the fact that a large number of trophies and prisoners were captured, and being under the general impression of Hitler's plans for this operation, the command assessed the situation one-sidedly, taking into account only positive factors. According to Brauchitsch and Bock, the 2nd Panzer Army should have advanced as soon as possible in the direction of Tula and captured the crossings across the Oka, in order to then advance towards Kashira and Serpukhov. At the same time, Brauchitsch drew the attention of those present to the wishes of Hitler, who suggested that Guderian take over Kursk, and then strike in the south with the forces of the 2nd Panzer Group. The adoption of the final decision on setting this task was expected only in the following days. The 2nd Army was ordered to defeat the enemy in the northern part of the encirclement near Bryansk. The task of the 4th Army was to advance with infantry formations and, if possible, a large number of mobile units to the Kaluga-Borovsk line and, in cooperation with the 9th Army, close the encirclement near Vyazma. The 9th Army was given the task, together with units of the 3rd Panzer Group, to reach the Gzhatsk-Sychevka line in order, firstly, to encircle the group near Vyazma from the north and, secondly, to concentrate for an offensive in the direction of Kalinin or Rzhev.

These considerations were set out in the "Order to continue the operation in the direction of Moscow" dated October 7, 1941. At the heart of this idea - to turn the tank forces to the north, - expressed by the new commander of the 3rd tank group, General of Tank Forces Hans Georg Reinhardt, was the plan to defeat the enemy by the forces of the northern wing of the 9th Army together with the southern wing of the 16th Army of the Army Group "North" in the area of ​​Bely, Ostashkov and disruption of communications between Moscow and Leningrad. And although Bock opposed this plan of operation, a day later the 3rd Panzer Group received the order from the Fuhrer to advance north. These forces were not enough for a fight at the decisive moment near Moscow, when the new Russian defensive lines had not yet been strengthened, and the Russian reserves for the most part were still on the way. Based on the assessment of the enemy, the OKW and OKH still considered it possible to carry out this broadly conceived plan.

The assessment of the enemy by the headquarters of Army Group Center, as can be seen from the records of October 8, was very optimistic: “Today the impression is that the enemy has no large forces at his disposal that he could oppose the further advance of the army group on Moscow ... For the direct defense of Moscow, according to the testimony of prisoners of war, the Russians have divisions of the people's militia, which, however, have already been partially brought into battle, and are also among the encircled troops. But the orders for the release of all forces for the rapid pursuit of the enemy in the direction of the Russian capital did not take into account two factors that were soon to slow down the further offensive, namely, the beginning of a period of thaw and the increasing resistance of the Russians. Starting from October 6, autumn rains began to fall in the southern sector of the group of forces, and from October 7 and 8 in its other sectors, as a result of which roads, especially country roads, became impassable, which significantly slowed down the offensive. The war diary of Army Group Center noted on October 10: “The movement of tank units is currently impossible due to the poor condition of the roads and bad weather.

For the same reasons, there are difficulties in providing tanks with fuel. On October 8, the actions of supporting aviation were also significantly limited, since the danger of icing, poor visibility and a snowstorm, on the one hand, and the poor condition of the runways, on the other, did not allow maintaining the aviation support of the operation at the same level. Parts of the 2nd Air Fleet carried out 1030 sorties on October 6, 559 on October 8, and 269 on October 9. In this regard, the pace of pursuit fell sharply, although the German divisions still moved forward and captured new areas. The most severe consequences of the thaw period appeared later, in the second half of October. However, the enemy’s desire, using local and climatic conditions, to slow down the German offensive more and more strongly, inflict more and more significant losses on the Germans, buy time to build new defensive lines in the rear, pull up reserves and prepare their troops for new battles, was stronger than the mudslide.

The German command, being confident in their victory, ordered a swift pursuit of the enemy, believing that the 57th tank corps and two infantry corps would be enough for this. The 41st Panzer Corps, already prepared for the "jump" on Moscow, was aimed at Kalinin. The Soviet command, on the other hand, took decisive countermeasures the day before. On October 5, the Headquarters realized that in connection with the German offensive, the order for the Western Front to take the line of Rzhev, Vyazma was almost too late and that a new line of defense should have been created further in the east, which was supposed to pass along the already partially equipped Mozhaisk line. It was supposed to throw all available reserves there and send all the troops that had escaped encirclement. As a first measure, four rifle divisions of the Western Front were ordered to take up positions on the Mozhaisk line of defense and create the necessary barrier there. In addition, Stalin urgently called G.K. Zhukov from Leningrad to Moscow to send him as a representative of the Stavka to the Western Front.

