In fact, the commander of the BrF decided to immediately develop the breakthrough that was emerging at the junction of the 3rd and 63rd armies, so at 21.15 on July 12 he gave the 1st Don Guards. tk order, which set the task on the night of July 13 to move to the western bank of the Zushi River and concentrate in the Ivan - Zatishye - Vyazhi area; in the morning, as soon as the infantry takes the line Evtekhovo - Grachevka, immediately enter the breakthrough in this sector and, building on the success, capture the Mokhovoye area by the end of the day 148
Cm.: Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. pp. 396–397.

As part of the 1st Guards. TK included three tank and one motorized rifle brigades, a tank regiment, anti-tank fighter, mortar and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, as well as a motorcycle battalion (about 13 thousand soldiers and officers, over 200 tanks); the entry of the corps into the breakthrough was ensured by the main forces of the 15th VA and the 2nd Automatic Regiment of the 63rd A (at the beginning of the operation, the tank corps was transferred under the control of the command of the 63rd A) 149
Cm.: Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. pp. 319, 397, 756; The balance of forces and losses in the Battle of Kursk. Appendix 3. The balance of armored forces near Kursk. Appendix 4 // Kursk battle. Decisive turning point of World War II. pp. 362, 367.

Supporting the Oryol operation from the southwest was entrusted to the troops of the right wing of the Central Front, which on July 15 were to launch an offensive on Kromy. Despite the fact that fighting did not stop in the Central Front zone, the troops of the right wing of the front, according to the instructions of the Supreme High Command, were intensively preparing to launch a counter-offensive, with their immediate task of destroying the enemy who had wedged themselves into the defense and restoring their previous position, and then developing an offensive to the north -west, in the general direction to Kromy. On July 12, the commander of the Central Front set the troops the task of going on the offensive on July 15, so that 3 days were given to prepare the operation. The units regrouped forces, concentrated artillery and tanks, replenished ammunition, and bomber aircraft intensified their operations. To go on the offensive, the 48th, 13th, 70th, 2nd Tank and 16th Air Armies were allocated. The front commander gave them the general task of destroying the enemy strike force in the area of ​​Nizhny Tagino - Awakening - Ponyri - Protasovo - Gremyachevo, so that by the end of July 17, the main forces would reach the line Nagorny - Shamshin - Novopolevo - Kamenka - Lebedikha - Morozikha - Katomki.

In the future, it was planned to develop a strike to the north in the general direction of Oryol, entering into interaction with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts.

Fulfilling the order of General Rokossovsky, given to the troops on July 12, the armies of the right wing of the Central Front on the same day began to regroup forces for the offensive, so that by July 15, a strike group consisting of the 18th Infantry and 16th Tank was formed in the Ponyri and Olkhovatka area buildings 150
Cm.: Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. P. 400.

At the same time, the enemy did not show activity, limiting itself to reconnaissance actions. The main attention of the German command was drawn to the offensive of the Western and Bryansk fronts towards Oryol, so the Germans began to withdraw some troops from the sector against the right wing of the Central Front and hastily transfer them to the north. During July 13, Soviet aviation recorded the movement of railway trains with artillery equipment and tanks to the north to the Glazunovka and Zmievka stations. Columns of vehicles and infantry were walking along dirt roads in the same direction.

According to General Greben 151
Cm.: Newton S. Battle of Kursk: a German view. pp. 145–146.

Initially, the command of the GA "Center" (Commander Field Marshal Hans Kluge, Chief of Staff General Hans Krebs. - P.B.) paid special attention to holding Orel, otherwise, due to the loss of this key transport hub, as well as the blocking of the railways and highways leaving the city, there was a threat to the supply of the 9th and 2nd tank armies. Therefore, on July 12, Field Marshal Hans-Guenther Kluge ordered the 2nd, 18th and 20th tank, 36th infantry divisions, as well as Ferdinand tank destroyer units and heavy artillery to be sent to the 2nd TA zone. The field marshal hoped that the critical situation at the front of this army could improve as a result of the lightning intervention of allocated reinforcements. At the same time, at the direction of Hitler, the command of the troops of the Oryol group was changed. At the very beginning of the Soviet offensive (according to some sources 152
Haupt V. Battles of Army Group Center. The view of a Wehrmacht officer. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2006. P. 257.

In the afternoon of July 12th. – P.B.) the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, General Rudolf Schmidt, was removed from his post (the reason for this decision was that Schmidt’s brother was arrested for treason, and letters were found in his apartment where the general criticized Hitler 153
It is noteworthy that the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who during World War II served in the Red Army on the Soviet-German front as an artillery officer and was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 2nd degree and the Red Star, for critical remarks expressed in letters about the political leadership of the Soviet state Not only was he removed from office, but he was tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to 8 years in prison. Moreover, this did not happen during the critical period of the war, but in the victorious year for the Red Army in 1945. General Rudolf Schmidt, who escaped serious reprisals from Hitler, was also arrested by the Soviet authorities after the war and was imprisoned until the early 50s, having been in Butyrskaya, Lefortovo and Vladimir prisons. ( Note auto)

), and General Walter Model was appointed to this post (at 17.45 on July 12, the chief of staff of the 2nd TA, Colonel August Winter, received an order to transfer command to General Model 154
Cm.: Newton S. Hitler's "firefighter" is Field Marshal Model. M.: AST; Guardian, 2007. P. 295.

(Model actually took command on July 13 and officially took office on July 15. – P.B.), who, thus, united under his control all German troops on the Oryol bridgehead (Model's responsibilities for commanding the troops of the 9th A were temporarily taken over by the army chief of staff, Colonel Harald Elverfeldt). - P.B.) At the same time, the headquarters of both armies remained where they were, so this measure only ensured unified operational command of the troops in the Oryol salient.

2.2. Development of the situation on July 13

In the Bolkhov direction, all the efforts of the troops of the 11th Guards. And during July 13, they were aimed at eliminating enemy strongholds and resistance centers and breaking through the enemy’s rear defensive line. To do this, on the second day of the operation, the command of the 8th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps brought two second-echelon rifle divisions into battle. In turn, the Germans, clinging to well-fortified settlements (Medyntsevo, Ulyanovo, Staritsa, Rechitsa, Durnevo, Slobodka, etc.), put up stubborn resistance, trying to prevent the development of a breakthrough, pull up reserves from the depths and, with their help, restore the situation. On July 13, the most stubborn fighting broke out in the Medyntsevo-Ulyanovo-Staritsa area. The units of the 211th and 293rd German infantry divisions that retreated here relied on the strong fortifications of these key points of the second defensive line, and also received support from tanks of the 5th TD, so they tried to hold the rear line with strong fire and repeated counterattacks until larger reserves arrived.

During the night from July 12 to 13 and the next day, aviation of the 1st VA ZapF carried out bombing strikes on enemy troops and positions in the Khatkovo, Moilovo, Ktsyn - Sorokino areas (in total, 652 sorties were carried out in 24 hours) 155

On the morning of July 13, 8th Guards. CK resumed its offensive. He was given the task: to break through the rear defensive line of the Germans in the Staritsa - Rechitsa sector; ensure the entry into the breakthrough of the 5th Tank Tank; in cooperation with him, advance in the direction of Ulyanovo - Krapivna. At dawn on July 13, after a 30-minute artillery barrage, parts of the 8th Guards and 5th Tank Corps of the 11th Guards. And they continued to move forward, trying to capture a large stronghold of the enemy’s second line of defense in the village of Staritsa, but were met by a counterattack by the 13th and 14th Panzer-Grenadier Regiments of the 5th Panzer Division, which was tasked with creating a defense line west of Rechitsa. Using previously prepared fortifications and folds of the terrain, the Germans met the attackers with strong crossfire and counterattacked on the flanks with forces of up to two or three infantry battalions with 15–30 tanks 156
Cm.: Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. P. 211; Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. P. 346; Fiery arc. P. 348.

At the same time, German attack aircraft, operating in small groups of 4 to 8 aircraft, tried to strike the battle formations of the advancing Soviet troops (in total, 80 sorties of German aviation were taken into account in the ZapF zone on July 13 157
TsAMO RF. F. 208. Op. 2511. D. 2424. L. 324.

). However, the counterattacks not only did not bring success to the Germans, but at the same time they were partially pushed back from their positions, and partly surrounded by the 13th PGP of the 5th Tank Division under the command of Colonel Heinrich Bronsart-Schellendorff. 158
Cm.: Haupt V. Battles of Army Group Center. The view of a Wehrmacht officer. M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2006. pp. 258–259.

After repelling the counterattacks, General Malyshev ordered the corps artillery group to carry out a ten-minute fire raid, for which more than 250 guns and mortars were concentrated on a two-kilometer front 159
Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. P. 211.

The fire raid was supplemented by a strike by the 224th assault air division of Colonel Mikhail Kotelnikov (Mikhail Vasilyevich Kotelnikov), assigned to the 5th Tank Tank, on artillery positions and accumulations of equipment in the area of ​​the strong point in Staritsa. After this, parts of the 11th Guards. SD of the 8th Corps, commanded by General Ivan Fedyunkin, operating with the support of the 43rd Guards. TBR Colonel Mikhail Lukashev (Mikhail Pavlovich Lukashev), captured Staritsa from the east, secretly advancing through ravines and hollows in small groups of infantry and tanks and at the same time distracting the enemy’s attention with fire and a demonstration of an offensive from the north. Having completed coverage by 1 p.m., units of the division suddenly attacked the strong point from the southeast, started fighting on the outskirts, and then broke through into the village. After a street battle, the remnants of the defeated German garrison tried to retreat to Medyntsevo, but were scattered by a blow from the left flank of the 1st Guards. SD 16th Guards sk under the command of General Nikolai Kropotin and the 10th Guards. TBR Colonel Andrei Burlyga, who advanced to block the Staritsa-Ulyanovo road, who bypassed Staritsa from the west and south-west.

Thus, by the middle of the second day of the operation in this area, the second line of defense of the German 53rd Army Corps was also overcome. The advancing Soviet troops opened their way to the south and southeast, while German units hastily consolidated their positions at the Zhelyabovo-Pustoy-Medyntsevo line.

The attack aircraft of the 1st VA ZapF began to strike along the road Staritsa - Dudorovsky - Ktsyn and destroyed the bridge over the Resseta River near Ktsyn, completely blocking the movement of vehicles in this area and prohibiting the approach to the site of the breakthrough of enemy reserves. Now, to develop success and deeply dismember the enemy’s defense, the command of the 11th Guards. And it decided to introduce a large group of tanks from the 5th Tank Tank into the breakthrough with the task of pursuing the enemy in the direction of Krapivna - Afonasovo. The tank group entered the breakthrough at 14:30 and, in cooperation with the advanced infantry detachments, pursuing the enemy to the southeast, immediately captured the villages of Vesniny and Krapivna, with separate detachments continuing to develop the attack on Yagodnaya. By the end of the day, formations of the 8th Guards and 5th Tank Corps reached the line Bely Verkh - Staritsa - Vesniny - Krapivna.

At the same time, as Marshal Baghramyan notes 160
Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. pp. 213–214.

Shock group of the 11th Guards. And she cut through the German defense with a narrow wedge and, although she successfully advanced into the depths, her flanks were poorly covered. The enemy was preparing a counterattack from the west, from the Medyntsev area, in order to cut off the units of the 5th Tank Tank that had advanced far forward. At the same time, the main forces of the German 25th Infantry Division, with the assistance of units of the 293rd Infantry Division and aviation support, were preparing to launch a counterattack on the left flank of the 36th Guards Corps, advancing a reconnaissance detachment of the Infantry Division to the village of Mekhovoe. Aviation reconnaissance data and testimony from prisoners indicated that large columns of enemy tank and motorized troops were approaching from the southeast, from the Orel area. From midday on July 13, the activity of enemy aviation increased sharply: groups of 20–30 dive bombers attacked the battle formations of tank and rifle corps. Under the current conditions, in order to achieve the development of a tactical breakthrough into an operational one, it was necessary, first of all, to use the combat capabilities of the tank corps assigned to the army.

Accordingly, taking into account the threat of flank counterattacks, Bagramyan ordered General Sakhno to gain a foothold with the main forces of the 5th Tank Tank at the reached line and pull back the tank brigades that had become separated from other units. In particular, the army commander considered that leaving the 70th Tank Brigade in Yagodnaya when it was separated from the rest of the corps by more than 15 km was impractical and dangerous, since this gave the enemy the opportunity to relatively easily cut it off from the main forces of the army. Based on this, Bagramyan ordered the brigade to withdraw to the Krapivna area 161
Cm.: Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. P. 347.

