Alexander Matsegora spoke about the conditions under which it is possible for Pyongyang to freeze nuclear explosions and missile launches

Alexander Matsegora

Moscow. January 30. website - The Russian Ambassador to the DPRK, in an interview with Interfax on the eve of Diplomat's Day, spoke about the conditions under which Pyongyang could freeze nuclear explosions and missile launches, how sanctions affected cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, and that contact with He may have an indirect connection with the North Korean leader, but he does have one.

Alexander Ivanovich, this year marks 70 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and the DPRK. Tell us how the countries are going to celebrate this significant date, are there plans for contacts between Moscow and Pyongyang at the highest and highest levels?

The 70th anniversary of our relationship is indeed a very important and significant date, and we, of course, will celebrate it. It is assumed that we will agree on some kind of informal plan with our Korean colleagues: maybe it will not be signed, but there will be a plan. It will include a number of events that we will hold in Moscow, and the Koreans will hold in Pyongyang. Moreover, these events will be carried out both at the level of ministries of foreign affairs, as I assume, and at the level of embassies. If we talk about what our embassy will do in Pyongyang, I would like to suggest to our Korean colleagues that they give me the opportunity to speak on television. I already performed on Korean television in 2015, when we celebrated the 70th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, and I hope that they will give me such an opportunity again. This will probably be the main event at the embassy.

As for events at the state or intergovernmental level, this issue is still in the process of discussion and agreement. I do not rule out that there will be some kind of high-level visit. A decision on this matter has not yet been made. Apparently, there will be joint photo exhibitions dedicated to the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Our Korean colleagues are committed to quite active events.

- Visit, do you mean, from our side to the DPRK or vice versa?

Perhaps this will be an exchange of visits, because, as far as I know, contacts between parliaments were planned at a fairly high level. I do not rule out that this is exactly what will be discussed.

- That is, not through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

This has not been discussed yet. Perhaps consultations on this matter will take place in the near future, and some kind of agreement will be reached. There is no solution yet.

While in Pyongyang, at what level do you maintain contacts with the North Korean leadership? Have you ever been received by the leader of a country?

I personally know Kim Jong-un. True, we met him back in 2010 (Kim Jong-un has held the post of supreme leader of the DPRK since 2011 - IF). Since my arrival in Pyongyang (Matsegora has been the Russian Ambassador to the DPRK since December 2014 - IF) As an ambassador, we did not have such face-to-face meetings, but we did have indirect contacts - to convey oral or written messages, etc. And from the leadership of the DPRK, I communicate with Lee Su Yong - he is a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, where he is responsible for foreign policy, and with Lee Yong Ho - the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These are my most senior partners.

Question on the current situation: US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson rejected the Russian concept of a “double freeze”, how great is the risk in this regard that after the “Olympic Truce” the situation on the Korean Peninsula will escalate again and return to the brink of military confrontation?

Although our American colleagues verbally reject our concept of a “double freeze,” in essence, a “double freeze” is now happening. The Americans have rescheduled their exercises; their Korean colleagues, for their part, are refraining from launches and explosions. Essentially, this is a "double freeze" in action - whether one likes it or not. And, thank God, this is happening.

As for the risk that after the “Olympic Truce” the situation may worsen, it must be said that the situation on the Korean Peninsula, unfortunately, is generally difficult to predict long-term - it is influenced by many factors. In particular, what kind of exercises will the Americans conduct after the Olympics, how large-scale and provocative, according to the northerners, they will be. And a lot depends on how inter-Korean events go now. I think that if they are successful and the Koreans get a taste for resuming communication, then this will be a very serious factor in keeping the situation from slipping into tension. I really hope this happens.

The American side expressed concern about the safety of North Korea's nuclear facilities in the event of internal political upheavals in this country. In your assessment, is there really a threat of internal political instability in the DPRK, and is there any reason to fear for the safety of nuclear facilities, including military ones?

As far as we know and are monitoring the situation, there is absolutely no danger of internal political destabilization in the country. The political situation in the DPRK is stable, the state and the country's leadership are guaranteed to keep all processes under control, and there are no protests taking place. I don't know what the Americans' concerns are based on. There are no threats or dangers of such a development of events now.

- So you don’t see a threat to the safety of nuclear facilities either?

If there is no danger of internal political instability, then of course not, what can we talk about?

The DPRK leadership stated that, in fact, work on their nuclear missile program was completed. Does North Korea's nuclear missile potential pose a threat to Russia? Are there any signs that Pyongyang will stop at this stage in the development of its nuclear missile potential or will it continue to develop the program, missile launches and nuclear tests?

The leadership of the DPRK, to be precise, stated that the goal of turning the country into a nuclear missile power had been achieved. That is, there was no announcement about the completion of work on the program as such. This is a very important detail.

As for the threat to Russia, the Koreans have repeatedly stated that their missiles are not aimed at us, I think that this is actually the case. But the very fact of the presence of nuclear missile weapons in the DPRK, the persistence of a situation of permanent acute tension, US-North Korean and inter-Korean confrontation, of course, leads to the fact that Russia does not feel safe either.