Such a decision seemed necessary to Stalin, since he received almost no information about the situation at the front, although he needed accurate data to take appropriate measures. Since Stalin was dissatisfied with the command of the Western Front, he sent a commission of the State Defense Committee to Konev, which, along with others, included Molotov, Mikoyan, Malenkov, Voroshilov and Vasilevsky. The commission was supposed to look into the merits of the issue and save what else could be saved. She found the state of affairs at the front extremely unsatisfactory. 61 Thus, the headquarters of the Reserve Front, for example, had no idea where the front commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union SM, was located. Budyonny. There was no connection with the Western and Bryansk fronts. In Medyn, one of the important cities that covered the approaches to Moscow, of all the defenders of the city, Zhukov found only three policemen. Having received Zhukov's information about the state of affairs and worrying about the difficult situation on the Western Front, Stalin acted very quickly. He removed Konev and appointed Zhukov in his place. Despite dissatisfaction with the former command of the Western Front, Stalin, at the insistence of Zhukov, left Konev as deputy commander of the front, and Sokolovsky as chief of staff of the front. At the same time, he immediately sent all available reserves to the Mozhaisk region. By October 10, there were four rifle divisions, cadets from various military schools, three reserve rifle regiments and five machine-gun battalions™ on the Mozhaisk line of defense.

On the same day, five newly created machine-gun battalions, ten anti-tank regiments and five tank brigades were additionally delivered. It is noteworthy that, in order to boost the morale of the troops at the front, Stalin called the ten anti-tank battalions that were at the disposal of the High Command ten “anti-tank regiments”1®1. But these forces were not enough to remove the threat of a German breakthrough. At a time when the head of the press bureau of the German Reich, Otto Dietrich, proclaimed on Hitler’s orders that the Soviet Union was “militarily finished,” and the Volkische Beobachter claimed that “Stalin’s army was wiped off the face of the earth,” the Russians, with the hope of expecting a period of thaw, organized a rebuff to the advancing enemy. The troops operating in the Mozhaisk region were united into the 5th Army, and the troops defending in the Orel region were united into the 26th Army. The Western and Reserve fronts were merged into one - the Western - front. The transfer of troops from the Far East and Central Asia, whose arrival was expected in mid-October, dates back to this time. The 316th rifle division, formed in July in Alma-Ata, was transferred to the west. In October she arrived in Volokolamsk. On the same day, German intelligence established the arrival of the 312th Rifle Division from Kazakhstan, the 313th from Turkestan and the 178th from Siberia.

In the following days, other formations from the Far East arrived at the front. The headquarters of the 16th, 31st, 33rd and 49th armies were redeployed to the east with the task of forming new armies from the reserve. Until October 13, it was possible to form the 16th Army under the command of Rokossovsky in the Volokolamsk region, the 1.5th Army in the Mozhaisk region, the new 43rd Army under the command of Golubev in the Maloyaroslavets region, the new 49th Army under the command of Zakharkin in the Kaluga region and the new 33rd Army under the command of Efremov in the Naro-Fominsk region. All these formations were combined into a new Western Front under the command of Zhukov, who had the task of stopping the advance of the German troops with all the forces at his disposal. To increase the maneuverability of his troops, Zhukov gathered all the means of transport available in Moscow to send them to the front. The Soviet Supreme High Command was able to transfer eight tank and two mechanized brigades, as well as several rifle formations, to the Western Front from the reserves of the Headquarters, and two tank brigades and one reinforced tank battalion to the Bryansk Front. Thus, by mid-October, 12 rifle divisions, 16 tank brigades and 40 artillery regiments and other units * 8 * 1 arrived to strengthen the defense of Moscow.

Aviation was also replenished with new formations and two divisions of long-range bomber aviation. All this made it possible, by the time the advanced units of the Germans reached the Mozhaisk defense line and started fighting, to create a dense defensive barrier on the main highways leading to Moscow, about which German intelligence knew nothing. The intelligence department of the headquarters of Army Group Center stated on October 14: “The enemy is currently not in a position to oppose forces advancing on Moscow that are capable of providing long-term resistance to the west and southwest of Moscow. Everything that was left of the enemy after the battle was pushed back to the north or south. 63 And although the command of the Western Front failed to establish contact with the units encircled near Vyazma, and attempts to break out of the encirclement cost heavy losses due to poorly organized interaction, the Russians still managed to tie down the German tank forces for a long time and thereby exclude the possibility of their participation in the immediate pursuit in the direction of Moscow15*. Starting from October 11, the German tanks were forced, moving forward, to break through all the new defensive lines, to overcome the very stubborn resistance of the enemy.

Growing difficulties in persecution. Despite the fact that Medyn was taken on October 11, and Kaluga on October 12, although the first gaps were created in the Mozhaisk line of defense, the ongoing stubborn fighting in the encirclement indicated that the release of the forces that ensured the encirclement would take longer than expected. Enemy attempts to break out of the encirclement in the Vyazma region on October 10-12 pinned down the 40th and 46th tank corps intended for pursuit and delayed their change. Only on October 14 was it possible to regroup the main forces of the formations of the 4th and 9th armies operating near Vyazma for the pursuit, which began on October 15. The forward detachments were too weak to break the growing resistance of the enemy in the first onslaught. They could only move forward with very heavy losses. On October 15, the commander of the 4th Army, General Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, assessing the situation, stated that “psychologically, a critical situation has developed on the Eastern Front, because, on the one hand, the troops found themselves in frosty weather without winter uniforms and warm apartments, and on the other hand, the impassable terrain and the stubbornness with which the enemy defends himself, covering his communications and quartering areas, make it extremely difficult to advance our, still weak, before new detachments".