Leaving Yagodnaya subsequently required two days of stubborn fighting with enemy reserves that had arrived here, which slowed down the pace of advance of the Soviet troops and increased their losses. On the other hand, the command of the 11th Guards. And it decided to increase efforts in the Medyntsevsky direction with the goal of defeating parts of the 5th TD of the Germans before the arrival of their reserves, advancing from the Orel area.

On the afternoon of July 13, formations of the 1st Tank Corps of General Vasily Butkov entered the battle in the Medyntsevsky direction. At 14.30 hours, the commander of the 11th Guards. And he introduced the 1st Tank Tank, following the 5th Tank Tank, into a breakthrough in the Staritsa-Ulyanovo sector, setting the task of attacking Medyntsevo, in cooperation with the left flank units of the 16th Guards. sk, destroy the 5th TD of the Germans. The offensive of General Butkov's corps was supported by the 231st assault air division of the 1st VA under the command of Colonel Leonid Chizhikov, units of which on July 13 launched a series of attacks on enemy strongholds in Medyntsevo and Dudorovo (Dudarovo, 6 km southwest of Ulyanovo). According to Baghramyan 162
Cm.: Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. P. 214; Haupt V. Battles of Army Group Center. P. 259.

As a result of the battle, the enemy's 5th TD suffered enormous damage, lost a large number of tanks and was left bleeding (according to German sources, the frontal counterattacks launched by the 5th TD on July 13 caused the loss of 45 tanks, while the enemy had 40 combat vehicles were shot down).

By 19 o'clock, two brigades of the 1st Tank Tank, in cooperation with rifle units of the 1st Guards. General Kropotin's SD captured Medyntsevo and Dudorovo. As a result of the battles on July 13, units of the 1st Tank Tank managed to advance 12–15 km and capture three large enemy strongholds, which lost 47 tanks, 7 self-propelled guns, 2 armored vehicles, 43 guns of various calibers, 6 mortar batteries, 800 military personnel were killed and captured, and in addition, he left three large warehouses. The losses of the 1st Tank Corps amounted to 350 military personnel killed and wounded, 10 tanks were destroyed and 13 vehicles received combat damage.

By 21 o'clock all the tank and motorized rifle brigades of the 1st Tank Corps were concentrated in the area of ​​Medyntsevo, Dudorovo and in the grove east of Dudorovo, and the advanced detachments of the 16th Guards that approached the Cherebet River. CK began pursuing units of the enemy's 5th Tank and 293rd Infantry Divisions, retreating in a southwestern direction to Kholmishchi - Dudorovsky. Moreover, due to the fact that the 211th Infantry and 5th Tank Divisions found themselves to the north and northwest of the breakthrough site, having lost contact with the 293rd Infantry Division, Müller’s task force came under the command of the commander of the 55th Army Corps, General Erich Jaschke (Erich Jaschke).

At the same time, formations of the 16th Guards. sk, advancing to the southwest, continued to expand the breakthrough towards the right flank of the 11th Guards. And by the end of July 13, they had fought their way to the Chernyshino-Dudorovo line, having captured several strong points in the defense zone of the German 211th Infantry Division. At the same time, in the evening of the same day, the commander of the 16th Corps, Hero of the Soviet Union, General Afanasy Lapshov, died, and the acting chief of the corps’ artillery group, General Lavr Mazanov, was taken prisoner by the Germans (Lapshov and Mazanov went to the Medyntsevo area to inspect damaged German tanks, among which supposedly there were “Tigers”, and on the way they came across one of the retreating enemy groups). At the end of July, the commander of the 16th Guards. sk General Ivan Fedyunkin was appointed.

On the left flank of the army, in the offensive zone of the 36th Guards. sk General Ksenofontov, on July 13, fierce battles continued for the strongholds of Dolgaya, Durnevo, Debri, Slobodka. Troops of the 36th Guards. sk, continuing the offensive to the southwest, fought with the 293rd Infantry Division of General Karl Arndt, as well as with units of the 25th Infantry Division under the command of General Anton Grasser, transferred by the command of the 53rd Army Corps to the line Vytebet River. Using prepared positions, the Germans sought to maintain a bridgehead on the left bank of the river as a starting position for preparing a flank counterattack. Heavy fire, repeated counterattacks and terrain crossed by a number of ravines made it difficult for the attackers to advance and maneuver, but by the end of July 13, units of the 36th Guards Corps captured the key enemy strongholds of Dolgaya (2 km west of Durnevo), Durnevo, Debri (2 km north of Durnevo), Slobodka and reached the border of the Vytebet River. The advanced detachments of the corps captured river crossings south of Dolgaya and east of Durnevo and crossed to the eastern bank, but their attempts to build on their success in the direction of Sorokino were unsuccessful. On the night of July 14, corps reconnaissance discovered the approach of enemy tanks and infantry; captured prisoners showed that units of the 18th and 20th tank divisions (from the 41st and 47th tank corps of the 9th A) were arriving in Sorokino and Ukolitsy . – P.B.), which will operate jointly with the 25th MD 163
Cm.: Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. P. 216.

Reconnaissance also noted the approach of artillery, including large-caliber artillery. The corps command reported to army headquarters that a counterattack on the left flank was being prepared. As a response, the command of the 11th Guards. And it moved an anti-tank reserve - iptap - to the threatened area.

By the end of the day on July 13, the troops of the 11th Guards. And we reached the line Chernyshino - Medyntsevo - Vesniny - Krapivna and further along the Vytebet River to Zhukovo. For July 12 and 13, 11th Guards. And she broke through the enemy’s tactical defense zone and wedged into his position to a depth of 25 km, expanding the breakthrough along the front to 23 km and inflicting serious losses on the 5th Tank, 211th and 293rd Infantry Divisions 164
Cm.: Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. pp. 348–349.

The paths for developing an offensive both on Bolkhov and Khotynets, to the railway and the Orel-Bryansk highway were open. The offensive of the troops of the 11th Guards. And already on the second day of the operation, it created a serious threat of enveloping Bolkhov from the north-west and west and reaching the rear and communications of the entire Oryol group of Germans.

At the same time, on July 13, the 50th A ZapF under the command of General Ivan Boldin went on the offensive, which carried out the task of covering the right flank of the 11th Guards. And with the help of an auxiliary strike in the direction of Zikeevo. In front of the army front, the enemy's 110th, 296th, 134th and part of the forces of the 211th infantry divisions were defending: in front of the right flank and center of the 50th A, on the Zaprudnoye - Puzanovka section, 21 km long, the 110th and 296th divisions were located , and then, in a strip over 26 km wide, the positions of the 134th and 211th divisions occupied; in tactical depth, in the Zhizdra-Lyudinovo area, the 5th TD remained in reserve 165
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 1–1 vol.

On the other hand, the forces and means of the Western Front concentrated here for the offensive were approximately two to three times smaller than the strike force of the 11th Guards. A. So, the 50th A, consisting of 7 rifle divisions (3 of which are under the control of the 38th sk); 3 artillery cannon, 3 anti-aircraft artillery, 3 mortar, 1 anti-tank artillery regiments; 2 engineering b-nov; 2 divisions of armored trains numbered “only” about 63 thousand people, over 530 guns (236 guns of 76 mm caliber and above, 241 anti-tank guns, 50 anti-aircraft guns) and 594 mortars of 82 and 120 mm caliber, and received a separate 196-mm for reinforcement. South Tank Brigade, as well as a tank regiment and a heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - a total of 75 tanks and 12 self-propelled guns 166
See: Combat schedule of the Red Army, July 1, 1943. Appendix 2. Balance of forces and losses in the Battle of Kursk. Appendix 3 // Kursk battle. Decisive turning point of World War II. pp. 305–306, 362; Fiery arc. P. 592; Pankov F. D. Fiery lines: the combat path of the 50th Army in the Great Patriotic War. M.: Voenizdat, 1984. pp. 128–143; Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. P. 286.

According to the operational department of the 50th A headquarters, by the beginning of the operation, the following balance of forces had developed in its zone, which was not entirely favorable for an attack on the enemy’s previously prepared defenses (Table 2).

table 2

The balance of forces and means at the front of the 50th A ZapF by July 13, 1943167
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 1 volume-2.

Note.

Data only for the 196th brigade.

According to the initial decision of the army commander, which was in accordance with the provisions of the Infantry Combat Manual, the main blow was to be delivered by two left-flank infantry divisions on the Kolpino front - mark 199.9, with the goal of breaking through in the direction of Khromyli - Maryinsky, and an auxiliary blow - by one rifle regiment 64- th SD in the direction to Kremischnoye; The 38th infantry regiment under the command of General Alexei Tereshkov, deployed on the right flank of the 50th A (17th, 326th and 413th rifle divisions), received the task of holding the defense and ensuring army formations from a possible enemy counterattack, as well as being ready to attack Marinka 168
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 2–5.

Here, on the right flank of the army, in the area of ​​Zagorichi - Bukan - Usty, a camouflage operation was carried out, and on July 12 - reconnaissance in force. To carry out the command’s decision to break through the enemy’s defenses, the 50th A regrouped and delivered the main blow with the left flank from the Kolpino area in the direction of Budskie Vyselki - Maryinsky - Khromyli. The 212th and 324th rifle divisions, operating with the support of the 196th tank brigade, two artillery and two mortar regiments, as well as one artillery and one mortar divisions, were concentrated in a breakthrough area 6 km long along the front. As a result of this strike, carried out with the assistance of the 440th rifle regiment of the 64th infantry regiment, which attacked Kremischnoye, it was planned to encircle and destroy in the Paliki - Rechitsa - Dubrovka area parts of the 134th German infantry regiment of General Hans Schlemmer, and subsequently build on the success at Zikeevo, using the 49th Infantry Division and a tank regiment, which remained in the reserve of the army commander in the area of ​​​​the village of Maklaki. To provide artillery support for the breakthrough, an artillery group was concentrated, which included three divisional artillery regiments (64th, 212th and 324th divisions), the 39th and 188th cannon artillery regiments of the RGK, the 54th and 307th mortar regiments, artillery and mortar divisions : 113 guns of 45 mm caliber, 88 guns of regimental and divisional artillery of 76 mm caliber, 48 guns of 122 and 152 mm caliber, 182 mortars of 82 mm caliber and 68 mortars of 120 mm caliber, 40 M-13 rocket launchers 169

As you can see, in total there were 539 guns and mortars in the group, that is, 90 guns per kilometer of the 6-kilometer breakthrough section, although the headquarters of the 50th A indicates a different artillery density - 56 guns per kilometer 170
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 3.

Belgorod-Kharkov operation ( « Commander Rumyantsev» ) August 3-23, 1943 became the final stage of the Battle of Kursk - a defensive and offensive operation of the Soviet army in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge. During these battles, a major offensive of the German army was thwarted and a powerful enemy group was defeated. By the end of July The Red Army succeeded stop the advance of fascist troops on the Kursk Bulge and debunk the German myth that in summer conditions the Red Army always only retreats, and victory goes to the Wehrmacht troops. The powerful offensive of our troops in the Oryol-Kursk direction, launched on July 13, 1943, forced the German command to withdraw the troops of Army Group South in the direction of Kharkov. The forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts organized the pursuit of the 4th Tank Army. By July 23, German forces had retreated to the lines they had occupied before the start of Operation Citadel.

The offensive was aimed at defeating the Belgorod-Kharkov group and liberating Left Bank Ukraine.

A rapid breakthrough of the pre-prepared German defense line seemed unlikely, but it was impossible to delay the development of the offensive: the long period of preparation for the offensive gave the Germans the opportunity to regroup their forces for defense. According to intelligence data, about 500 German tanks and self-propelled guns needed short-term repairs (2-3 weeks) and putting them into operation before the start of the offensive would have significantly strengthened the German group. Thus, the Red Army command had to make a difficult choice between an earlier start of the offensive and its power.

According to the command’s plan, it was supposed to strike with the flanks of Voronezh (commander - Army General N.F. Vatutin) and Stepnoy (commander - Colonel General I.S. Konev) fronts from the area northwest of Belgorod and split the enemy group into parts. The forces of the Southwestern Front were supposed to attack our two fronts from the south and prevent the enemy from retreating from Kharkov to the west and southwest. With a simultaneous attack on Akhtyrka, it was planned to isolate the Kharkov area, not giving the enemy the opportunity to bring up reserves.

The operation was planned in two stages: defeat the enemy forces around Kharkov and liberate the city.

A distinctive feature of the future operation was that the attacks were directed along the rivers. Getting rid of the need to cross water barriers should have allowed the troops to maintain a high speed of advance. Another advantage of this direction was the protection of advancing units from flank attacks by river beds.