North Korean nuclear testing sites are located near our borders, and the wind pattern there is such that if, God forbid, there is some kind of emergency situation, our territory could suffer. Therefore, of course, we are not indifferent to what is happening there. We are concerned about the situation on the Korean Peninsula - that's a fact.

As for whether Pyongyang will stop at this stage or continue developing its program, naturally, it is difficult for us to judge what thoughts and what plans are in the minds of the DPRK leadership in this regard. I think a lot will depend on how things go in inter-Korean relations. Because Pyongyang understands that the next nuclear test or missile launch will not only call into question further inter-Korean rapprochement, but will simply completely destroy it. From my point of view, if this rapprochement is successful, and Pyongyang feels that there are prospects for deeper interaction, despite the sanctions (which the Koreans may try to negotiate among themselves), then there is a serious likelihood that the DPRK will refrain from new explosions and launches.

That is, do you think that the US-South Korean exercises, which, although they have been postponed, will take place in any case, may not become a factor that will provoke North Korea to new tests?

Of course, the northerners are very nervous when these exercises take place. Moreover, when the organizers of these exercises announce that they are working on the tasks of capturing Pyongyang, destroying the leadership of the DPRK, landing troops on the coast of the DPRK, and establishing administrative control over the provinces of North Korea. Well, who will like it? Of course, the North Koreans don't like this very much.

But I must say that in the past, exercises were held every year. And even during these maneuvers, both six-party and inter-Korean negotiations took place. The exercises, naturally, were a deterrent in the movement of northerners and southerners towards each other, and generally complicated the situation, but they were not an insurmountable obstacle.

On the issue of inter-Korean contacts: does Russia support South Korea’s initiative to move to discussing denuclearization issues? Is Moscow ready to facilitate such a dialogue and offer one of the Russian cities as a platform for possible contacts?

What topics the Koreans will discuss at their meetings is, of course, first and foremost a question that they decide among themselves. At the moment, the northerners categorically refused to include the nuclear missile topic on the agenda. But, it seems to me, they can reason soberly and understand that southerners cannot avoid discussing it.

Another thing is that it is impossible to solve this problem only in the inter-Korean format. The North Koreans have said many times that their nuclear weapons are a response to the threat from the United States, which means that they will discuss this issue primarily with Washington.

As for whether we are ready to assist, I will say this: in past years we offered our help, offered our cities to southerners and northerners to organize their meetings. Although the problem is not the meeting place, they can easily agree on this. They can meet in Panmunjom, Seoul, and Pyongyang. But, if they suddenly want to go to Vladivostok, for example, I think that we will provide them with such an opportunity with great pleasure.

- So this issue is simply not on the agenda at the moment?

Not yet. So far they are quite successfully negotiating in Panmunjom, in the demilitarized zone.

Recently, accusations against Russia have often been heard from the American side and in the Western press that we are somehow assisting Pyongyang in circumventing sanctions regarding oil supplies and the coal embargo. The latest accusations have already been directed at us that we are violating the provisions of the UN Security Council resolution. Are these claims justified?

These claims are completely unfounded. As an ambassador, I know this situation very well. We have open statistics on the supply of petroleum products to North Korea, and every month we transmit data on the volume of these supplies to the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council. The volumes are small: about 500-600-700 tons of high-quality gasoline per month.

As for transshipment at sea, that is, illegal delivery, this is simply unprofitable from an economic point of view, not to mention the fact that we are committed to the resolution and are fully implementing it. After the introduction of additional internal excise taxes on Russian petroleum products, they became too expensive for Koreans. Our exporters have no economic incentive for such supplies, not to mention the fact that they are not inclined to take risks and put their business at risk.

As for coal, Russia is the largest exporter of this type of raw material. The Koreans were once our competitors in the Chinese market. In recent years, North Korea has supplied up to 25 million tons of coal to China. It is simply impossible to imagine that we, having our own coal, would suddenly start selling North Korean coal at incredible risk.

I don’t know what goal those who are trying to spread these rumors are pursuing. Perhaps they are simply trying to completely intimidate companies that would be willing to cooperate with North Korea in legal areas.

And there are enough such areas left, for example, petroleum products. About 60 thousand tons can be legally supplied to the DPRK within the framework of quotas determined by the Security Council. But in order to intimidate suppliers and discourage them from North Korea, perhaps such accusations are made against us.

There is a lot of talk about how China even “exceeds” the requirements of the resolution, while we do the opposite. That is, we do not have such a task - to reduce cooperation with North Korea as much as possible, following calls from Washington?

Of course not. We don't have such a task. We consider all these unilateral sanctions illegitimate. We consider the sanctions that the Americans and other states impose unilaterally, bypassing the Security Council, to be illegal and aimed solely at creating additional problems for the population of the DPRK.

And the resolutions indicate that they are aimed primarily at preventing the development of North Korea’s nuclear missile programs, and not against the civilian economy and population. Therefore, where permitted by resolutions, we will cooperate. For example, supply food if Koreans are willing to pay for it, legally supply petroleum products within certain quotas, and so on.

Another aspect of the sanctions is the situation with North Korean workers. Will Russia fulfill the requirement of the UN Security Council resolution to stop using North Korean labor within 24 months, and will this not create problems in bilateral relations with the DPRK? In this regard, are measures being prepared to prevent the influx of illegal workers from the DPRK, in particular, when passenger traffic is resumed on the Vladivostok-Rajin ferry route?