In a report from the headquarters of the 57th Panzer Corps, which was advancing in the area of ​​Medyn and Mozhaisk, it was reported that the last battles for capturing Russian positions were the most fierce during the entire period of the campaign in Russia, as the enemy was putting up fierce resistance, fortifying himself in concrete long-term structures built back in peacetime. Losses in tanks increased greatly from the beginning of the operation until mid-October. Thus, the 6th Panzer Division, which on October 10 had over 200 tanks, on October 16 had at its disposal only 60 tanks ready for use in battle. The 20th Panzer Division, one of the first to start pursuing the enemy in the direction of Moscow, out of the 283 tanks it had on September 28, irretrievably lost 43 tanks by October 16.

The 4th Panzer Division, battered in the battles in the Mtsensk area, by this time had only 38 tanks. In total, by October 16, the 2nd Panzer Army had 271 tanks, the 3rd Panzer Group - 259 tanks and the 4th Panzer Group - 710 tanks. Of course, we are talking about available tanks, and there were much fewer ready for use in battle. While Army Group Center still had over 1,240 tanks at its disposal, Army Group South lost 144 tanks in the 1st Panzer Army sector of the front during the period from September 26 to October 15, 1941. On October 15, the 1st Panzer Army had only 165 tanks. But not only tank formations suffered heavy losses. The infantry units were also forced to pay dearly for their successes in the offensive. The losses of Army Group Center for the period from October 1 to October 17 amounted to 50 thousand people. These numbers are indicative of how fierce the fighting was. The difficulties caused by heavy losses in men and equipment and the lack of replenishment were further complicated by mudslides and disruption of supplies. The thaw did not immediately make itself felt during the hostilities. Only from mid-October, its disastrous consequences began to be felt on the entire front of Army Group Center, just at the very moment when the fighting began on the defensive line near Mozhaisk and when the advancing divisions needed a large amount of ammunition and fuel. The German command was aware of the difficulties that could arise during the period of thaw.

But it believed that in 65 this should not be taken into account, since the battle for Moscow was planned to be won before the onset of the thaw, that is, until mid-October. The German leadership did not consider it necessary to consult on this issue with specialists. The opinion of the meteorologists at the disposal of the OKH was not requested. Thus, everything went on, as in the Russian proverb: "In autumn, a bucket of dirt from a spoonful of water." Without taking appropriate measures and not properly preparing for the thaw, the OKH claimed in the autumn of 1941 that the Germans had suffered an incredible natural disaster and that "the thaw turned out to be unprecedentedly strong and dragged on for an unusually long time" ™. Thus, the German command was ready to shift its guilt to some higher power, independent of it. Hitler later stated: "With the onset of the rains, we were once again convinced that it was fortunate that the German armies did not advance far into Russia in October." But the facts show that the amount of precipitation in October and November 1941 was below the usual norm. The whole period of the thaw was consequently drier than usual. Even if the average air temperature in October and November 1941 was lower than in previous years, this also did not affect either the duration of the thaw period or its intensity, rather, on the contrary.

The relatively early frosts that set in in 1941 made it possible already at the beginning of November to use highways and country roads, as well as the terrain away from them. Thus, comparing the data on temperature and precipitation, we can state that the thaw in the autumn of 1941 was weaker and shorter than in other years. The Russians, of course, took advantage of the rainy weather and included in their defense plans the role of climatic conditions. Zhukov, for example, expected that the German offensive could develop only along the main highways. Therefore, he concentrated the small forces he had at his disposal on October 15 on the roads leading to Moscow, in the region of Volokolamsk, Istra, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets, Podolsk and Kaluga, while the Bryansk Front concentrated the troops remaining at its disposal in the direction of the main German attack, along the Orel-Tula highway. On October 17, the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Army reported that “on both sides of Mtsensk, the enemy retained the same number of forces ... Occupying his equipped field positions and bunkers with armor caps, he puts up fierce resistance.

The main forces of the 2nd Army suspended the offensive, waiting for the approach of service units. The reports of the division of the 2nd Army indicated that since October 7 the regular supply of formations had completely ceased, that the divisions had stretched for 240 km or more and were forced to switch to supply from local resources, as a result of which their main forces were not capable of either march or combat use. The same situation was observed in the 4th Army, which, moreover, due to enemy counterattacks supported by tanks and aircraft (despite bad weather, it stepped up its operations), was forced to go on the defensive in some sectors of its right flank. On the sector of the front of the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group, supply difficulties were so great that the advance of their formations was significantly delayed. The main line of communication for the transport of supplies on the northern wing of the army group was the Vyazma-Moscow highway, which at times was unusable due to various kinds of damage from shelling, bombing, and delayed-action mine explosions. In addition, the highway was overloaded, and it was impossible to move outside the highway bed.