The large-scale effort to disguise the direction of the main attack deserves special attention. In the area of ​​the small river Sudzha, far to the west of the strike force prepared for the offensive, the concentration of a large number of combined arms and tank formations was skillfully simulated. Over 500 models of tanks and guns created an entire fake army preparing for an offensive. The radio stations imitated the operation of radio networks of tank formations. The infantry simulated a massive transfer of forces to the front line.

Current page: 24 (book has 44 pages total) [available reading passage: 29 pages]

1.2. The concept of Operation “Commander Rumyantsev”

On the other hand, the highest military-political leadership of the USSR in the summer of 1943 still sought to inflict a decisive blow on the enemy precisely on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, not allowing him to put in order the troops weakened by losses after the offensive according to the Citadel plan. According to Manstein's subsequent assessment of events 603
Manstein E. Decree. op. P. 544.

The Soviet command in the second half of 1943 set as its goal to achieve what it failed to achieve in the winter of 1942/43 - the destruction of the GA "South" and at the same time the GA "A" on the shores of the Azov and Black Seas, since this success could have a decisive impact on the situation on the entire Eastern Front and open the way to the Balkans for the Red Army. Accordingly, preventing this became the goal of the military operations that were conducted by the GA “South” from the moment the operation “Citadel” ended until the onset of the thaw period in the spring of 1944.

First of all, the Soviet Supreme High Command set itself the task of organizing the destruction of a large group of German troops in the Belgorod and Kharkov area in the shortest possible time. However, the operation to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov group of Germans was conceived and planned in a completely different situation than the offensive against the Oryol bridgehead of German troops - in conditions of extremely limited time at the final stage of the defensive battle on the southern front of the Kursk ledge. In the 20th of July, after returning to defense at the original lines, the German command began to transfer tank and motorized formations from its southern strike group to the Donbass and Orel areas in order to repel the Red Army offensive that had begun there. At the same time, those German troops that retreated to their previous defensive positions immediately began to strengthen them with engineering, prepare new intermediate lines in depth and allocate tactical and operational reserves.

In this regard, the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff urgently worked out operational decisions regarding the immediate transition of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts to the offensive. When developing possible solutions, it was necessary to take into account that the configuration of the front line in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction represented a wide arc, covering the entire location of the 4th TA and the Kempf operational group of the enemy, the bulk of the forces and means of which were concentrated in the Tomarovka - Golovchino - Belgorod area . This dictated the decision to cover the entire Belgorod-Kharkov group of Germans through concentric attacks from the Miropolye - Ugroedy area to Valki and from the Martovaya - Pechenegi area to Merefa. At the same time, the organization of such an operation required the creation of strong groups on the outer advancing flanks of both fronts, capable of completing operations with a depth of up to 250 km without slowing down. This could only be achieved as a result of a complex transfer of troops to the right flank of the Voronezh and left flank of the Steppe front, which required a lot of time and did not correspond to the current situation. Firstly, by the time the Kursk defensive operation was completed, the main group of troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts had formed in the Oboyan - Cherkasskoe - Gostishchevo area, where two tank armies (1st and 5th Guards), three combined arms armies (53, 6 and 5th Guards), as well as most of the forces of the 69th Army. Secondly, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command believed that the operational situation required the Voronezh and Steppe fronts to go on the offensive as soon as possible, before the Germans had time to organize defense, replenish their units after an unsuccessful offensive and create reserves by transferring troops from the depths or from other sections of the front.

In addition, the area of ​​offensive operations of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was a terrain crossed by a significant number of tactical watersheds - rivers and streams with ravines and gullies. Such terrain greatly hampered the offensive actions of the Soviet troops and made it easier for the enemy to organize defense: most of the more or less large rivers, such as Vorsklitsa, Vorskla, Merla, Udy, Lopan, flow mainly in the southwestern direction, which created natural obstacles to the offensive in south direction; when advancing in the southwestern direction, these rivers limited maneuver towards the flanks and created advantageous cut-off positions for enemy reserves; at the same time, the Seversky Donets River formed a natural defensive line for the Germans, covering their entire Belgorod-Kharkov group from the east. Therefore, the most advantageous direction for the use of tank and mechanized formations was the area between the Vorskla and Lopan rivers, while the nature of the terrain in front of the right flank of the WorF made it difficult for large masses of armored vehicles to operate here.

General Sergei Shtemenko notes 604
Shtemenko S. M. General Staff during the war: From Stalingrad to Berlin. pp. 228–230.

That the question of the need to defeat the enemy in a counteroffensive had already been considered in the most general form, since only the results of the defensive battle near Kursk could provide a complete basis for the development of the final plan for the offensive operations of the fronts. In April - May 1943, the Headquarters and the General Staff took a critical approach to proposals for possible methods of defeating large enemy groups, especially in cases where this was planned to be done through encirclement. Experience has shown that due to timing, complexity of maneuver, balance of forces and other conditions of a specific situation, not every enemy group was advantageous to encircle. In particular, this directly applied to the forces of German troops defending in the area of ​​​​Belgorod and Kharkov. The commander of the Military Fleet, General Nikolai Vatutin, was the first to speak out in favor of encircling the Belgorod-Kharkov group, but the General Staff had a different opinion, guided by the following arguments. First of all, the enemy forces here were very large: the German 4th Panzer Army and the so-called Task Force Kempf, numbering a total of eighteen divisions, including four tank divisions. It was also necessary to take into account the powerful two-lane defensive system of the German troops, the creation of which began in March. Breaking through the defense of the Belgorod-Kharkov group, its encirclement and subsequent liquidation was a difficult task, the solution of which would have tied a large number of Soviet troops to itself for a long time, distracting them from the attack on the Dnieper, which would allow the enemy to create a new strong defense along the right bank of the Dnieper.

In this regard, the General Staff was working on a plan to encircle and destroy the Belgorod-Kharkov group in parts, starting with its main forces north of Kharkov, by delivering converging attacks from the Sumy region to the southeast and from the Volchansk region to the west. However, to carry out such attacks required large regroupings of troops and a long time, which provided the enemy with the opportunity to reorganize and replenish the units and formations of the South Civil Defense Army, weakened after Operation Citadel. Consequently, this option was also considered unacceptable. As a result, the General Staff came to the final conclusion: the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping of German troops should be isolated from the influx of reserves from the west, for which it is necessary to use the two tank armies available in readiness north of Belgorod, with their help to break into and disorganize the entire enemy defense, to dismember with deep blows and only after that destroy the enemy piece by piece.

The commander of the 40th Army of the WarF, General Kirill Moskalenko (Marshal of the Soviet Union since 1955) recalls 605
Moskalenko K. S. Decree. op. pp. 79–80.

That at a meeting about the upcoming offensive, he expressed considerations on the plan of the operation, which consisted in striking with the main forces of the Vortf from the line Krasnopolye - Soldatskoye in the general direction of Akhtyrka, Poltava. This would make it possible to cover the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group from the west and, in cooperation with the troops of the Steppe and Southwestern Fronts, to encircle and destroy it, repeating Stalingrad on an even larger scale. In addition, such an idea opened up the prospect of delivering the main attack in the 40th A zone, which would have to operate not in the auxiliary, as planned, but in the main direction. However, the proposal to shift the direction of the main attack somewhat to the west was not accepted. Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov answered Moskalenko that now the VoRF does not have enough forces for the proposed deep coverage and encirclement of the enemy, so the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered to hit the enemy on the head - on his main forces, which are concentrated near Belgorod. However, Zhukov agreed with the proposal to the extent that it was necessary to intensify the blow against the enemy in the 40th A zone and, for this purpose, bring the fresh 27th A into the battle not in the 6th Guards zone. And, as planned earlier, and on the left flank of the 40th A. Thus, it became clear that the Headquarters proceeded from the desire not to give the enemy time to further strengthen the defense, which could only be achieved if the planned strike was delivered as quickly as possible faster.

As a result, the task of destroying the Belgorod-Kharkov group of Germans had to be solved by dividing it into two parts as a result of a powerful blow from a group of Soviet troops concentrated in the Oboyan - Cherkasskoe - Gostishchevo area (53rd and 69th, 5th and 6th guards combined arms armies, 1st and 5th guards tank armies). The general direction of this attack was determined towards Bogodukhov - Valki, due to which coverage of the Kharkov enemy group was achieved from the west. At the same time, for the first time during the war, it was planned to use two tank armies as a mobile front group to develop success in one direction 606
Cm.: Decree. op. P. 280.

It was also planned to launch an auxiliary strike by part of the forces from the Stary Saltov - Martovaya area to Osnova. The western part of the Belgorod-Kharkov group was supposed to be defeated by a deep blow from part of the forces of the WorF from the Krasnaya Yaruga - Kresanov - Soldatskoye area to Akhtyrka, with the aim of encircling the forces of the 27th and 6th Guards Armies of the Tomarov-Borisov group of Germans, as well as destroying the enemy forces defending in the Bolshaya Bobrik - Krasnopolye area, through a flank attack by the 40th A from the Kresanov area to Boromlya. At the same time, the Psel River, flowing in the western part of the area of ​​upcoming hostilities, although it was an obstacle to the attack from the Miropolye-Krasnopolye area to the west, at the same time served as cover for the right flank of the troops advancing in a southern direction towards Bogodukhov.

The new operation conceived in this way received the code name “Commander Rumyantsev”. The plan for action arose towards the end of the defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk, the plan for the offensive operation in its final form was developed on the basis of instructions from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, issued on July 22, 1943, and after July 23, direct work on the plan began - including on the ground 607
Cm.: Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. P. 455.

The fighting did not actually stop, the Headquarters did not provide a long operational pause for the transition from defense to the offensive, so the development of the operation plan was distinguished by its originality - it was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters and the Military Councils of the fronts and took place mainly among the troops. Thus, on July 22, the representative of the Headquarters, Marshal Zhukov, held a meeting at the headquarters of the Military Forces of the Russian Federation on the issue of preparations for the upcoming offensive actions; On July 27, he met with the commander of the 53rd Army StepF and on the same day reported that he had worked out a decision on the offensive operation with him; On July 31, he heard the decisions of the army and corps commands for the operation at the headquarters of the 5th Guards. TA. In addition to representatives of the Headquarters, the Military Councils of the Voronezh, Steppe and Southwestern Fronts actively participated in the development of the plan for Operation Commander Rumyantsev. On August 1, Marshal Zhukov arrived in Moscow, agreed with Stalin on the main provisions of the plan, after which the fronts immediately assigned tasks to the armies, and the operation began.

There was no written or graphic document with a general plan for the operation “Commander Rumyantsev” - the Headquarters and the General Staff meant by this conventional name not a specific document, but coordinated action plans of the Voronezh, Steppe and part of the forces of the Southwestern Front in August 1943, united by a common purpose and unified leadership 608
Cm.: Shtemenko S. M.

The plan of the operation appeared in documented form after it began, when the operational side of the offensive was set out in the reports of the Military Councils of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts dated August 5 and 6, 1943, respectively, and then clarified in accordance with the instructions of Headquarters. Subsequently, the operation plans were adjusted by the front command and Headquarters, taking into account the development of the operational situation.

At the end of July 1943, it was planned to involve the forces of three fronts in the operation - Voronezh, Steppe and South-Western, the purpose of which was to defeat the enemy in the Belgorod and Kharkov area, which would open the way for Soviet troops to the Dnieper, making it possible to seize crossings on this river and cut off the enemy's escape route from Donbass to the west. Taken together, all this promised great operational benefits. The plan was to be carried out in two stages: in the first stage, defeat the German troops north, east and directly south of Kharkov, and then, in the second stage, liberate the city of Kharkov. Thus, the main goals of Operation Commander Rumyantsev were the defeat of a group of German troops in the Belgorod and Kharkov region, the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper, the capture of crossings and the blocking of the enemy’s escape routes from Donbass to the west, which created the conditions for the complete liberation of Left-Bank Ukraine 609
Cm.: Great Shtemenko S. M. General Staff during the war: From Stalingrad to Berlin. P. 231.

Since Operation Commander Rumyantsev was the main operation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the actions of Soviet troops in other directions (in particular, in the Donbass) were planned taking into account its interests. This was controlled by Marshal Vasilevsky, who at that time was a representative of the Headquarters on the South-Western and Southern fronts, together with their command developing plans to defeat the enemy in the Donbass.