North Korean illegal immigrants in Russia in large numbers - this is absolutely impossible. Firstly, unlike all other guest workers, Koreans come to us through Korean state companies. They send them to us not individually, but in groups, construction teams. I simply cannot imagine that they will go to Russia illegally, it is impossible from any point of view. Of course, we will be forced to implement this decision of the Security Council, especially since we voted for it, and send all workers from Russia by the end of 2019. Although, to be honest, we will create serious problems for them in this way. Korean workers in Russia worked and earned money not only for their state, but also for their families. On average, every Korean working in Russia supports over 10 of his relatives with the money he earns here. Now they are returning, and they are faced with the question of how to continue to support them while in North Korea. For these tens of thousands of people returning, they need to look for work, and an employment problem arises. But there is nowhere to go. Once the decision has been made, we will definitely implement it. This is a very serious blow to families, and frankly, if the initiators of this idea had the task of creating problems for ordinary people in the DPRK, then they can be “congratulated,” they created these problems.

But at the same time, the stated purpose of the ban on the use of North Korean labor is to cut off one of the sources of financing for the nuclear missile program.

You know, the initiators of increasing pressure on the DPRK seem to be simply forcing the North Koreans to once again demonstrate their nuclear missile capabilities and prove that they don’t care about these new sanctions. It is impossible to resolve the DPRK nuclear missile problem solely through economic and military pressure.

The last question concerns our trade and economic cooperation: at what level is it now and in what direction is it moving?

Our trade is now at an extremely low level, and there is a completely objective reason for this. Firstly, the system of legal payments has been completely destroyed. It is impossible to pay money for Korean goods through a bank, and it is also impossible to sell our goods to Koreans, since they will not be able to transfer their money to our bank, I mean dollars and euros.

As for ships, in fact, due to unilateral US sanctions, now any ship that calls at a Korean port cannot call at any other port for 180 days. As a result, shipowners refuse to go to the DPRK. And therefore the situation in trade, not only, by the way, with Russia, is now critical.

- Precisely because of sanctions?

Precisely because of the sanctions. I repeat, if the initiators of these sanctions aimed to create economic problems for the DPRK, then they succeeded in this. Although they could not stop either the explosions or the launches. Our trade is now limited to one-time deliveries, and our suppliers, who still work with Koreans, receive payment in rubles. Ruble payments are possible, but such exchange of goods occurs in very small volumes. Last year, according to preliminary estimates, our trade amounted to just over $80 million. This year, I think, this volume will decrease even more.

fix

RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITH DPRK

On October 12, 1948, the USSR was the first to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK. North Korea officially recognized the Russian Federation as the legal successor of the former USSR. On February 9, 2000, a new interstate Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation was concluded in Pyongyang. The legal basis for Russian-North Korean relations also consists of the Pyongyang (2000) and Moscow Declarations (2001), signed during the visits of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to the DPRK and the Chairman of the State Defense Committee of the DPRK Kim Jong Il to Russia.

Russia and the DPRK maintain political dialogue at the highest and highest levels, contacts and exchanges between various departments of the two countries, and inter-parliamentary relations are developing.

On August 24, 2011, negotiations between Dmitry Medvedev and Kim Jong Il took place in Ulan-Ude, during which a wide range of issues of bilateral relations, as well as regional issues, including the situation surrounding the settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula, were discussed. The agenda also included the implementation of trilateral (Russian Federation - Republic of Korea - DPRK) economic cooperation projects - connecting Korean railways with the Trans-Siberian Railway, construction of a power transmission line and laying a gas pipeline from the Russian Federation to the Republic of Korea through the territory of the DPRK.

The death of Kim Jong Il (December 19, 2011) and the accelerated transfer of power to Kim Jong Un initially did not have a significant impact on the overall vector of development of bilateral relations. During the exchange of telegrams, Kim Jong-un assured the Russian leadership that the continuity of the DPRK's policy in the Russian direction would be maintained.

However, North Korean nuclear missile experiments, carried out contrary to the demands of the world community at the end of 2012 - beginning of 2013, could not but have a negative impact on the dynamics of the development of our relations. Russia supported the corresponding UN Security Council resolution 2094 of March 7, 2013, which further tightened sanctions aimed at stopping Pyongyang’s programs in this area. Many planned bilateral events and contacts were cancelled. In particular, the meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission was postponed to a later date.

At the same time, efforts were continued to find ways to reduce tension on the peninsula and to resume the six-party negotiations on the settlement of the nuclear war as soon as possible. In 2013, congratulatory telegrams were exchanged at the highest level on the occasion of the Liberation Day of Korea (August 15), V.V. Putin sent a telegram to Kim Jong-un on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK (September 9), our ministers congratulated each other on the 65th -anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations (October 12). On July 4, 2013, consultations between the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia V.G. Titov and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia I.V. Morgulov with the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK Kim Kye Gwan took place in Moscow.

February 5-10 this year Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK Kim Yong Nam visited the Russian Federation and took part in the opening ceremony of the XXII Winter Olympic Games. On February 7, in Sochi, he had a brief protocol contact with V.V. Putin. Negotiations were also held with V.I. Matvienko.