The difficulties of transportation have grown into a real crisis. The combat log of the headquarters of the 9th Army noted on this occasion: “The main reason for the emergence and deepening of the crisis is that the repair of the highway requires much more effort and time than expected. The failure of the original assumptions was shown first of all by the destruction caused by the Russian time bombs. Such mines, bursting, form a funnel 10 m deep and 30 m in diameter. The fuses are set with such accuracy that several explosions occur daily, and therefore it is necessary to rebuild detours every day. With these broadly conceived acts of sabotage, to which there is no end in sight, the enemy, although he will not be able to thwart our offensive near Vyazma, will make it difficult and delay the development of our success, and winter is approaching. In the Kalinin region, the Russians, having pulled up their reserves, continuously attacked the German forward detachments.

In order to coordinate the fighting on this sector of the front, the Russian Headquarters created the Kalinin Front on October 19 under the command of Konev. In order to somehow solve the problem of supplying the 9th Army, the OKH made an attempt to build a railway from Vyazma to Sychevka, but this took time and did not eliminate difficulties at a time when everything was decided by the speed of action. Due to the lack of rolling stock on the front of Army Group Center, the construction of the railway also did not save. On October 19, the entire 5th Infantry Division was allocated to repair the highway. On this day, on the entire front of the army group, the supply situation deteriorated so much that the offensive actually had to be suspended, only local battles took place. On October 19, the war diary of the headquarters of the Army Group Center recorded: “On the night of October 18-19, it rained on the entire front of the army group.

The condition of the roads deteriorated so much that a severe crisis ensued in the supply of troops with food, ammunition, and especially fuel. The condition of the roads, the weather and the terrain to a large extent delayed the course of military operations. The main concern of all connections is the supply of material and technical means and food. Bock, in his diary, was forced to admit that the persecution did not have the success he had hoped for. 68 “In total, all this (private successes achieved) can only be assessed as nothing. The dismemberment of the battle formations of the army group and the terrible weather have led to the fact that we are sitting still. And the Russians are gaining time in order to replenish their defeated divisions and strengthen the defense, especially since they have a lot of railways and highways near Moscow. It's very bad!" Although the Russians gained time, their divisions also suffered from mud and impassability. General A.V. Khrulev, who at that time was the head of the rear of the Red Army, considers the catastrophic situation with roads during the period of thaw to be one of the main reasons “why the entire Kalinin Front suffered a“ fatal failure ”and why the supply of supplies was disrupted. From all the armies, telegrams were then sent to the chief of logistics complaining about the violation of the entire supply system.

In view of the shortage of aircraft, it was impossible to supply troops by air, and therefore it was proposed to resort to the only remaining means - to deliver goods by horse-drawn transport. To this suggestion of the chief of logistics, Stalin sarcastically remarked that Khrulev, apparently, had forgotten that he was living in the age of technology. Nevertheless, in a short time, the entire supply system of the Russians was rebuilt based on the use of horse-drawn transport, which made it possible to quickly eliminate the crisis situation with the supply of troops. The goals of the German command in relation to Moscow. After the encirclement of the Soviet troops near Vyazma and the beginning of the persecution, the German command considered the battle for Moscow basically won. It believed that the only thing now was to smash the remaining forces of the Red Army and break the resistance of the few Zhukov troops still continuing to defend themselves west of Moscow. The OKH intended to withdraw from the Soviet German front and transfer to the west the headquarters of the corps, four infantry and one cavalry divisions with a view to their reorganization for use in operations according to the plan for the period after Barbarossa.

It was about the 8th Army Corps, which included the 8th, 28th, 5th and 15th Infantry Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry Division 69th. Based on these divisions, it was supposed to form the 5th, 8th and 28th light divisions and the 24th tank division. On October 11, the OKH reported to the army group command how it envisaged the continued use of the 9th Army and 3rd Panzer Group after the capture of Kalinin. These formations were to advance in the direction of Torzhok and further to Vyshny Volochek and Ostashkov with the task of depriving the enemy of the opportunity to retreat further to the east, to prevent him from escaping from the strikes of the flank formations of Army Group Center and North. In this regard, the entire northern wing of Army Group Center was not to participate in a direct attack on Moscow. The encirclement of Moscow itself was supposed to be carried out by the forces of the 2nd Panzer Army, the 4th Army and the 4th Panzer Group. On October 12, Hitler ordered "the surrender of Moscow not to be accepted, the Soviet capital to be surrounded and subjected to exhausting artillery shelling and air raids." He had to admit that the original plan to “flood Moscow and its environs so that where Moscow hitherto stood ... a huge lake would form that would forever hide the metropolis of the Russian people from the eyes of the civilized world” turned out to be unrealistic. The plans for further operations were based on Hitler's order to turn the left wing of Army Group Center to the north, and the forces of the 2nd Army to advance south through Kursk to Voronezh in order to prevent the threat of an enemy strike at the junction of Army Groups Center and South. While the 2nd Panzer Army was to bypass Moscow from the south and close the encirclement to the east of the city, the 4th Panzer Group was to carry out the same maneuver from the north, while providing for flank attacks on Rybinsk and Yaroslavl.