1.3. Forces and assets concentrated by the Soviet side to carry out Operation Commander Rumyantsev

During the preparations, the composition of the forces involved in the operation was finalized. As a result of the regroupings, the VoRF included the 38th A, the 40th A (the 2nd Tank Corps was assigned to the army), the 27th A (the 10th and 4th Guards Tank Corps were assigned to the army), the 6th Guards. A (the army was assigned to the 5th Guards Tank), 5th Guards. A, 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies, 2nd VA. By the end of July 23, WarF troops occupied the line Snagost - Uspenskoye, Glushinsky:

– 38th A on the section Snagost – Alekseevka – Uspenskoye (exclusively);

– 40th A on the Uspenskoye – Bubny section;

- 6th Guards And on the Gertsovka – Trirechnoye section;

- 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies in the Trirechnoye (exclusively) - Glushinsky sector (the tank army was preparing to enter the front reserve).

The VoRF reserve consisted of the 27th and 1st Tank Armies, concentrated in the Beloe - Bobrava - Pena area (27th A) and in the Ivnya - Melovoe area (17 km southwest of Ivnya) - Vladimirovka (1st TA).

The 69th A, 7th Guards were included in the StepF. A, 53rd A with 1st MK, 5th VA 610
Cm.: Konev I. S. Decree. op. P. 21.

By the end of July 23, StepF troops reached the line Glushinsky (exclusively) - Melekhovo - Myasoedovo - Razumnoye and further along the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets River to Volchansk:

– 53rd A on the section Glushinsky (exclusively) – Kisilevo (9 km southeast of Wisłoe) (exclusively);

– 69th A on the Kiselevo – Myasoedovo section (exclusively);

- 7th Guards. And on the Myasoedovo – Razumnoye – Volchansk section.

South of StepF (south of Volchansk), along the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets River, troops of the Southwestern Front were deployed, including the right-flank 57th A, which was planned to be involved in the operation “Commander Rumyantsev” as part of StepF, occupying the Volchansk (exclusively) - Malinovka sector .

Nominally, StepF was also subordinated to the 47th A and the 3rd Guards. MK and 4th Guards. And from the 3rd Guards. Tk, concentrated in the areas of Korocha - Novaya Sloboda - Alekseevka (47th A) and Chernyanka - Orlik - Loznoe (4th Guards A). However, in fact, their operational use was not permitted without agreement with the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, where it was planned to bring these armies into battle to develop the offensive in the VoR zone, so before the start of the operation they were both withdrawn to the Headquarters reserve 611
Cm.: Koltunov G. A., Soloviev B. G. Decree. op. P. 279.

Therefore, on July 30, 1943, General Ivan Konev reported to the Headquarters representative, Marshal Zhukov, that the Steppe Front had been assigned active tasks, but the four best armies of the front (5th and 5th Tank Guards Armies, 27th A with the 4th Guards Tank, 4th Guards And with the 3rd Guards Tank - P.B.) transferred to the Voronezh Front; The 69th and 7th Guards armies of the Voronezh Front, included in the Steppe Front as a result of the July battles, have a small number of divisions and large losses in material artillery and weapons; There are few tanks at the front - in the 53rd A there are only 60 tanks, in the 69th A - 88 tanks, in the 7th Guards. A - 50 tanks, in the 1st mechanized corps - 200 tanks 612
Cm.: Konev I. S. Decree. op. P. 22.

In this regard, Konev asked to strengthen the front with one tank corps, which he considered possible to take from the VoRF (4th or 3rd Guards Tank Corps), and also transfer the StepF to the 4th Guards. A or 52nd A.

In addition, the 5th assault (until July 21, 1943 - the 8th mixed air corps) and the 10th fighter air corps of the 5th VA StepF (army commander General Sergei Goryunov, chief of staff General Nikolai Seleznev) were not yet there in mid-July ready to conduct combat work - they were staffed with poorly trained flight personnel who had no combat experience, and a significant part of the equipment was worn out and required repair 613
Cm.: Gorbach V. Decree. op. pp. 334–335.

At the same time, in order to optimally organize the relocation of the 2nd and 5th Air Armies, the command of the Red Army Air Force changed their combat composition. The two above-mentioned corps were transferred on July 18–19 to the 2nd VA WarF, from where the 4th fighter, 1st attack and 1st bomber air corps came under the control of the 5th VA. As a result, under the command of General Krasovsky there were insufficiently trained and technically ready aviation units, and General Goryunov had to solve the problem of making up for combat losses suffered by the 2nd VA formations during the Kursk defensive operation - 170 new aircraft were required to staff the arriving corps 614
Cm.: Gorbach V. Decree. op. pp. 336–337.

The position of the 5th VA was further complicated by the fact that its formations were relocated to airfields previously occupied by the 2nd VA, from where the departing technical and logistics units of this army, contrary to the instructions of the Air Force command, removed all equipment, all stocks, supplies and materials, even to kitchen boilers. On the other hand, the 2nd VA had a shortage of vehicles - up to 55 percent of the required quantity, which caused delays in the delivery of ammunition and fuel and lubricants (the stock of fuel and lubricants was about 60 percent of the norm, the stock of bombs and shells was 55– 65 percent) 615
Cm.: Gorbach V. Decree. op. pp. 339–340.

Regarding fuel reserves, the general reserves of motor gasoline available at VoRF and especially at StepF did not ensure an uninterrupted supply of troops even at the time of the start of the offensive operation 616
Cm.: Koltunov G. A., Soloviev B. G. Decree. op. pp. 283–284.

Moreover, like the 2nd VA, a number of operational formations of both fronts were understaffed with vehicles. Thus, the staffing level of the 1st TA for motor transport was about 55 percent - there was a shortage of more than 3 thousand vehicles 617
Cm.: The hatches were opened in Berlin. The combat path of the 1st Guards Tank Army. M.: Voenizdat, 1973. P. 71.

The lack of fuel and transport reduced the maneuverability and mobility of units and formations, especially artillery.

As you can see, before the start of the planned operation, the Soviet troops needed time to prepare and increase their combat effectiveness. Marshal Zhukov notes 618
Zhukov G.K. Decree. op. pp. 467–468.

That the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, having reached the front line of the German defense on July 23, could not immediately launch a counteroffensive, although this was demanded by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. It was necessary to replenish fuel, ammunition and other types of logistics, organize interaction between all branches of the military, conduct thorough reconnaissance, and carry out some regrouping of troops, especially artillery and tanks. In addition, all commanders and staffs, especially the leadership of StepF, needed to familiarize themselves with the situation, and the troops needed to go to their assigned zones and here organize rear work in a new way. According to the strictest estimates, all this required at least eight days, but Stalin was in a hurry to start the battle. Only with great difficulty, after repeated negotiations, Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky managed to convince him not to rush into active actions and to begin the operation when it was fully prepared and financially secure. In connection with Stalin’s position, the opinion of A. Tomzov is interesting 619
Cm.: Tomzov A. Losses of armored vehicles of Army Group South in the Battle of Kursk. German armored vehicles on the Kursk Bulge. Appendix III // Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. P. 823.

What if the Soviet offensive had been further postponed and had begun not on August 3, but later, then the Germans had managed to restore much more armored vehicles damaged during Operation Citadel, and then the course of hostilities could have turned out somewhat differently, in any case, the Red Army met there would be much stronger resistance. On the other hand, the difference in the timing of the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operations allowed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to transfer the 16th and 17th breakthrough artillery divisions, the 3rd Guards. Ministry of Defense and command of the 7th Automatic Regiment of the RGK from the Western and Bryansk Fronts after they completed the tasks of ensuring a breakthrough of the enemy’s defense.

On August 1, 1943, the combat strength of eight combined arms (27, 38, 40, 53, 69, 5, 6, 7th Guards) and two tank (1st and 5th Guards) armies of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts with assigned forces and means of reinforcement included: 15 rifle corps 620
The departments of the four corps are at the disposal of the front command. ( Note auto)

(50 rifle divisions); 8 tank and 3 mechanized corps; artillery corps (2 artillery and 1 guards mortar divisions); corps air defense area (5 anti-aircraft artillery divisions); 3 separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions; 3 fighter brigades; 7 separate tank brigades; 4 separate artillery brigades and 5 separate anti-tank artillery brigades; 16 separate tank and 10 separate self-propelled artillery regiments; 41 separate artillery, guards mortar, anti-tank, anti-aircraft regiments; 1 separate artillery division and 2 armored train divisions 621
Cm.: Fiery arc... pp. 590–591.

In units and formations of the two fronts, there were about 1,144 thousand people (of which 656 thousand were combat personnel), 14,376 guns and mortars (including rocket launchers, but excluding 50-mm mortars), 2,439 tanks and self-propelled guns deployed along a front length 244 km (in the band that was occupied by VoRF alone until July 18) 622
Cm.: Goncharov V. Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. pp. 764–765; Great Patriotic War 1941–1945. P. 81; Fiery arc. pp. 598–599; Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. P. 287.

It should be noted here that a comparison of data on the combat strength and number of forces and assets of the two indicated fronts suggests an underestimation of the total number of their armored vehicles. By the beginning of the operation, 4 tank and 2 mechanized corps, 1 separate tank and 6 self-propelled artillery regiments as part of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies, according to some information 623
Cm.: Babajanyan A. Kh., Popel N. K., Shalin M. A., Kravchenko I. M. Decree. op. P. 67; Katukov M. E. Decree. op. P. 573; Ratio Kursk battle. Decisive turning point of World War II. pp. 361, 364; Rotmistrov P. A. Steel Guard. M.: Voenizdat, 1984. P. 206.

There were up to 1,105 tanks and self-propelled guns (1st TA - 562 tanks and self-propelled guns, of which 542 are combat-ready; 5th Guards TA - 543 tanks and self-propelled guns, of which 503 are combat-ready). Composed of 7 separate tank brigades (53 tanks each), 15 separate tank and 4 separate self-propelled artillery regiments (39 tanks and from 12 to 21 self-propelled guns per regiment), attached to the combined arms armies of two fronts, there should have been at least 1 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and the 1st mechanized and 4th guards. The tank corps consisted of 204 and 189 tanks and self-propelled guns, respectively - a total of 393 combat vehicles 624
Cm.: Ratio strength and losses in the Battle of Kursk. Appendix 3 // Kursk

In total, this amounts to approximately 2.4–2.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, however, three more operational-tactical tank formations remain unaccounted for - the 2nd, 10th and 5th Guards Tank Corps, which were involved in Operation Commander Rumyantsev. from the very beginning of its implementation. In each of these corps, by the beginning of August there were 100–150 tanks and self-propelled guns, in particular, when the 10th Tank Tank was withdrawn for replenishment on July 16, its units had 110 combat-ready tanks 625
Cm.: Zamulin V. N. Prokhorovka - an unknown battle of the great war. M.: AST; Transitbook, 2005. pp. 503–504.

The 5th Guards and 2nd Tank Corps received additional armored vehicles from the VoRF reserve, in addition to the fact that both corps had a repair fund for combat vehicles 626
Ivanovsky E. F. The tankmen began the attack. M.: Voenizdat, 1984. P. 135.

Consequently, the total number of armored vehicles possessed by both fronts should have been about 2.7–2.9 thousand combat vehicles, and not 2439 tanks and self-propelled guns (1972 tanks and self-propelled guns at VoorF, 467 at Stepnoye 627
Cm.: Goncharov V. Statistics and comments. Appendix II // Battle Fiery arc. pp. 764–765.

). In fact, according to some data, the WorF troops had 199 more armored vehicles - 2171 tanks and self-propelled guns 628
Cm.: Katukov M. E. Decree. op. P. 573; The balance of forces and losses in the Battle of Kursk. Appendix 3 // Kursk battle. Decisive turning point of World War II. P. 364.

Then the total number of armored vehicles on both fronts reaches 2638 tanks and self-propelled guns, which seems more reliable, given the likely shortage in individual armored units and formations that participated in defensive battles on the southern front of the Kursk salient (for example, in the tank brigades of the 6th Tank Tank 1- th TA at the beginning of the operation there were 40–45 tanks each 629
Cm.: Getman A. L. Tanks are heading towards Berlin. M.: Voenizdat, 1982. P. 103.

). A similar size of the armored fleet of the two fronts - over 2.6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns - is given in certain Soviet military-historical works, although two tank brigades of the 57th A of the South-Western Front (109 combat vehicles) are also taken into account. 630
Cm.: Soviet tank troops 1941–1945. M.: Voenizdat, 1973. P. 138.