During the visit to Pyongyang of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan R.N. Minnikhanov on March 21-22 this year. Issues of bilateral trade and economic cooperation were substantively discussed.

On March 25-27, the Minister for the Development of the Far East A.S. Galushka visited Pyongyang as co-chairman of the Russian-North Korean Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, during which a constructive exchange of views took place on further improvement of the mechanisms of interstate interaction in the trade, economic and scientific sectors.

On April 28-30, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Far Eastern Federal District, Yu.P. Trutnev, visited the DPRK. The head of the Russian delegation had meetings with Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK Pak Pong Du, Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the DPRK Ro Du Cher.

The contractual and legal framework of bilateral relations continues to be improved - an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Prevention of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Harvesting of Living Marine Resources, an Agreement on the State Border Regime, an Agreement on the Settlement of the Debt of the DPRK to the Russian Federation on Loans Extended by the USSR, an Exchange Plan are signed between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK for 2013-2014. and a number of other protocols and agreements. The Agreement on the reception and transfer of persons who have violated the legislation of the parties on the entry, exit and stay of foreign citizens, and the Agreement on legal assistance in criminal cases are being prepared for signing.

Russia is one of the traditional trade and economic partners of the DPRK. International sanctions, as well as unilateral restrictions imposed by some countries, seriously complicate the development of our economic ties. However, the volume of Russian-North Korean trade turnover in 2013 increased by 64.2% compared to 2012 and amounted to 112.7 million US dollars, incl. Russian exports to the DPRK - $103.4 million (an increase of 77.0%), imports from the DPRK - $9.3 million (a decrease of 9.1%).

The only bilateral investment project being implemented in practice at this stage is the reconstruction of the Khasan-Rajin railway section (almost completed) and the third berth of the Rajin port (planned to be completed by mid-2014), carried out by Russian Railways JSC in the interests of creating a large transshipment terminal.

Russia continues to provide humanitarian assistance to the DPRK - in 2013-2014, through international organizations, fortified wheat flour, 50 fire engines, and sets of medical equipment and medicine were supplied to the DPRK. In addition, significant assistance is also provided bilaterally.

Contacts between public organizations, friendship societies, and higher educational institutions have intensified somewhat. Tours of Russian creative groups to the DPRK have resumed - on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in October 2013, the “Orchestra of the 21st Century” performed in Pyongyang under the direction of People’s Artist of Russia P.B. Ovsyannikov. In April this year In the DPRK, the Ensemble of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia took part in the “April Spring” festival under the direction of People’s Artist of Russia V.P. Eliseev.

fix

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

1. GENERAL INFORMATION

Area - 122.8 thousand square meters. km, or 55% of the territory of all Korea. In the north it borders with the People's Republic of China (1360 km) and the Russian Federation (39.1 km, including along the Tumangan River - 16.9 km, by sea - 22.2 km). Population – about 24.5 million people. The capital is Pyongyang (with its suburbs - 2.6 million inhabitants).

Administratively, the DPRK consists of nine provinces, two cities with special status - Nampo and Rason, counties and villages. The Rason trade and economic, Kaesong industrial and Kumgan tourist zones have special administrative status.

2. STATE STRUCTURE

North Korea is a socialist state.

The State Defense Committee of the DPRK has been declared the highest governing body of the country. Its First Chairman - Kim Jong-un - is the "highest official", the supreme commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA).

According to the Constitution, the highest legislative body is the unicameral Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) of the DPRK, elected for five years. In the period between sessions, its work is led by the Presidium of the Supreme Council. The last elections to the Supreme Council were held in March 2014. Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council - Kim Yong Nam (represents the DPRK in foreign relations), Chairman of the Supreme Council - Choi Thae Bok.

The highest administrative and executive body of power is the Cabinet of Ministers. Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers - Park Pong Du.

Local authorities - provincial, city, county people's assemblies are elected for a term of four years. During the period between sessions, local power is exercised by people's committees.

A special role in North Korean society is played by the Workers' Party of Korea (First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea - Kim Jong-un), which has about 4 million members and candidate members.

3. ECONOMIC SITUATION

The DPRK is pursuing a course of “self-reliance” in the economy, focusing on a rigid administrative-command system. The situation in the national economy of the country, which is experiencing a deep systemic socio-economic crisis, remains difficult.

In 2013, at the March plenum of the Central Committee of the WPK, a decision was made to implement a new strategic course, “Penjin,” the essence of which boils down to parallel economic construction and the build-up of “nuclear deterrent forces.”

North Korea is extremely militarized. The number of KPA is about 850 thousand people. About 15% of the budget is spent on defense.

4. FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITIES

The DPRK maintains diplomatic relations with 166 countries, as well as with the European Union and ASEAN, and is a member of more than 250 international organizations.

The DPRK joined the UN at the same time as the Republic of Korea in 1991.

Pyongyang’s foreign policy doctrine is based on the ideas of “independence” and “originality,” opposed to globalization and openness in world politics and economics. In international relations, the DPRK defends the principle of state sovereignty and opposes any actions aimed at exerting forceful pressure and interfering in the internal affairs of independent states.