The 4th Army was to advance along the line of the Moscow District Railway, where three Russian defensive sections passed. Bock tried simultaneously with the maneuver of the 9th Army to strike with the forces of the 3rd Panzer Group and the 2nd Army, since he feared, as was the case after Smolensk, that the forces of the army group would be dispersed and thereby risk weakening them in the main direction. But all his attempts were unsuccessful. 70 By the time the difficulties in supplying the front first reached their apex"*111 and the shadow of their dire consequences was already hanging over the troops, Halder announced new grand plans that were to lead to a further dispersion of the forces of Army Group Center. After the defeat of the enemy forces opposing Army Group North, it was supposed to take up positions that would cover the troops from the northeast and from the north. Thus, any pressure on them by the enemy from the interior of the country during the winter months was would be ruled out and less forces would be required to solve this problem.The goal was to, subject to the occupation of Rybinsk, reach the line of Vologda, the Lake District, to the border of the tundra, and cut the only railway leading from the White Sea to the central regions of Russia.It turned out that the 4th Army had to go to the rear of Moscow, east of the Volga, on its own.

To Major General Hans von Greifenberg's objection about the "catastrophic state of the roads in the area of ​​operations of the army group," Halder replied with the remark that he asked that "everything be done with regard to the provision of supplies and proper preparations should be made for the intended long journey." The OKH at this time was completely under the impression of victorious reports of battles with an encircled enemy and hoped that things would continue in this spirit. This was manifested in Halder's boundless and enthusiastic recognition of the one-of-a-kind battle near Vyazma, and therefore he did not want to hear about the difficulties existing in the troops. The position of the 9th Army, which was supposed to be used for an offensive in a northern direction, at that time was far from the best. Army troops, bypassing Kalinin on both sides with their infantry corps, tried to connect with the advanced units of the 3rd Panzer Group, but were continuously subjected to sudden attacks by Russian divisions. Starting from October 17, Soviet troops, supported by tanks and aircraft, daily attacked the Germans in the Kalinin area. Therefore, on October 23, Bock ordered the offensive through Kalinin to be suspended and the enemy to be defeated first in the Volga Reservoir-Kalinin-Volga triangle.

The reason for this decision was that the Russians had concentrated large forces southeast of Kalinin, which posed a threat to the flanks of the 9th Army and 3rd Panzer Group. Hitler believed that instead of the temporarily suspended offensive of the 9th Army, a strike should be made in the direction of Rybinsk and Yaroslavl by the forces of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups, and the 9th Army should take up defenses west of Kalinin. Bock immediately opposed this maneuver of his tank forces and justified the impossibility of its implementation primarily by difficulties in supply and the poor condition of the roads. Nevertheless, on October 28, Hitler ordered this plan to be carried out, with the ultimate goal of reaching the Volga, in order to block the enemy between the Volga and Lake Ladoga, cut off the railways going from the east through Yaroslavl and Rybinsk to Bologoye, and also through Vologda to Tikhvin, depriving the Russians of the opportunity to supply troops, and thereby inflict a decisive defeat on them. Despite the objections of the command of Army Group Center, which believed that the implementation of such a plan would cause enormous difficulties and affect the further development of the offensive against Moscow, Hitler maintained his directive in force. Thus, in addition to the troops of the northern wing of the army group, the bulk of the forces of the 4th tank group could not participate in the attack on the Russian capital.

Objecting to the new plans to use the troops of the northern wing of the army group, Bock also opposed the decision to use the tank formations of the 2nd Panzer Army for the offensive on Voronezh, and not on Tula. Hitler considered the 4th Army strong enough to carry out the tasks previously envisaged for the 2nd Panzer Army with the forces of the right-flank formations. The discrepancy between Hitler's assessment of the situation and the actual state of affairs at the front was most clearly manifested in the fact that Kluge was forced to pull up his last reserves and order the 13th, 12th, 20th and 57th army corps to go on the defensive in the southern sector of the front. According to Bock, the only chance to continue the offensive with the forces of the 72nd right-flank formations of the 4th Army was that Guderian's army would launch an offensive through Tula to the northeast. This blow was supposed to force the enemy, opposing the 4th Army, to withdraw his forces from this sector of the front and throw them against the 2nd Panzer Army. In this way, Bock hoped to facilitate the further advance of the 4th Army. The turn of the 2nd Panzer Army to the south not only made it impossible to fulfill these plans, but also created an additional "wide gap on ... the entire front of the army group", which there was nothing to close. Bock fought against this order by all means.

He even explained to Halder that he was slowing down in issuing Hitler's order to the troops to suspend the offensive of the 2nd Panzer Army in the direction of Tula until the question of assigning a further task to it was finally resolved. In this case, he was ultimately successful, and on October 28 Hitler announced that he "agreed, in order not to waste time, to continue the offensive of the 2nd Panzer Army in the same direction." The consequence of this was that only the 2nd Army was aimed at Voronezh, while Guderian's troops were ordered to advance in the direction of Moscow "between Ryazan and Kashira across the Oka". The big goals that were proclaimed even these days at the Fuhrer's headquarters, in practice, despite all the orders and directives, were unrealistic, since the supply situation and the condition of the German troops made it impossible to continue the offensive. Bock gave an order saying that if it was not possible to advance further, then at least everything possible should be done to prepare the offensive and overcome difficulties in supplying the troops as soon as possible, so that with the onset of good weather (frost), the advance should immediately be resumed. In this way, Bock acknowledged that the last attempt in a fleeting battle to defeat the remaining units of the Red Army and capture Moscow before the onset of winter had failed.