The formations of the 2nd and 5th air armies of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (22 air divisions) on August 1, 1943 numbered 1311 combat aircraft - 748 and 563 aircraft, respectively (including 555 fighters, 435 attack aircraft, 285 bombers, 36 reconnaissance aircraft ), for the support of which an additional 200 long-range aircraft were involved - a total of over 1.5 thousand aircraft (according to other sources, the 2nd VA had 753 aircraft before the start of the offensive, and the 5th A had 769, a total of over 1500 combat vehicles of front-line aviation, and a large number of new and repaired military equipment arrived from factories and from army workshops immediately before the start of the offensive, from July 31 to August 2) 631
Cm.: Goncharov V. Statistics and comments. Appendix II // Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. P. 766; Gorbach V. Decree. op. P. 338; Fiery arc. pp. 594–595.

In addition, in order to prevent the enemy from maneuvering forces and means, in the period from August 4 to 15, formations of the 17th VA Southwestern Fleet were also involved in the battle (a separate bomber air division and two mixed aviation corps - a total of at least 300-400 aircraft) 632
Cm.: Gorbach V. Decree. op. pp. 369–375; Fiery arc. P. 482.

So the actual number of aircraft used in the operation was much more than 1,500 aircraft - apparently, about 2 thousand aircraft in total.

Thus, the Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of 3.8:1 in personnel (combat strength 3.3:1), 4.8:1 in artillery, 6.6:1 in tanks and self-propelled guns, minimum 1.5:1 – for aircraft (most likely 2:1, and at the beginning of the operation at least 3.4:1). The average operational density of forces and assets concentrated on the Voronezh and Steppe fronts reached 4.7 thousand soldiers and officers, 59 guns and mortars, 11 tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer of front, which was 4.7 times higher than that of the enemy, in terms of personnel, 5.9 times - in artillery, 5.5 times - in armored vehicles. Consequently, the command of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts theoretically had the opportunity to evenly distribute troops throughout the occupied zone and at the same time launch a general offensive - the achieved numerical and material superiority basically ensured a fourfold superiority, which was considered from experience to be quite sufficient to achieve success in an offensive against a pre-prepared defense .

These data fully confirm the opinion of Field Marshal Manstein 633
Manstein E. Decree. op. P. 545.

That in the area of ​​​​operations of the GA "South" the decisive condition for the course of the campaign was the superiority of forces on the Soviet side in the number and strength of formations, as well as to an ever-increasing degree in their armament, which was already colossal by the end of Operation Citadel. Thus, according to German data on July 17, 1943, 29 infantry and 13 tank and motorized divisions of the army group had to defend against 109 Soviet rifle divisions, 9 rifle brigades, 10 tank corps, 20 separate tank brigades, 16 tank regiments, 8 anti-tank fighters brigades; before September 7, another 55 rifle divisions, 2 tank and mechanized corps, 8 tank brigades and 12 tank regiments were recorded in front of the army group front (at the same time, the striking power of the Soviet rifle division, compared to the German infantry, was increased by the attached separate tank brigades or regiments; the striking force of one Soviet tank corps corresponded approximately to the strength of a German tank division; the Soviet mechanized corps was superior to a German motorized division). Manstein estimates the overall balance of forces on the GA “South” front to be approximately 7:1 in favor of the Soviet side (on average, the total ratio of forces excluding aviation was 5:1 in favor of the Soviet side. – P.B.). Accordingly, the field marshal notes that such numerical superiority made it possible for the Russians to attack not only in one, but often in many sectors at the same time, having an overwhelming superiority in forces. In addition, it allowed the enemy to make up for their losses surprisingly quickly. Thus, in front of the front of Army Group South, the enemy was only able to withdraw 48 rifle divisions, 17 tank and mechanized corps from the front for rest once, and partly even twice, from the front in July to September, and, in addition, to give all divisions monthly 10 percent replenishment. (Indeed, the 1st TA VorF, which suffered heavy losses during the Kursk defensive operation, received more than 200 new tanks and by the beginning of August 1943 was staffed by 82 percent in personnel, 81 percent in tanks, 67 percent in self-propelled artillery installations, by 85 percent for guns and mortars, although General Nikolai Popel claims that new reinforcements were not allocated to the VoRF troops, so they carried out offensive operations with those forces and means that remained after the end of the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk 634
Cm.: Babajanyan A. Kh., Popel N. K., Shalin M. A., Kravchenko I. M. Decree. op. P. 63; Popel N.K. Decree. op. P. 181.

Liberation. Turning battles of 1943 Isaev Alexey Valerievich

Operation "Commander Rumyantsev"

The element of the commander of the Voronezh Front Vatutin was an offensive. Even before the start of the Citadel, he insistently suggested attacking rather than defending. He returned to planning a new offensive during the period of the defensive battle. It cannot be said that this was Vatutin’s personal initiative: the plan for the offensive operation was prepared by the headquarters of the Voronezh Front on instructions from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The operation soon received the code name "Commander Rumyantsev", in honor of the 17th century Russian military leader who commanded Russian troops during the Seven Years' War.

The first version of the plan for Operation Rumyantsev provided for the encirclement of the entire enemy group in the Belgorod and Kharkov area. Vatutin conceived the classic “cannes” - enveloping and destroying the enemy with strikes in converging directions. According to his plan, it was supposed to break through the German front with two strong blows: one in the Krasnopolye area and the other in the Chuguev area. Next, the first strike group was supposed to move to the south with the aim of enveloping the enemy group from the west, and the second - to the west, with the aim of bypassing Kharkov from the south. If the edges of these attacks had converged, the entire Belgorod-Kharkov group of Germans, i.e., the 4th Tank Army and the Kempf Army Group, would have been encircled.

The second version of the Soviet command’s plan was slightly less ambitious, the scope of the “cannes” was somewhat smaller. It assumed the encirclement of the enemy group as a result of concentric attacks from the Krasnaya Yaruga and Chuguev regions. If this maneuver was successfully carried out, the main forces of the 4th Panzer Army and the entire Kempf Army Group were surrounded.

However, there was one serious obstacle to the implementation of these plans. To carry out the first variant of the offensive, it would be necessary to create large shock fists on the outer flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, capable of breaking through the defenses and breaking through to a depth of 250 km. It was possible to create them only after very complex regroupings, which would take a lot of time. As a result, the offensive would have to be postponed to a later date. The implementation of the second option of the offensive operation also required significant regroupings and a large amount of time for their implementation.

The plan of the Soviet command to implement the Belgorod-Kharkov operation (“Rumyantsev”)

Headquarters and Stalin personally were clearly not happy with this development of events. Moreover, the leader demanded an immediate offensive. Zhukov recalled: “The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, having reached the front line of the German defense on July 23, were unable to immediately launch a counteroffensive, although this was demanded by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. […] Me and A.M. It took Vasilevsky a lot of work to prove to him the need not to rush into action and to begin the operation only when it was fully prepared and financially supported.” Nevertheless, harsh pressure from above forced us to abandon major regroupings. Stalin gave only about eight days, during which it was only possible to replenish supplies and give the units the necessary rest.

However, in addition to the will of the leader, there were quite obvious military considerations. The current situation required the Voronezh and Steppe fronts to go on the offensive as soon as possible. Soviet intelligence informed the command that by this time the Belgorod-Kharkov group of Germans was significantly weakened. The SS Panzer Corps was transferred to the Donbass, and the Grossdeutschland Panzer Division was transferred to the Oryol bridgehead. This was caused, on the one hand, by the successful development of the offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the Oryol group of Germans, and on the other hand, by the transition of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts to the offensive in the Donbass. However, both offensives were already running out of steam, and it was necessary to hurry and attack before the return of German reserves from Donbass and the Orel region.

There was also one more factor, which, although not explicitly taken into account by the Soviet command, directly influenced the course of hostilities. A large number of German tanks and self-propelled guns of Army Group South, knocked out and damaged during the Citadel, were still being repaired at the end of July 1943. According to Panzer Lage and StuG Lage Ost, as of July 31, GA “South” had 625 combat-ready tanks, 633 under repair and 190 on the way, as well as 251 combat-ready StuG and StuH, 84 under repair and 11 on the way. Most of the equipment being repaired required short-term repairs lasting from 6 to 21 days. If the Soviet offensive had begun later, for example, on August 15, after the accumulation of forces and a long pause, it would have been met with fire from a much larger number of tanks and self-propelled guns than at the beginning of the month. The situation would change not even quantitatively, but qualitatively. Accordingly, the success of Operation Rumyantsev would be called into question.

The Soviet command needed a plan that could be put into effect as quickly as possible. In its final form, it was developed on the basis of instructions from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, given on July 22, 1943. It was decided to deliver the main blow with the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, bypassing Kharkov from the west. This option provided a significant gain in time, since there was no need to make large troop movements. The grouping that formed during the defensive battles on the left wing of the Voronezh and on the right wing of the Steppe fronts basically corresponded to this version of the offensive plan. The new plan also had another undeniable advantage. The planned attacks were directed along rivers, which significantly weakened their importance as strong natural barriers. After the troops of two fronts entered the area west of Kharkov, they were to be attacked by the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front. Thus, despite major changes to the original plans, the Soviet command retained the idea of ​​“cannes” - a battle of encirclement. Only now they were asymmetrical, a very powerful right “claw” and a relatively weak left one.

If we formulate the main idea of ​​the Soviet offensive plan in one word, it would be the word “speed.” The plan included high rates of advancement of tank armies. In just three or four days they had to advance 100–120 km. The 5th Guards Tank Army had to cover 100 km in three days: 40 km on the first day and 30 km on each of the subsequent days. Such a swift rush would ensure the interception of roads leading from Kharkov before the arrival of German reserves from Donbass.

One of the main obstacles to this daring plan was the condition of the troops on both fronts. In the defensive battle, the troops of both sides suffered significant losses. How did the Red Army manage to quickly recover from the blows it received and go on the offensive? The answer to this question is quite simple. Indeed, the Voronezh and Steppe fronts emerged from successful defensive battles fairly drained of blood. However, the Soviet side still had a reserve in its hands, prepared in advance in case of loss. Bitter experience 1941–1942 taught the Soviet command a lot. Even before the start of the “Citadel”, several armies were lined up at the base of the Kursk Bulge. They united into the Steppe Military District. He was a kind of “safety cushion” for the Red Army. Even if Manstein and Kluge had succeeded in cutting off the Kursk salient, they would not have succeeded in destroying the integrity of the Soviet defense as a whole. Instead of a huge gap at the base of the ledge, a new front of reserve armies would await them. Partially these reserves were used during the defensive battle. The 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle. The headquarters of the Steppe District became the headquarters of the Steppe Front. However, the bulk of the reserves remained untouched. It was decided to use them during Operation Rumyantsev. The Steppe Front received the 53rd Army, the Voronezh Front - the 27th and 47th Armies. Another army, the 4th Guards, was still in reserve at the beginning of the battle. It was planned to be used to develop success or fend off possible crises.

The commanders of the Steppe and Voronezh fronts disposed of the fresh armies transferred to them in their own way. Konev supplied the 53rd Army to I.M. Managarova in the first line, she was supposed to deliver the main blow. Vatutin decided to use the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters transferred to him in an unusual way. He considered it inappropriate to saturate the direction of the main attack with troops. There were already two tank armies there. Therefore, the 27th Army (66 thousand people) received an unusual task. It was supposed to go on the offensive together with the 40th Army somewhat west of the main strike group of the Voronezh Front. The strike was aimed at the southeast, towards Grayvoron and Akhtyrka. This was done in accordance with a subtle calculation of the future.

Vatutin was an experienced Soviet military leader. He understood that as he deepened into the formation of Army Group South, a hail of flank counterattacks would fall on his troops. The defensive battle showed the difficulties of direct confrontations with the new German armored vehicles. German counterattacks could lead to a repetition of the Kharkov drama of March 1943, which put an end to the development of the successes of Stalingrad. An additional strike group was called upon to solve this problem, and in two versions. If the Germans had attacked the flank of the Soviet tank armies encircling Kharkov, they themselves would have been under attack from the advancing 40th and 27th armies. If the German attack would have been delivered to the west, at the base of the breakthrough, then the 40th and 27th armies would have absorbed it on the defensive, keeping the main forces of the front intact. It should be noted that the auxiliary strike group of the Voronezh Front received a strong tank fist - three tank corps. For comparison, Vatutin’s tank armies had two tank corps and one mechanized corps. In terms of tanks, the three corps of the auxiliary strike force had 420 combat-ready tanks. Accordingly, the 1st Tank Army has 450 tanks. As we can see, the tank fist of the auxiliary strike of the 40th and 27th armies was not much weaker than the tank army, although it did not have a corresponding headquarters.