The DPRK carries out its foreign policy activities under the conditions of sanctions imposed in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions (No. 1718, 1874, 2087, 2094, 2270), condemning the North Korean nuclear missile program.

5. INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS

The DPRK and the Republic of Korea were proclaimed on September 9 and August 15, 1948, respectively, after attempts to recreate a unified Korean state failed. According to the Armistice Agreement, signed on July 27, 1953 following the 1950-1953 war, North and South Korea are separated by a military demarcation line, on both sides of which there is a demilitarized zone with a total width of 4 kilometers.

In July 1972, the Joint Statement of the North and the South was signed, which set out the basic principles of unification - independently, without relying on external forces; in peaceful way; based on the "great national consolidation".

In 1991, the DPRK and the ROK entered into an Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Cooperation and Exchanges, and in 1992 they adopted the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In the entire history of relations, two inter-Korean summits have taken place. Both took place in Pyongyang: June 13-15, 2000, between former DPRK leader Kim Jong Il and then-ROK President Kim Dae-jung, and October 2-4, 2007, between Kim Jong-il and then-ROK President Roh Moo-hyun.

The nuclear test and launch of a launch vehicle carried out in North Korea in 2016 complicated the prospects for the normalization of inter-Korean relations and became the reason for increasing the military activity of the United States and the Republic of Korea in Northeast Asia.

6. RUSSIAN-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS

North Korea officially recognized the Russian Federation as the legal successor of the former USSR. On February 9, 2000, a new interstate Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation was concluded in Pyongyang. The legal basis for Russian-North Korean relations also consists of the Pyongyang (2000) and Moscow (2011) declarations, signed during the visits of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to the DPRK and the Chairman of the State Defense Committee of the DPRK Kim Jong Il to Russia.

Russia and the DPRK maintain political dialogue at the highest and highest levels; develop contacts and exchanges between various departments of the two countries, inter-parliamentary relations.

North Korean nuclear missile experiments, carried out contrary to the demands of the international community, had a negative impact on the dynamics of the development of bilateral relations. Russia supported UN Security Council Resolution No. 2270 of March 2, 2016, which further tightened sanctions aimed at stopping Pyongyang’s nuclear missile programs.

At the same time, efforts were continued to find ways to reduce tension on the peninsula and to resume the six-party negotiations on the settlement of the nuclear war as soon as possible.

The contractual and legal framework of bilateral relations continues to be improved: an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Prevention of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of Marine Resources, an Agreement on the State Border Regime, an Agreement on the Settlement of the Debt of the DPRK to the Russian Federation on Loans Extended by the USSR, an Agreement on Acceptance and Transfer persons who have violated the legislation on the entry, exit and stay of foreign citizens, the Agreement on Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters and a number of other documents.

The volume of Russian-North Korean trade turnover remains low and in 2014 amounted to 92.3 million US dollars.

The only bilateral investment project that has received practical implementation is the reconstruction of the Hasan-Rajin railway section and the pier in the port of Rajin.

Russia continues to provide humanitarian assistance to the DPRK through international organizations, as well as through bilateral channels.

Contacts are developing through public organizations, friendship societies, and higher educational institutions.

Today, July 30, the editors of Military Review received a message from the DPRK Embassy in the Russian Federation, which refers to the successful testing of the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile. "Military Review" cites the text of the letter in its entirety:

Under the personal leadership of the Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Chairman of the State Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (State Council of the DPRK), the Supreme Commander of the KPA, the highest leader of our party, state and army, Comrade Kim Jong-un, on the night of July 28, 106 of Juche (2017), the second test launch of the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile.

The respected supreme leader, who with his extraordinary military wisdom, bold will and quick-witted resourcefulness always performs all-conquering miracles and declares checkmate to victory, refuting the predictions of the people of the world, presented the combat mission to the sphere of missile research.

Conduct a test launch in the shortest possible time, simulating the maximum range of the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile, and once again confirm the reliability of the complete missile system.

Scientists and technicians in the field of national defense - loyal fighters of our party, who with absolute confidence in the party share ideas, breath, steps with the leader and take any fortress in one fell swoop, carried out a mortal battle with full confidence that they will clearly show the strong power of the strategic nuclear armed forces of the TPK to the whole world. And we completed preparations for the second test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile ahead of schedule.

During the preparations for the test launch of the second intercontinental ballistic missile, Hwasong-14, the respected senior leader received reports on this every day in a row. And he gave prudent instructions, and on the night of the launch day he personally went to the rocket test launch site and supervised on the spot.

This test launch was conducted to definitively confirm the overall technical specifications of the weapon system, including the maximum firing range of the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is capable of carrying a large, heavy nuclear warhead.

As soon as the respected senior leader ordered the launch, the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile immediately rose into deep space.

The Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile, launched in the northwestern region of our country, rose to 3,724.9㎞ (maximum peak), flew 998㎞ in 47 minutes. 12 seconds and exactly hit the specified water area in the open sea.

The test launch was conducted at the highest possible angle, simulating maximum fire reach, and did not have any negative impact on the safety of surrounding countries.

The respected senior leader proudly said that the reliability of the ICBM system was once again confirmed in this test launch, and the ability to suddenly launch an ICBM anywhere and at any time was demonstrated. And it has been clearly proven that the entire US mainland has now come under our guns.