Moreover, the troops of his army group had open flanks, were not ready for operations in winter conditions, and they were opposed by the enemy, who received reinforcements. It was clear to Bock that in order to defeat the enemy, a new offensive had to be launched, but he was unable to make up for the enormous losses suffered by his troops. On October 31, Bock wrote in his diary: “Our losses are becoming very tangible. In the formations of the army group, more than twenty battalions are commanded by oberleutnants. The losses of the officers of the Army Group Center averaged 45 people daily (about 40% of all officer losses on the Eastern Front), and they were especially great in the infantry, where those who were out of action had to be replaced by officers of other military branches. Russian defensive measures. The Soviet command was aware that in mid-October a serious danger hung over Moscow. During these days, all available reserves of the Headquarters were thrown into battle or pulled up to the front. The formation of new formations and the transfer of divisions from the East were not yet completed. When forward detachments of German tank formations appeared in front of the Mozhaisk line of defense and the Russians did not have equivalent forces against them, Zhukov recommended to Stalin that Moscow be evacuated. Already on October 13, Secretary of the Central Committee and the Moscow City Party Committee A.S. Shcherbakov officially declared that Moscow was in danger and that it was necessary to mobilize new forces for the defense of the city. Along with the ongoing frantic construction of defensive works around and inside the city, a call was made for another 12 thousand people who were to take these positions.

They were part of the destruction battalions, which on October 17 were used to cover the roads leading to Moscow. Since Stalin was not completely convinced of the effectiveness of these measures, on October 16, the evacuation of most government, military and party institutions, as well as the diplomatic corps, began from Moscow to Kuibyshev. These events had a demoralizing effect on the population of the city, and panic arose. Even the fact that Stalin and his closest associates remained in Moscow did not have a calming effect on the Muscovites, and thus, on October 19, a state of siege was declared in the city and its environs, and the laws of war were proclaimed. The ruling stated: “Persons who violate public order must be immediately prosecuted and referred to a military tribunal for sentencing. Provocateurs, spies and other agents of the enemy who call for a violation of order must be shot on the spot.

These circumstances, as well as the first battles on the Mozhaisk line of defense, as a result of which the Russian units were forced to retreat, convinced the German command that the Russian army, lacking forces on a long front, concentrated strong groups in only a few points in order to cover the main forces from defeat and create a basis for further fighting, that it would not have large combat-ready reserves before the onset of winter. Therefore, the German command believed that it was possible to continue the offensive with the available forces, break through the shallow Russian defensive lines and quickly surround Moscow.

In such an assessment of the situation, which actually determined only the difficult position of the Red Army, three important factors were not taken into account. Firstly, the Mozhaisk line of defense, which had deeply echeloned (100 km) equipped positions with numerous natural and anti-tank obstacles, allowed the Russians to carry out a slow organized withdrawal to the east with battles, inflicting more and more losses on the Germans. The rivers Lama, Moskva, Kolocha, Luzha, Pakhra, Oka, Protva, Una, Plav and Sukhodrev flowed along the path of the German advance. Good railways and highways approached the positions of the Mozhaisk line of defense, which made it possible to transfer troops to where they were most needed, and to quickly bring in reinforcements. By the way, these roads, starting from mid-October, were almost not subjected to German air raids. The actions of the 2nd air fleet were directed mainly against the enemy, located directly in front of the German battle formations, in order to support the offensive of their troops. The railway distribution network near Moscow, the destruction of which would have been especially important for the disruption of the supply system of the Russian troops, was not subjected to any strong influence of aviation. During the whole of October, German aviation carried out only 17 night harassing raids and 6 daytime raids on Moscow, the largest of which (59 aircraft) was a raid on October 28th. But at the same time, German aviation failed to inflict great damage on the city1^41. The second factor was the new method of warfare applied by Zhukov. It was necessary both for the combat use of small units, often created for this purpose, and due to the fact that the battles took place near the Russian capital. Retreat from the Mozhaisk line of defense and leaving a large area was no longer possible if Stalin wanted to keep Moscow11^1. The Red Army practically fought on the last frontier.

Therefore, Zhukov did everything to use his small forces as efficiently as possible, creating for this purpose in the armies in the most dangerous sectors deeply echeloned anti-tank and artillery defense centers, forcing the advancing enemy to break through more and more new positions. In addition, tanks were now used not only to support infantry, but also concentrated to fight German tanks. To strengthen the defense, Stalin immediately sent all the anti-tank units at his disposal to the front for use in the main directions. In the implementation of this new method of warfare, which provided wide opportunities for maneuver and combined fire action with quick counterattacks on the flanks of the advancing enemy, Russian aviation provided increasing support. Soviet pilots, operating from stationary airfields near Moscow, more and more often entered into battle and inflicted significant losses on the German troops. In the period from 10 to 31 October, Soviet aviation made about 10,000 sorties in the location of the troops of Army Group Center1, operating even when German aviation could not fly due to weather conditions.