However, even such forethought did not guarantee against surprises. Therefore, another reserve transferred to Vatutin, the 47th Army (60 thousand people) still remained in the rear at the beginning of the operation. It could be used both to fend off crises in the direction of the main attack, and to develop an offensive.

In general, there is no doubt that the main player in the new offensive was to be Vatutin’s troops. The combat units of the Voronezh Front numbered 524 thousand people and 2171 tanks, the Steppe Front - 198 thousand people and 501 tanks. The 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies, battered in defensive battles, were replenished with tanks and self-propelled guns. The average strength of the rifle divisions of the Voronezh Front at the beginning of the operation was 7,180 people, of the Steppe Front - 6,070 people. Such a high figure was a consequence of strengthening reserves. The fresh 27th Army had an average rifle division strength of 7,600 men. The battle-worn armies looked much worse; the divisions of the 5th and 6th Guards Armies averaged 5,700–5,800 men. The staff strength of the Soviet rifle division in 1943 was about 11 thousand people. It was almost impossible to meet a fully staffed division at the height of the war on both sides of the front.

However, if in ground battles the Steppe Front was to become a clear outsider, in air battles it was to play a much more prominent role. According to the then existing rules, each Soviet front, as a union of armies, had to have at least one air army under its command. In defensive battles, Konev’s Steppe Front did not receive it. However, during the preparation for Operation Rumyantsev, he got it. This was the 5th Air Army under Lieutenant General S.K. Goryunova. Before the start of the offensive, it consisted of 769 aircraft, while the 2nd Air Army of the Voronezh Front had 753 aircraft (of which 79 were U-2 night biplanes).

Of the preparatory measures for the operation, the operational camouflage carried out in the Voronezh Front deserves special attention. Its task was to mislead the enemy regarding the actual direction of the main attack. In the Sudzhi area, far to the west of the assembled strike force, the concentration of a large number of combined arms and tank formations was skillfully simulated. For camouflage, 8 radio stations, 450 tank models and 500 gun models were used. The radio stations imitated the operation of radio networks of tank formations. The infantry imitated foot marches towards the front. The measures taken gave the desired results. The 7th Panzer Division was concentrated to cover this direction. In addition, Luftwaffe activity increased noticeably. The Sudzha area was systematically bombed by German aircraft.

As for the enemy, his grouping in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction consisted of 15 infantry divisions (88, 75, 323, 68, 57, 255, 332, 167, 168, 198, 106, 320, 282, 39, 161st Infantry Division ) and four tank tanks (6, 7, 11, 19th TD), which were part of the 4th TA and the Kempf army group. The German infantry divisions, which were in the center of the battle formations, had previously participated in Operation Citadel, during which they suffered losses and did not have time to receive reinforcements in the required quantities, so the combat strength of their infantry battalions was at the level of 300–400 people, which made them limited combat-ready. The tank divisions, having received reinforcements and repaired previously damaged tanks, were in good condition and were ready for any offensive or defensive actions, although they did not have many combat-ready tanks. As of the evening of August 2, 1943, German troops had the following number of combat-ready tanks and assault guns as part of formations and units of 4 TA and AG Kempf:

6th TD: 1 Pz II, 6 Pz III lg, 4 Pz III 7.5, 3 Pz III Flam, 11 Pz IV lg, 3 Bef Pz;

7th TD: 7 Pz III kz, 35 Pz III lg, 22 Pz IV lg;

11th TD: 7 Pz III kz, 27 Pz III lg, 1 Pz IVlg, 23 Pz IV lg, 24 StuG;

19th TD: 1 Pz III kz, 16 Pz III lg, 9 Pz IVlg, 19 Pz IV lg, 4 Bef. Pz;

10th Tank Brigade: 21 Pz V;

StuG Abt.905: 21 StuG, StuG Abt 228: 27 StuG, StuG Bttr 393: 6 StuG;

s. Pz.Abt. 503: 8 Pz VI.

Total: 306 combat-ready tanks and assault guns.

After the withdrawal of his troops from the penetration area to their original positions, the enemy went on the defensive on well-prepared lines. The main defense line, 6–8 km deep, consisted of two positions that had a number of strongholds, resistance nodes, connected by full-profile trenches. The second defensive line ran 2–3 km from the front line and had trenches, bunkers and various kinds of artificial obstacles. The total depth of the tactical defense zone was 15–18 km. Settlements were prepared for all-round defense. Of particular importance were the large resistance centers equipped in advance in the depths of the defense: Tomarovsky - 10 km from the front line, Borisovsky - 20 km from the front line. In the depths of the defense, 50–60 km from the front line, through Bogodukhov, Zlochev, Kazachya Lopan, Zhuravlevka, Veseloe, there was an operational rear defensive line. In addition, directly near Kharkov, the enemy created two powerful ring defensive lines and connected them with a series of cut-off positions. Thus, the enemy’s defense in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction was prepared in advance and well equipped in engineering terms. And the enemy troops, having occupied defensive lines, were ready for a stubborn defense.

By the end of August 2, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had completed preparatory measures and, according to the operation plan, took up their starting position for the offensive. For the Germans it was largely unexpected. The commander of Army Group South, Manstein, subsequently wrote:

“We hoped during Operation Citadel to defeat the enemy so much that we could count on some respite on this front. However, this hope later turned out to be fatal for the development of the situation on the northern flank of the group, since the enemy launched an offensive earlier than we expected.”

The offensive was unexpected not only for the headquarters of Army Group South, but also for the German soldiers in the forward trenches. The artillery preparation opened with a powerful five-minute raid of all fire weapons along the front edge of the German defense. The raid lasted from 5.00 to 5.05 on August 3, i.e., even before full dawn. Therefore, it was unexpected for the Germans and took them by surprise. From 5.05 to 5.35 a pause was taken in anticipation of full dawn. After this, the guns roared again. The artillery preparation lasted three hours.

At the end of the artillery preparation, another surprise awaited the Germans. From 7.55 to 8.15 all guns and mortars fired at an increasing rate at the enemy's forward trenches. At the same time, also at 7.55, the Soviet infantry began approaching and reaching the first trenches. At the signals of the infantry units, the fire of heavy-caliber guns gradually transferred (“slid”) from the front edge into the depths of the German defense.

Artillery preparation proceeded in close cooperation with aviation, which in groups of 20–30 aircraft continuously bombed and fired artillery and machine gun fire at the enemy’s battle formations, as well as the locations of their reserves and artillery.

At 8.15, infantry and breakthrough tanks, following the barrage of fire, broke into the forward trenches. At 13.00, as soon as the infantry of the 5th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front wedged into the main enemy defense line for about 2 km, the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies were brought into the battle. Their task was to complete the breakthrough of the tactical zone of enemy defense and with the main forces to develop success in operational depth. They were introduced on a narrow 5-km front.

The commander of the 1st Tank Army, Katukov, later recalled: “The grandiose movement of Soviet tanks that entered the breakthrough was imprinted in my memory. We walked along the right side of the five-kilometer corridor in two corps columns. On the left, the 5th Guards [Tank] Army was moving in the same order. We were covered from the air by a squadron of Yaks. A visual connection was maintained between the columns. During the entire war, none of us had ever seen such a concentration of Soviet tanks on such a narrow section of the front.”

On the very first day of the offensive of the Voronezh Front troops, the enemy’s defenses in the direction of the main attack were broken through to the entire tactical depth. The infantry of the 5th and 6th Guards armies advanced 8-12 km. Tank formations of the Voronezh Front were forced to break through the second line of enemy defense together with the infantry. Entering into battle, rather than making a clean breakthrough, significantly reduced the pace of advance of the tank armies relative to the operation plan. The 1st Tank Army advanced only 12 km. The 5th Guards acted much better on the first day of the offensive. tank army. Building on their success, her tanks broke through to a depth of 20–25 km.

Events developed in the offensive zone of the Steppe Front according to a similar scenario. The former commander of the XI Corps defending in the Belgorod region, Erhard Routh, recalled: “By the time all the enemy’s light artillery and a significant part of the heavy mortars opened fire, the action took on the appearance of a witches’ sabbath. Concentrated in a small area, this fiendish fire destroyed all the defenses and shelters in the position. Uprooted and broken tree trunks covered the ground, making any movement impossible for the surviving German soldiers. They could only squeeze into the craters from the explosions, seek salvation from the hellish fire and wait for the inevitable attack by the Soviet infantry.”

Despite a strong artillery strike, the troops of the Steppe Front near Belgorod failed to achieve decisive success. Then it was decided to use the powerful aviation fist, which was in the hands of Konev. At first, Soviet attacks were supported by almost continuous actions of groups of attack aircraft numbering from 12 to 24 vehicles. In the period from 8.30 to 8.45 a powerful blow followed on enemy resistance units. About 100 Pe-2s took part in it, covered by 80 fighters. As a result, in a section of German defense with an area of ​​7 square meters. km, 110 tons of bombs were dropped with a density of 17 tons per 1 kilometer. However, fierce trench fighting raged for several hours. The final blow that broke the German defense was the entry into battle of the 1st Mechanized Corps at 15.00. As a result, the troops of the 53rd Army and the right flank of the 69th Army of the Steppe Front advanced 7–8 km in a day.

The first day of the operation was quite successful for the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. However, from the point of view of fulfilling the tasks laid down in the operation plan, the achievements of the first day, to put it mildly, left much to be desired. Instead of 40 km according to plan, the 5th Guards. The tank army covered only 20 km. The 1st Tank Army traveled even less.

Nevertheless, on the morning of August 4, Vatutin was still full of optimism and was already thinking about a maneuver battle in the depths of the German defense. In a report to Stalin, he wrote that Rotmistrov’s tank armies and three tank corps from the 27th Army would move to the Bogodukhov area, “forming a compact tank fist that can operate in any direction and which will cut off all routes to Kharkov from the west.” Vatutin also planned the entry of the 47th Army “in the direction of Boromlya, Trostyanets... for a further offensive between the river. Psellus and R. Vorskla". Vatutin wanted to once again exploit the idea of ​​​​an offensive parallel to the main strike group. He also again directed his troops to attack in the gap between the rivers in order to avoid crossing them with battle.

Meanwhile, the first hiccups arose in the offensive. The commander of the 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army had an order from Katukov not to get involved in the battle for Tomarovka, but to block this enemy fortified node, bypass it and move on. However, despite a clearly stated order, General Getman launched an attack on the heavily fortified Tomarovka on the morning of August 4. Katukov had to intervene personally, and only in the afternoon the 6th Tank Corps bypassed Tomarovka from the east. A motorized rifle brigade was assigned as a barrier against it. As a result of the unsuccessful battles for Tomarovka, the 6th Tank Corps lost 21 tanks and 300 people killed and wounded. The 5th Guards also took part in the battles for Tomarovka. tank corps, which was operationally subordinate to the 1st Tank Army. Having lost 23 tanks in frontal attacks on Tomarovka and not achieving success, he was given the task of bypassing the German stronghold from the east. But it was not only and not so much about that. The tank army lost time; of its three corps, only one of its three corps advanced for some time - the 3rd mechanized corps of General Krivoshein. The 31st Tank Corps remained in reserve; its time had not yet come.

Also on the second day of fighting, the situation in the air changed. During World War II, aviation was perhaps the most maneuverable means of combat. Aircraft could be deployed to fend off an unexpected crisis much faster than tank, and even more so infantry divisions. Therefore, already on the second day of the Soviet offensive, the activity of German aviation in the air over Belgorod increased sharply. The German VIII Air Corps flew more than 1,100 sorties in a day. Moreover, the vast majority of these sorties were carried out by attack aircraft, that is, single-engine and twin-engine bombers, as well as attack aircraft. This was immediately felt by the advancing Soviet units. The report on the combat operations of the 3rd Mechanized Corps during Operation Rumyantsev said: “On the second day of the battle, the enemy brought up bomber aircraft, which in massive raids almost continuously attacked the columns following the advancing units, disrupting their battle formations and causing large damage to manpower and equipment."

However, despite all the difficulties that arose, Katukov’s 1st Tank Army covered 20 km in a day. She was lucky to some extent. The 3rd Mechanized Corps managed to wedge itself between two German reserve formations. The 19th Panzer Division was pulled up to Tomarovka, the 6th Panzer Division to the area east of Belgorod. Between these two enemy formations there remained a corridor through which the tanks of Katukov’s army rushed to the south and southwest.

The 5th Guards was in much worse conditions. tank army. Having overcome the positions of the German infantry units, its tank corps collided with the 6th Panzer Division. The latter took up defensive positions in pre-equipped positions in the area of ​​Orlovka and Bessonovka.