The respected senior leader said that today we deliberately conducted a test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, staged at maximum firing range, to sternly warn the United States, which, having lost its mind the other day, is talking empty nonsense. Looking at the current level, the drafters of US policy probably correctly understood that if they even touch our state with their fingers, then the aggressive state of the so-called USA will not be in vain.

The respected senior leader said that the arrogant nonsense of war and the threat of extreme US sanctions against our state will, on the contrary, awaken, inspire us and strengthen our argument for possessing nuclear weapons. And he emphasized that for our people, who have experienced on this earth the terrible scourge of war by American beasts, the mighty deterrent force of war for the defense of the state is a necessary strategic choice, nothing irreversible and an incomparable expensive strategic asset.

The respected senior leader noted that if, despite our repeated warning, the United States again sticks its evil face into our land and launches an absurd game with nuclear weapons, we will correct their bad inclinations with our strategic nuclear forces, which we have shown in detail.

The respected senior leader warmly congratulated scientists, technicians and missile research workers who once again demonstrated to the world the independent dignity and majestic appearance of the Juche nuclear power, the world's leading missile development country, by successfully conducting the second test launch of the Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile " And I took a photo with everyone as a souvenir. That touching look will remain for a long time.

Our Republic, under the banner of the new parallel line of the great Workers' Party of Korea, will certainly achieve final Victory in the anti-imperialist and anti-American struggle by developing and improving more powerful strategic and Juche weapons, demonstrating to the whole world the invincible power and potential development forces of Juche Korea.

We remind you that the DPRK carried out another launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile - the second one in July. On Saturday night, reports appeared about the DPRK launching a new ballistic missile towards the island of Hokkaido in the Sea of ​​Japan. It was released in the mountainous province of Chagando. According to the South Korean military, the new DPRK missile flew about a thousand kilometers, reaching a maximum altitude of 3.7 thousand kilometers. South Korea believes that this time it was presumably an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The United States also believes that North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile.

According to the Russian defense department, the missile rose to a height of 681 kilometers and flew 732 kilometers, falling in the central part of the Sea of ​​​​Japan. As the Ministry of Defense noted, Moscow monitored Pyongyang’s missile launch, which was carried out in the direction from the borders of the Russian Federation and did not pose a danger to Russian territory.

Alexander Matsegora spoke about the difficulties in Russian-North Korean cooperation under sanctions

Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Alexander Matsegora

Moscow. July 18. website - The Russian Ambassador spoke in an interview with Interfax about how long the emerging denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will last, about the role of Russia in this process, about the difficulties in Russian-North Korean cooperation under sanctions, about the fate of joint economic projects with the participation of Russia and the two Koreas in the DPRK Alexander Matsegora.

Alexander Ivanovich, have practical preparations for the Russian-North Korean summit already begun, is there any clarity about where and when it will be held, and is it possible that the summit will take place not in Russia, but in the DPRK?

Regarding the Russian-North Korean summit, I would like to refer you to the statement on this matter by Presidential Press Secretary D.S. Peskova. As a last resort, you can refer to the KCNA press release following the meeting between Sergei Viktorovich Lavrov and the leader of the DPRK Kim Jong-un. It said the following: the parties agreed to hold a summit meeting. There is nothing to add to this yet.

US officials say complete denuclearization in North Korea can be achieved within one year. How realistic are these forecasts, what are our calculations, and can we say that this process has already been launched, or is it all still at the declaration level and is still far from any real progress?

The process of denuclearization of the DPRK cannot be separated from the solution of the second part of the problem - providing Pyongyang with guarantees that the United States will renounce hostility towards the republic. This is exactly what the North Koreans indicate in their official documents, including the results of Trump’s meeting with Kim Jong-un.

That is, they are talking not only about guarantees of military security. Guarantees of non-hostility are a much broader concept.

So, if the US President guarantees such a renunciation of hostility, and the North Korean leader believes in this, taking into account the fact that the Koreans, at the call of their leader, are ready for any labor feats (remember how they almost instantly destroyed the Punggye-ri nuclear test site), Pyongyang can very quickly clear your nuclear site. The main thing is that there is such trust. However, there are other questions. For example, financial resources.

North Korean denuclearization will cost a lot of money. Let me give you one example. In 2008, the six-party process agreed to decommission the cooling tower of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor as one of the first steps. So, preparing the project for its dismantling and the explosion itself cost $2.5 million, which the Americans paid out of their own pockets. Now the Koreans have carried out calculations at their own expense and destroyed the Phunggye-ri training ground, and I very much doubt that they will continue to do everything at their own expense. After all, we are talking about dozens of nuclear facilities. The United States will probably want to completely destroy uranium mines, enterprises, infrastructure, scientific laboratories, etc. This all costs a lot of money and, of course, will require expert verification and time.

The task is extremely difficult, but the fact that the Americans are talking with the Koreans on this topic, that the US President and Secretary of State are talking with the leadership of the DPRK on this topic, is in itself a huge advance. Washington does not threaten, does not pull squadrons and squadrons to the Korean Peninsula, but is looking for a negotiated settlement - this can only be welcomed.