The third, decisive factor was the nature of the fighting. As the front approached Moscow, the morale of the Red Army men rose. In his order to the troops of the Western Front, Zhukov pointed out: “At this moment, everyone, from an ordinary Red Army soldier to senior commanders, must boldly and steadfastly fight for their homeland, for Moscow! The manifestation of cowardice and panic in these conditions is tantamount to betrayal. In this regard, I order: 1. Cowards and alarmists who leave the battlefield, leave their positions without an order and throw weapons and equipment, to be shot on the spot. 2. Responsibility for the implementation of this order to impose on the military courts and the prosecutor's office ... Not a step back! Forward for the Motherland! Although this order and similar orders did not lose their force in the second half of October, one should generally state an increase in the will to fight and an increase in the morale of Soviet soldiers. The formations that arrived from the Far East served as an example for other troops. Especially Soviet propaganda singled out the military exploits of the 316th Infantry Division under the command of General I.V. Panfilov and the 78th Infantry Division under the command of General A.P. Beloborodov, who were part of the 16th army of Rokossovsky. Both divisions for their courage were renamed, respectively, into the 8th and 9th Guards Rifle Divisions "181. Not only strict orders and political slogans put forward by political workers led to an increase in the moral qualities of the soldiers, but also fear of German captivity."

The fate of Russian prisoners of war very soon became known to Soviet soldiers. Bock, during his trip to the front, having made sure of the difficult conditions in which the Russian prisoners of war were, wrote in his diary that the torment, hunger, executions of soldiers - all this was in reality. “A terrible impression was made by tens of thousands of Russian prisoners of war, who almost without guards moved towards Smolensk. Pale and emaciated, these unfortunate people could hardly stand on their feet. Many died along the way. I talked about this with the army command, but it is unlikely to help. 77 The “order on commissars” also played its role. Soviet political workers understood that in the event of capture they would inevitably be killed, and encouraged their soldiers to resist with all their might, so that when they were faced with the alternative of surrendering to the Germans or continuing the fight, they tended to the latter. And although some German commanders demanded that this order be canceled because of its negative consequences for the actions of the German army, Hitler did not meet these wishes, as this contradicted him. Not only the commanders at the front, but also the propaganda organizations tried to eliminate the obvious shortcomings, since they understood that the Russian soldiers hardly believed the German broadcasts and leaflets. In one of the reports of the propaganda department of the Wehrmacht under the command of the rear area of ​​​​Army Group Center, a significant statement was cited on this occasion: “Creating a favorable mood among the population makes it difficult ... our treatment of prisoners of war.

Again and again there are cases when prisoners are simply shot, who, due to exhaustion, cannot continue to move ... News of these cases, when prisoners are shot in populated areas, instantly spread to the entire region. But the German command did not show much desire to improve the situation of Soviet prisoners of war and to hold anyone accountable for the mass executions of these people who voluntarily surrendered to the Germans. On the contrary, Jodl, in his resolution on the above report, pointed out: “It was necessary to conduct counter-propaganda, namely, it was necessary to indicate that in this case we are talking about prisoners of war who refuse to go further, not because they can no longer, but because they don’t want to. In all such reports, I am surprised that it is only stated as a result of which of our wrong actions the enemy counter-propaganda receives arguments advantageous for itself. It would be more correct to report on what counter-propaganda measures should be taken.” The bodies of the German security service, pursuing a policy of terror against the civilian population and mass executions, 78 only increased the hatred of Russians for the German occupiers.

The situation of the Russian population was also worsened by the directive on the suppression of the partisan movement of October 25, which recommended the Wehrmacht to cultivate respect for the Germans among the population and thereby gain its confidence. But the result of this directive was not trust, but an even deeper hatred and fear of the Germans. The difficult food situation of the civilian population in the occupied areas convinced the Red Army that the German soldiers had come not as "liberators", but as enslavers, and that they should be fought against with all available means. At the same time, not only ordinary soldiers, but above all, the Soviet intelligentsia deeply hated the German invaders. In 1941, A. Surkov wrote a story that tells how a Red Army soldier takes an oath.

The soldier swears: “I am a Russian soldier of the Red Army. My country gave me a rifle in my hands. She sent me to fight against the black hordes of Hitler, who invaded my land ... I have one hundred and ninety-three million Soviet people behind me, and Hitler's enslavement is harder than death ... I saw thousands of murdered women and children lying on highways and railways. They were killed by German bloodsuckers… The tears of women and children burn my heart. Killer Hitler and his hordes will pay with their wolf blood for these tears; the hatred of the avenger knows no pity." The hatred and steadfastness demanded by the commanders from the soldiers of the Red Army was reinforced by the exactingness of the party, which carefully watched to ensure that all formations held their sectors at the front.