Commander of the 5th Guards. tank army, Rotmistrov recalled: “Many heights, deep gullies and rivers, including the impassable Gostenka River, themselves presented serious obstacles for our tanks. The enemy managed to mine all the approaches to them, and at the heights to dig in tanks and anti-tank artillery with all-round fire. 18th Tank Corps of General A.V. Egorova ran into enemy defenses and, having no conditions for maneuver, was forced to temporarily suspend the offensive.”

Fuel and ammunition in two advanced tank corps of the 5th Guards. The tank army, after a tense first day of operations, was at an end. However, in the second echelon of the army there was a fresh mechanized corps, which seemed to be asking itself to develop success. It was decided to use it for a quick rush forward while the 18th and 29th tank corps were refueling and restoring their strength. On the morning of August 4, 5th Guards. The mechanized corps moved forward and began an offensive to the south, along the route assigned to the army. At this moment, at noon on August 4, Rotmistrov received an order from Vatutin to strike with part of his forces in the direction of Belgorod from the southwest. In fact, this meant a 90-degree turn; instead of attacking south, it was necessary to attack east and even northeast, helping the neighboring front. The mechanized corps, which had not yet had time to say its weighty word in the battle in the main direction, was withdrawn from the battle and deployed to the auxiliary direction. To top all the troubles, it was against Rotmistrov’s army in the Orlovka area that the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks “Tiger” was brought into battle. It had only 6 combat-ready vehicles, but in defense the Tigers were a strong opponent for the T-34-76. All of the above immediately affected the pace of advancement - on August 4, Rotmistrov’s tank army covered only 10 km in a day.

Tiger tank of the 503rd Tank Battalion in the Belgorod area

The turn of a fresh corps from the 5th Guards Tank Army to Belgorod was one of Vatutin’s most controversial decisions in Operation Rumyantsev. Of course, this city was a “tough nut to crack”, during the assault of which the armies of the Steppe Front could suffer heavy losses and lose their offensive potential. The Germans turned Belgorod into a powerful center of resistance; many defensive structures were erected on its territory. Around the city, blocking the closest approaches to it, there was a ring, defensive contour created by the Germans in the winter of 1941/42. By the beginning of the Soviet offensive, it was significantly strengthened. In addition, a dense network of bunkers ran directly along the outskirts of the city, and all stone buildings were turned into strong strongholds. The inner city districts were also prepared for persistent street fighting. Barricades and bunkers were built at street intersections, and a significant part of the streets and buildings in the city were mined. The northern and eastern parts of the city were covered by strong stripes of minefields. Suffice it to say that during the fighting, Soviet sappers removed more than 16 thousand enemy mines in the Belgorod area.

It was obvious that a strike on Belgorod from the rear would significantly facilitate its assault. Therefore, Konev sent his strongest 53rd Army to bypass the city from the west. The successful offensive of this army allowed its neighbor, the 69th Army, to reach the less fortified western outskirts of Belgorod. The city was semi-surrounded. On August 5, Belgorod was attacked from three sides. While units of the 69th Army were attacking the city from the north and west, units of the 7th Guards Army were attacking from the east. The Germans put up stubborn resistance, trying at all costs to keep the Belgorod resistance center in their hands. The fight was fought for every block, and often for individual houses, which the Germans turned into strongholds. However, the attacks of the Soviet troops slowly but surely did their job. By 18 o'clock the city was completely cleared of German troops.

As a result, the Steppe Front quite successfully coped with the task of liberating Belgorod. We have to admit that the turn of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps of the 5th Guards. The tank army to the rear of the German troops defending Belgorod did not have a decisive impact on the city’s defense system. It was entirely possible to do without this attack. Belgorod was already surrounded from the rear by the troops of the 53rd Army and its 1st Mechanized Corps. The reduction in activity in the direction of the main attack of the Voronezh Front was not justified.

Soviet infantrymen attack, hiding behind the hull of a destroyed Panther.

Vatutin clearly overestimated the capabilities of Rotmistrov’s army to advance with only two tank corps. When it became clear that the momentum had been lost, the front commander was simply furious. On the morning of August 5, Vatutin wrote to Rotmistrov: “Your passive actions border on crime. You are exposing Katukov’s flank.” The front commander threatened the commander of the 5th Tank Army with removal from office and trial.

However, it cannot be said that August 5 was a day of complete disappointment. On the morning of August 5, the 27th Army and the strike force of the 40th Army went on the offensive. The 40th Army began its operations at 7.15 am after a two-hour artillery preparation. The 27th Army, due to the fact that its reconnaissance detachments had already violated the enemy defense system on August 4, limited itself to only a 15-minute powerful fire raid before the attack.

Having broken the resistance of the 11th Panzer Division defending here and inflicting heavy losses on it, both armies broke through the enemy defenses on a 26-kilometer front, and by the end of the day they had advanced 8-20 km in battles. The front of the German 4th Panzer Army was saved from immediate collapse by the introduction of the 7th Panzer Division into battle. Nevertheless, the transition of the second strike group of the Voronezh Front to the offensive meant the threat of encirclement and destruction for German units in the Tomarovka area. Units of the 332nd and 255th infantry and 19th tank divisions defended here. They successfully held off attacks by the 6th Guards Army and the 6th Tank Corps, but now found themselves surrounded on both flanks. They only had the road to Borisovka at their disposal. The retreat began with the onset of darkness. By the morning of August 6, Tomarovka was completely in the hands of Soviet troops.

The announcement for Belgorod residents eloquently characterizes the policy of the occupation authorities

Delay in the offensive of the 5th Guards. tank army directly influenced the pace of the advance of the 1st Tank Army. Katukov was forced to provide cover on his left flank from two brigades of the 3rd Mechanized Corps. This, naturally, reduced the number of tanks and motorized infantry at the forefront of the main attack. Therefore, the planned exit to Bogodukhov on the third day of the operation did not take place. However, on August 5, the 1st Tank Army achieved a good result and covered 30 km. Another deterrent was enemy aircraft. The Luftwaffe remained highly active in the air. The 1st Tank Army, which remained the leader of the offensive, clearly felt the impact of the enemy from the air. The report of the headquarters of the 3rd mechanized corps of Katukov’s army, written based on the results of the August battles, stated: “The main damage in equipment and manpower in these days (August 5–6) was suffered by the corps due to enemy aviation.” He is echoed by the officers of the neighboring 6th Tank Corps, who characterized the advance of these days as follows: “under the enemy’s air influence, without encountering serious resistance from his ground forces.”

The lagging behind the actual pace of the Soviet offensive from the planned ones made a clash with German reserves from the Donbass more and more realistic even before Kempf reached communications. From the 1st Panzer and 6th armies, units of the SS divisions “Reich”, “Totenkopf” and “Viking”, as well as the 3rd Panzer Division, moved towards the battlefield. Theoretically, the Soviet command could influence the transport of German troops from Donbass with air strikes. Indeed, German trains and columns of vehicles moved from south to north, almost parallel to the front line. Since the aviation of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was mainly engaged in supporting the advancing troops, the 17th Air Army of the Southwestern Front and long-range heavy bombers could be involved in the operation. However, this operation was not planned in advance. The order to bomb the trains coming from Donbass came only on August 5, 1943, when it became clear that the tank armies did not have time to cover 100 km in three days. As a result, at first only one Soviet air corps took part in it. Scouts saw from the air that there was no shortage of targets, but small groups of Soviet attack aircraft could only slightly batter the enemy columns. Only on August 7 were truly large forces involved in the raids, capable of inflicting heavy losses on the Germans. But they were already destroying the last lagging columns. The Soviet command had a chance to disrupt or at least seriously delay enemy reserves. However, this chance was missed. The greatest intensity of impact on German transportation was achieved after the echelons with tank divisions proceeded to the Kharkov area.

The first on the path of the Soviet offensive was the 3rd Panzer Division. On August 1, 1943, it consisted of 16 Pz.III 8 Pz.IV and 55 tanks under repair. She received orders to be transported to the Kharkov area on August 2, the day before the start of the Soviet offensive. Meeting of the advanced units of the 5th Guards. tank army and a German tank division occurred on August 6. On this day, Rotmistrov’s army successfully advanced along the Uda River, the settlements of Uda and Shchetinovka were captured, and the advance detachment of the army reached Zolochev. The Soviet advance detachment with 6 tanks and the advance units of the 3rd Panzer Division approach the city almost simultaneously. Street battles break out, as a result of which Zolochev remains in the hands of the Germans. Rotmistrov orders to bypass Zolochev, but the German defense, reinforced by the arriving reserve, holds the blow. The Tigers of the 503rd battalion operate together with the 3rd Tank Division. Here, in the Zolochev area, the German command will regroup the 167th Infantry Division, removed from the front that was reduced due to the loss of Belgorod. The fighting in this area drags on, Soviet troops capture Zolochev only by August 9.

Soviet infantrymen are waiting for the order to attack

Further attacks in this direction no longer had any prospects. Therefore, the Soviet command was forced to abandon the original plan of using the 5th Guards. tank army. It was decided to use the successful advance of the 1st Tank Army. It made a fairly large hole in the enemy’s defenses, and through this gap it was possible to bypass the enemy’s resistance centers from the west. On the evening of August 9, at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the 5th Guards Tank Army was withdrawn to reserve and transferred to the subordination of the commander of the Steppe Front, Konev. For several days of fighting, the 5th Guards. TA suffered serious losses and its strike capabilities were significantly weakened. So, only for the period August 6–8, the 5th Guards. TA lost 167 tanks and self-propelled guns, 74 of them irretrievably.

While the main part of the troops of the Voronezh Front was developing an offensive in the southern and southwestern directions and had already broken through to enemy positions at 60–65 km, in the Borisovka and Golovchino areas there were fierce battles with a semi-encircled group of Germans. It found itself flanked by the offensive of the 27th and 5th Guards armies. The Borisov group consisted of units thrown back from the main line of defense - units of the 332nd and 255th infantry divisions, as well as units of the 19th and 11th tank divisions.

Dismounting a tank landing force from a T-34 tank. The practice of tank landings was widespread in the Red Army

To eliminate the semi-encircled enemy group, Vatutin decided to use the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps (from the 5th Guards Army), as well as the 6th Guards Army and the 23rd Rifle Corps of the 27th Army. Also, the 31st Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army was deployed to the rear of the German units defending in the Borisovka area. Two of his brigades intercepted the escape route from Borisovka to the south.

In addition, the 13th Guards Rifle Division forced a march into the Golovchino area to prevent a breakthrough to the southwest along the railway and the Borisovka-Grayvoron highway. In order to speed up the completion of the task received, the division commander sent a landing party consisting of 11 tanks and a battalion of machine gunners to Golovchino, which captured the Khotmyzhsk station by 18.00 on August 6. This detachment captured five railway trains (315 wagons) and several large warehouses with ammunition and food. The encirclement ring around German units in the Borisovka area closed.

At 2 a.m. on August 7, units of the 66th and 97th Guards Rifle Divisions attacked Borisovka from the east, southeast and south. Further holding of this strong point became pointless; it threatened to become a mousetrap for the Germans occupying it. In the second half of the night, a series of breakthrough attempts began. Some groups of Germans simply infiltrated into gaps not occupied by Soviet units. But in some cases the breakthrough was carried out by brute force. From 3.00 to 13.00 on August 7, six consecutive enemy attacks fell on the 13th Guards Rifle Division. The attacks were carried out by groups of 300-1200 soldiers and officers, reinforced by 5-20 tanks.

Panther tanks abandoned at a collection point for emergency vehicles in Borisovka

The tanks became a battering ram, which allowed them to push forward. So, at 8.00 on August 7, tank ambushes of the 237th Tank Brigade of the 31st Tank Corps were attacked by a large group of enemy tanks and infantry. As a result of the battle, the Germans managed to break through to Gayvoron, losing, according to Soviet data, 14 tanks and 2 self-propelled guns. Accordingly, the 237th brigade lost 7 T-34 tanks burned out and 3 damaged in this battle.

But not all breakthrough attempts were successful. In total, 450 prisoners were taken in the Borisovka area. Among the corpses of the killed Germans was the corpse of the commander of the 19th Panzer Division, Lieutenant General Schmidt. Katukov wrote in his memoirs about the circumstances of the death of the German general: “The commander of the 19th Panzer Division, General Schmidt, was killed by a bomb fragment. His staff car with documents and personal belongings was driven to the army checkpoint by our tank crews.” Also, the Germans were forced to abandon a large amount of equipment that was being repaired in the Borisovka area. Thus, in the area of ​​Borisovka, Golovchin and Grayvoron, 75 “Panthers” from the 51st battalion were abandoned or blown up. Of this number, 35 Pz.V Panther tanks were blown up during the retreat directly to Borisovka, where the repair shops of the 39th Panther tank regiment were located.