At the moment, is there any idea who could take on this financial burden and is this issue being discussed at all?

In general, judging by what the Koreans said following the visit of US Secretary of State Pompeo to Pyongyang, our American colleagues this time were not ready to discuss such details, including what they could give in return. The Koreans lament that they expected to receive proposals from the Americans to create a system for maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula (this was indicated in a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry following Pompeo’s visit). But that did not happen.

- What do North Koreans mean by the concept of “renunciation of hostility”?

They have never deciphered this concept in one paragraph. However, if you put together everything that was previously written on this topic by North Korean authors, who always express only the official position, you will get a fairly extensive list of demands. This is the signing of a peace treaty, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the opening of embassies, the withdrawal of American troops from South Korean territory, the revision of US-South Korean defense agreements, and so on. It is clear that the entire list is a maximum program. What is the minimum that they will agree to, this must be asked from the Koreans, but Pyongyang’s request position is very serious.

South Korean and American media write that the DPRK has allegedly stepped up work at a nuclear test site in the nuclear center in Yongbyon, there is a missile engine testing site, in general, they are expanding their enterprises for the creation of ballistic missiles, and that in reality, Western journalists suggest that Pyongyang is deliberately understates data on its nuclear potential. Do we have any information on this matter that could confirm or refute these reports? And how sincere, in your opinion, is Pyongyang really in its desire for denuclearization, or are both the American and North Korean sides behaving according to the principle “if you want peace, prepare for war”?

A list of North Korean nuclear facilities has already been presented once during the six-party talks. (Russia, China, USA, Japan and two Koreas - IF), and on this list we have broken a lot of teeth and spears in our time. Naturally, the Americans were unhappy; it seemed to them that the Koreans did not include all the objects in it.

By the way, this topic promises to be one of the most difficult in the future. Indeed, in practical terms, the conversation should begin with agreeing on a list of objects that are subject to destruction as part of the denuclearization process. It is difficult to avoid a situation in which the Americans will believe that this or that facility belongs to the nuclear program, and the Koreans will say that this is a purely civilian enterprise. The Americans will respond by demanding that they be allowed into the site in order to verify what this object really is, etc. We've all been through this before. However, be that as it may, all this work will have to be done. It’s difficult for me to answer your question about American satellite data.

As for the sincerity of Kim Jong-un, then, judging by what and how he said during the meeting in Singapore with Trump and during the conversation with Lavrov in Pyongyang - and I was a direct participant in the latter, it seemed to me that he was very sincere. This, however, is my purely personal opinion.

Based on media publications of data from American satellites against the backdrop of warming relations between the United States and the DPRK, can we conclude that the American side is not so open?

Americans, for example, in the context of Russian-American relations, often choose the timing and nature of some information leaks in order to resolve some of their internal political issues. I do not rule out that here we are dealing with a similar case. There are many in the United States who would like to question what Trump is doing on the Korean platform.

Assuming that US-North Korean contacts progress, will they still need the assistance of other parties? Is Russia ready to provide assistance in destroying the DPRK's nuclear weapons, taking into account our accumulated experience in this area?

Our president said that, if necessary, we are ready to provide our guarantees. Of course, everything related to the elimination of the DPRK’s military nuclear potential is a task that should be addressed primarily by the nuclear powers, the “nuclear five,” including Russia.

We were involved in this process during previous attempts to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and will definitely be involved in this process in the future. However, I am afraid that some time will pass before this issue becomes relevant.

Unlike the United States, the Russian side, like the North Korean side, speaks of the need for denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula. Does this mean that nuclear weapons should be removed from South Korean territory, that American troops should leave the peninsula? And should denuclearization be connected with the dismantling of the American missile defense system in South Korea and Japan?

I want to draw your attention to the fact that in the Singapore Declaration this topic is designated precisely as the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula, not the North Korean nuclear problem. This is the unchanged position of our North Korean colleagues, and the Americans in Singapore accepted it. By the way, there were also six-party negotiations to resolve the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula.

The Americans once said that they had completely withdrawn their nuclear weapons from South Korea; they claim that now they are not there. This topic was also raised during the six-party talks. The North Koreans said that if their opponents want to check everything, then they will also demand inspections of facilities in the South to confirm the absence of American nuclear weapons there. The northerners cannot be denied logic, although I remember the Americans and the southerners were very nervous. Including regarding questions from the northern side about visits to the ports of the Republic of Korea by American nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers (The Americans do not confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on their ships that call at the ports of South Korea).

So the concept of “nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula” has serious meaning and significance.

You mentioned the verifiable nature of denuclearization. From Washington we hear the formula that lifting sanctions is possible only after this process has acquired a verifiable irreversible character. How do we feel about this formula, and what steps, in your opinion, should Pyongyang take to begin the gradual lifting of sanctions?

I return to the Singapore Declaration. There were four points: in the first place - the normalization of bilateral relations between the DPRK and the United States, in the second - the creation of a peacekeeping system on the Korean Peninsula; on the third - denuclearization; the fourth is the return of the remains of American prisoners of war killed during the Korean War. The day after Kim Jong-un returned to Pyongyang, local newspapers published extensive reporting on the results of his visit. It literally noted the following: US President Trump agreed that the parties’ actions as part of the denuclearization process should be gradual and synchronous. This means that the American administration understands the counterproductiveness of demands for exclusively unilateral steps on the part of the DPRK; something must be offered and done in return. Easing sanctions is one possible option.