If any unit retreated without an order, then it was immediately subjected to censure and a demand was put forward in front of it in the future to show higher fighting qualities. But not only the moral qualities of the Russian soldiers had a decisive influence on the nature of the actions of the Red Army, but above all the timely transfer of reserve formations and troops from the eastern regions of the country. While the German General Staff believed that the Soviet reserves had been basically used up and that Stalin no longer had the strength to occupy a new line of defense, the Russian command already at the end of September began to transfer divisions and cadre formations from the eastern regions of the USSR to the west to make up for the losses suffered in the battles for Kiev. These troops arrived just in time, in mid-October, to join the battle for Moscow.

The reports of the Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge, in which from the beginning of July he reported to the leaders of the USSR on the position of the Japanese government, which decided not to oppose the Soviet Union in the Far East, as well as the urgent need to throw all forces against the Germans in order to defend Moscow, were the basis for the further transfer of troops. The news received from Sorge was for the Russian command a valuable confirmation of the correctness of the measures taken by him, but were not decisive arguments for this major transfer of troops. Politicians from the Kremlin, based on the changed situation in the world, when confrontation between Japan and the United States became more and more likely, transferred part of the troops from the Far East to Europe not at all under the influence of Sorge's reports. Yet it must be taken for granted that the news that the Far East was not in immediate danger from Japan enabled the Russians to transfer more forces to the west than originally planned.

The railway network of the Soviet Union made it possible to transfer eight fully equipped divisions, including one tank division, to the European part of the USSR over a period of twelve to fifteen days. The Germans did not expect such a pace at first. To transport one rifle division, it was necessary from 20 to 40 trains that would go along both tracks at high speed. Whole "packs" of 15-20 trains, going close one after another only at night, completely fell out of sight of German air reconnaissance. To ensure the speedy transfer of troops, the Russians stopped all other trains for several days, including trains with military supplies, and in this way the divisions were delivered directly to the front line in echelons.

This made it possible by the end of October to transfer at least 13 rifle divisions and 5 tank brigades to the area west of Moscow from the Far East, Central Asia and Siberia and to a large extent stabilize the front. In addition to this direct replenishment for the front, divisions destined for the newly formed armies in the Tyluash were simultaneously delivered.

These troops, engaged in combat training, had the task of creating defense lines in depth in the formation areas and immediately occupying them. In the event of a breakthrough by the Germans near Moscow and their exit to the Volga, they could continue to conduct hostilities. This confirms that if Moscow had fallen, then Stalin would not have considered the war lost, as the German command hoped, but would have been ready to fight further inland. Since the Russian command was convinced by previous experience that the introduction of reserves into battle in small portions was irrational and only led to large losses, the Stavka began to create a shock fist from the reserves, intending to bring these forces into battle concentratedly, in the main directions. The fact that the Russians covered the gaps on the front west of Moscow with workers' detachments, and not with regular troops, only reinforced the German perception that the Russians were exhausted and that the war in the East could be ended in the not too distant future. In a conversation with Ciano on October 25, 1941, Hitler asserted “that, as the events of the past four months testify, the fate of the war has, in fact, been decided and that the enemy has no opportunity to prevent this ... Under these circumstances, the war will soon be again transferred to the West ... ". In reality, the situation at the front was far from being so favorable for the Wehrmacht. At the end of October, the Russian front was so strengthened111^ that the command of the Western Front believed that they could stop a new German offensive. Zhukov's October 30th order to go on the defensive was symptomatic in that it showed how Zhukov, using new methods, intended to conduct combat operations and gain time in doing so.

First of all, all highways and other roads leading to the defense areas were mined and badly damaged over a distance of 100 km. All tank-dangerous directions between the roads were mined in order to prevent the possibility of a detour. Through the construction of barricades, ditches and other obstacles, it was supposed to slow down the advance of the German infantry units, if necessary, the defenders were even to flood the areas of the terrain lying in front of their front line. It was ordered to create a number of "anti-tank areas" (Kalugino, Drakino, Lopasnya, Stremilovo, Kamenka, Kresty, Istra, Naro-Fominsk, Petrovskoye, Akulovo, Kubinka, Dorokhov, Serpukhov, Zvenigorod, Mikhailovskoye, Lokotnya, Anufrievo, NovoPetrovskoye, Teryaeva Sloboda), in which all available anti-tank weapons - anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, tanks and infantry support guns. In addition to these areas, "anti-tank areas" were additionally created by the forces of the armies and divisions at the junctions of formations.

The commanders in the field paid special attention to ensuring that the battle formations of the troops at their disposal were echeloned in depth and that sufficient reserves were allocated at all levels, from the regiment and above, which could be brought into battle at a decisive moment. To ensure reliable command and control of troops, communication lines, as well as command posts, were well hidden underground. At the junctions of units and formations, the commanders used well-trained communications. Zhukov again and again pointed out the need to organize interaction between infantry and artillery, tanks and aircraft, and placed responsibility for this on the commanders of units and formations. Since the command of the Western Front did not expect a major German offensive in the foreseeable future, it believed that it would be possible in a relatively calm environment to complete the necessary defensive measures and prepare to repel the German offensive.

K. Reinhardt. Turn near Moscow.