- Has Pyongyang approached us for assistance in lifting international sanctions?

The fact is that the DPRK does not recognize the UN Security Council sanctions. They believe that these restrictions are unfair and illegal, and refuse to recognize them. If you raise the question of weakening or removing them, you recognize the sanctions. This is the logic here.

How can you currently assess the humanitarian situation in North Korea, whether the country needs any additional assistance. If so, which one first?

The humanitarian situation in the DPRK is primarily addressed by the UN and other international and national humanitarian organizations.

The situation in this sense, of course, remains tense in the DPRK. We are talking about food shortages, shortages of medicines, and other difficulties experienced primarily by the least protected segments of the population. We do not see any improvement in the situation. North Korea desperately needs help.

At the same time, sanctions, to put it mildly, do not help solve existing problems. The delivery, for example, of humanitarian supplies that international organizations collect, including, by the way, through Russian contributions, faces incredible difficulties. It is difficult to finance the operational activities of humanitarian agency workers - banking channels are completely blocked.

Last week, reports appeared in Western agencies, citing sources, that the American side had filed a complaint with the UN Security Council sanctions committee that North Korea was violating the oil embargo. This document featured a Russian ship under the Russian flag, which allegedly participated in the transshipment of oil products. Do you know anything about this?

Everything about this matter is clear to me. I'll explain why. All supplies of gasoline and diesel fuel that are carried out from Russia are reported monthly to the 1718 Committee of the UN Security Council. As a rule, we are talking about several hundred tons of high-quality Russian gasoline and diesel fuel. This, as we understand, fully satisfies the Republic’s needs for high-quality fuel. The bulk of the petroleum products supplied to the DPRK - and we are sometimes convinced of this at the work of our Embassy's fleet - are of brands and varieties that are not produced in Russia. It is much cheaper than what is supplied from our country.

I don’t see the point of using a Russian vessel to deliver products from third countries here in some not entirely open way.

- But no complaints were received against us through official channels?

No such factual claims were received against us through official channels.

In an interview with our agency in January of this year, you said that you assessed the situation in our mutual trade at that time as critical. Tell me, has the situation changed for the better over these six months?

No. Unfortunately, if the situation has changed, it has been for the worse. Since the sanctions are in effect, almost all channels are blocked, our businessmen do not want to take risks, our banks, one might say, shy away from any mention of the DPRK.

But I must say that in all these not very happy moments for me, as an ambassador, there is one positive thing: I am once again convinced that our customs, our border guards, and our financial control services are working efficiently.

The relevant presidential decrees on issues of relations between Russia and the DPRK are strictly implemented.

That is, it turns out that the statements that were made during the visit of the head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry to Moscow, during the visit of Sergei Viktorovich to Pyongyang, that we intend to intensify, actively increase trade and economic cooperation so far only at the level of declarations, are not given sanctions implement this?

Both we and our Korean colleagues have intentions and desires. There are a lot of good developments. Objectively, our economies have complementarity - the Koreans have what we need, the northerners have a desire to buy a lot of what we have. But, I repeat, there are serious, intractable problems that I have already mentioned. Judge for yourself: any ship that visits a North Korean port will not receive permission to enter most ports of other countries for a very long time. Unfortunately, conditions for trade with Pyongyang remain very difficult.

Both Seoul and Pyongyang expressed their readiness to restart trilateral economic projects with Russia. Which of these projects have a chance of being implemented in the foreseeable future?

I always say that trilateral cooperation projects have a very good future. And sooner or later these programs will definitely be implemented - simply because of the obvious benefits for all participants.

But sanctions also affect these areas of our interaction. No matter what, it all comes down to sanctions, and not only the Security Council, but also national ones. The southerners, for example, still have the so-called “May 24 measures” in place, which generally prohibit companies and citizens of the Republic of Korea from doing anything with North Korea. Therefore, everything that is said in Seoul about the intention to promote trilateral cooperation is so far declarations not supported by practical deeds. And if the UN Security Council sanctions are a law binding on all of us, then the South Korean measures are something that Seoul could correct on its own, especially taking into account the ongoing process of inter-Korean reconciliation.

- It turns out that the ball is now in Seoul’s court?

In any case, this is so according to the project of supplying our coal to South Korea through the North Korean port of Rajin.

This project is not included in the UN Security Council sanctions, and we are ready to begin supplying coal through Rajin to South Korea even now.

-Are the North Koreans ready too?

They are naturally ready. As soon as our South Korean colleagues ease their sanctions on the Rajin project, the port will come to life, work will begin, and the first step will be taken in a very promising area of ​​trilateral cooperation.

The final question concerns North Korean workers who, in accordance with UN Security Council decisions, must leave the territory of the Russian Federation by 2019. How many contract workers from North Korea remain in Russia today?

Their numbers have dropped by about half compared to what they were before the sanctions. (adopted in December 2017 - IF).

- So there were about 30 thousand people, and only half remained?