The defeat in the Borisovka area could be fatal for the fate of the 4th Tank Army. However, it was at this moment that the “Great Germany” division arrived in the Akhtyrka area. It became the core around which the German divisions, battered in the first days of the battle, gathered. Collisions with German divisions arriving from other directions took place on August 6–7 in almost all directions. The first to meet the “Great Germany” division, which arrived from near Karachev, were units of the 27th Army on August 7. Soon the 10th Motorized Division, also transferred from Army Group Center, appeared here. In addition to the German mobile formations, infantry divisions removed from quiet sectors of the front arrived near Kharkov.

The only direction in which the German reserves had not yet shown themselves was the offensive zone of the 1st Tank Army. Stuck on the first day of the operation in front of Tomarovka, the 6th Tank Corps picked up the pace and confidently moved forward. The headquarters of the 1st Tank Army defined the nature of the corps’ advance as follows: “under the influence of enemy aviation, without encountering serious resistance from its ground forces.” In addition to air strikes, the offensive impulse was restrained only by the need to refuel equipment and tighten up the rear. In the first half of the day on August 7, the corps stood in place, refueling tanks and putting itself in order. At 15.00 the tank engines roared, the units moved forward, and already at 18.00 they broke into Bogodukhov. Enemy resistance was weak. Having occupied the city, one of the brigades advanced further and straddled the roads leading to it from the south.

Soviet T-34 tanks on the offensive

Katukov wrote in his memoirs about the capture of Bogodukhov: “We did not encounter much enemy resistance here. The city was occupied by rear units who did not expect such a sudden appearance of Soviet tanks, and therefore rich trophies fell to our share.”

Waiting for enemy reserves became increasingly nervous. Late in the evening of the same day, when Bogodukhov was occupied, Vatutin warned his army commanders: “Reconnaissance has established that the enemy from the south to the Kharkov region has begun to pull up to three tank divisions (presumably 3 tank divisions, “Reich” and “Totenkopf”).”

Katukov's tank army at that time was the undisputed leader of the offensive of the Voronezh Front troops. During the five days of the battle, she fought over 100 km and broke away from the rifle formations by 30–40 km. A great success was the capture of a large road junction - Bogodukhov.

However, sooner or later the rapid flight of the 1st Tank Army was to lead to a meeting with German tank divisions transferred from Donbass. On August 8, the brigades of the 3rd Mechanized Corps reached the Bogodukhov area. There were only a few kilometers left to the Poltava-Kharkov railway. However, in the reports of the brigades the words “organized resistance” and “stubborn fire resistance” were heard. Units of the 3rd mechanized brigade of Krivoshein's corps on the morning of August 8 were counterattacked by motorized infantry with tanks. The counterattack was repulsed, and the captured prisoners turned out to be from the SS Reich division. The meeting with a dangerous and strong enemy, which was expected any day now, took place. The 3rd Mechanized Corps was not the only one who met with Reich units. It was at this moment that Katukov brought the 31st Tank Corps, the third corps of his army, into battle. Until this moment, he was in reserve and was used to cover the flanks. On the afternoon of August 8, the 31st Tank Corps turned around from behind the left flank of the 3rd Mechanized Corps and went on the offensive. However, the Soviet tanks were immediately met with counterattacks and artillery fire. The introduction of reserves into battle did not lead to a quick leap forward. As soon as it began to attack, the 31st Tank Corps went on the defensive.

On the evening of August 9, Vatutin wrote to Katukov: “I have a report that you have gone over to the defensive with the main forces of the army, having in front of you the battered Reich division.” I think this decision is absolutely wrong.” The front commander ordered to look for the enemy’s weak points, attack the flank and rear, “encircle and destroy.” Vatutin’s reproach was only partially fair - not the entire 1st Tank Army went on the defensive. On the afternoon of August 9, two brigades of the 6th Tank Corps attacked from Bogodukhov to the south. In the evening they managed to occupy Murafa and Aleksandrovka on the banks of the Merchik River. The Poltava-Kharkov road was only a stone's throw away. Meanwhile, on August 9-10, the SS division “Totenkopf” arrived in the area south of Bogodukhov, and on August 10, the SS division “Viking” appeared in the same area south of Bogodukhov. The collection of reserves by the command of Army Group South was completed, and the time had come for a counterattack.

On the morning of August 10, Vatutin received a directive signed by Stalin, which instructed him: “The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considers it necessary to isolate Kharkov by quickly intercepting the main railways and highways in the direction of Poltava, Krasnograd, Lozovaya and thereby speed up the liberation of Kharkov. For this purpose, Katukov’s 1st Tank Army will cut the main routes in the area of ​​Kovyaga, Valka, and Rotmistrov’s 5th Tank Army, bypassing Kharkov from the southwest, will cut the routes in the Merefa area.” Rotmistrov's tank army, withdrawn to reserve after regrouping, had to break through from behind its more successful neighbor far to the southeast, to Novaya Vodolaga. This would lead to the fact that the German command had only one supply line for the troops in Kharkov at its disposal - the road running directly to the south. It was supposed to be intercepted by the 57th Army.

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Operation “Commander Rumyantsev” The commander of the Voronezh Front Vatutin’s element was an offensive. Even before the start of the Citadel, he insistently suggested attacking rather than defending. He returned to planning a new offensive during the period of the defensive battle.

A new book from the author of the bestsellers “Penal Battalions and Barrier Detachments of the Red Army” and “Armored Troops of the Red Army.” THE FIRST study of the history of the creation and combat use of Soviet tank armies during the Great Patriotic War.

They have come a long and difficult path from the first failures and defeats of 1942 to the triumph of 1945. They distinguished themselves in all the major battles of the second half of the war - on the Kursk Bulge and in the Battle of the Dnieper, in the Belarusian, Yasso-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and other strategic offensive operations. Possessing crushing power and phenomenal mobility, the Guards tank armies became the elite of the Red Army and the main striking force of the “Russian blitzkriegs” that broke the back of the previously invincible Wehrmacht.

In accordance with the plan of the operation “Commander Rumyantsev”, set out in the chapter “First Guards Tank Army”, the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army were to build on their success in the direction of Zolochev, Olshany, by the end of the third day to capture the area of ​​Olshany, Lyubotin and cut off the Kharkov retreat routes groups to the west. The depth of the task is about 100 km.

10 days were allotted to prepare for the offensive. During this time, the command staff of the 5th Guards Tank Army studied the terrain in the zone of upcoming actions, the nature of the enemy’s defense and organized cooperation. At the same time, military equipment was repaired and supplies were replenished. Telephone and radio communications, as well as communications using mobile devices, were organized with all interacting parts and connections. The army created operational groups that were supposed to move behind the first echelon of advancing troops. In preparation for the offensive, training and exercises were conducted on sandboxes with headquarters officers to practice command and control. Much attention was paid to carrying out measures to disinform the enemy, which made it possible to attract his attention to the Sumy direction and ensure surprise attacks in the Belgorod area. The army headquarters worked out a plan of interaction and a scheme for introducing the army into battle. Issues of support were reflected in the plans of the chiefs of engineering troops, intelligence and army logistics. The political department drew up a work plan for the period from August 2 to August 5.

The army included one mechanized and two tank corps, a separate tank, motorcycle, two self-propelled artillery, howitzer artillery, anti-tank artillery, guards mortar and light bomber regiments, an anti-aircraft artillery division and a separate engineering battalion (see table No. 39). The army had 550 tanks.

Table No. 39

General Rotmistrov decided to lead the army into the breakthrough in a two-echelon formation: in the first - the 18th and 29th Tank Corps, in the second - the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. The detachment of General K.G. was allocated to the reserve. Trufanova. To coordinate issues of interaction between the 5th Guards Army, the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies at the command post of the commander of the 5th Guards Army, General A.S. Zhadov held a meeting. On it are generals A.S. Zhadov, P.A. Rotmistrov and M.E. Katukov discussed all issues of interaction at the stages of the operation, outlined the routes of movement of the tank corps introduced into the breakthrough in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army.

On the evening of August 2, units of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army (18th and 29th Tank Corps) began moving to their original areas. At two o'clock in the morning on August 3, they concentrated on the line Bykovka, Krapivenskie Dvory, where army artillery, deployed the day before the tanks arrived, took up firing positions.

On the morning of August 3, after powerful artillery and air preparation, the strike forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts went on the offensive. At the same time, the partisans began carrying out Operation Rail War behind enemy lines. On the Voronezh Front, the 5th and 6th Guards armies had advanced only 4–5 km by mid-day. Therefore, to build up the strike in the zone of the 5th Guards Army, formations of the first echelon of tank armies and the 5th Guards Tank Corps were introduced into the battle. The entry was carried out in a narrow zone: the 1st Tank Army - 4–6 km, and the 5th Guards Tank Army - about 5 km. From the air, General Rotmistrov’s formations were supported by the 291st assault aviation division of General A.N. Vitruk and the 10th Fighter Aviation Corps of Colonel M.M. Golovni.

Developing the success of the rifle divisions, the tank armies completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone, advanced units reached the Tomarovka, Orlovka line, advancing 12–26 km. As a result, the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance were separated. In the offensive zone of the 53rd and 69th armies of the Steppe Front, the 1st Mechanized Corps was introduced into the battle, which completed the breakthrough of the main enemy defense line and entered the area north of Rakov.

On the morning of August 4, the strike force of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy. By nine o'clock the forward detachments of the first echelon corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army reached Orlovka and Kozichev. But here they were stopped by the German 6th Panzer Division, reinforced by units of other formations. The enemy, relying on pre-prepared defenses along the impassable Gostenka River, offered stubborn resistance. As a result, part of the 18th Tank Corps of General A.V. Egorova were forced to pause the offensive. The 29th Tank Corps of General I.F. also did not advance. Kirichenko. The army commander was forced to bring up artillery and bring the second echelon of the army into the battle - the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps of General B.M. Skvortsova. He was ordered to strike at Kazachev, Udy, bypassing the left flank of the enemy’s 6th Panzer Division and by the end of the day to reach the Zolochev area. But this plan remained unrealized, since the commander of the Voronezh Front demanded that the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps be turned to Belgorod in order to assist the troops of the Steppe Front in capturing the city.

General Rotmistrov, left without a second echelon, urgently brought his reserve into the battle (the detachment of General K.G. Trufanov), giving it the same task as the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. At the same time, the 18th Tank Corps was ordered to bypass Orlovka from the northwest to Gomzino, and the 29th Tank Corps, in cooperation with the troops of the 5th Guards Army, destroyed the enemy in the Orlovka area.

Carrying out the assigned tasks, the 18th Tank Corps, having bypassed Orlovka from the west, by five o'clock in the evening on August 5, with the forces of the 110th Tank and 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigades, reached the Gomzino line and launched an attack on Shchetinovka. Units of the 29th Tank Corps, having captured Orlovka, continued their success to the southwest. The 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in the Grezny area came into contact with units of the 1st Mechanized Corps. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front liberated Belgorod.

To increase the pace of the offensive, General Rotmistrov ordered the first echelon formations to conduct combat operations at night. At the same time, tank brigades, advancing in the second echelon of corps and, therefore, having a lower daily consumption of ammunition and fuel, advanced to the first echelon by nightfall. At this time, the rear was pulled up, ammunition, fuel, and tanks restored by repairmen were brought in for the withdrawn units of the first echelon. This refreshment of forces made it possible to maintain a high tempo of the offensive. On the night of August 8, the 181st Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel V.A. Puzyreva, acting as an advance detachment of the 18th Tank Corps, went behind enemy lines along an overgrown country road and suddenly burst into the city of Zolochev. The main forces of the corps, having knocked out the enemy from Shchetinovka and Uda, came to the aid of the 181st Tank Brigade. By evening, the enemy was completely defeated and thrown back from Zolochev to the southwest.

On August 7, the 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army liberated Bogodukhov with a sudden attack, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps liberated Grayvoron, cutting off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and south.

As a result of the successful actions of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, the enemy’s defenses were broken through in a strip 120 km wide. Formations of the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies advanced up to 100 km, and the combined arms armies advanced 60–65 km. This forced the enemy to begin advancing to the Belgorod-Kharkov direction the divisions “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Viking”, the 3rd Panzer Division from Donbass and the motorized division “Great Germany” from the Orel region.

On August 6, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev was introduced to I.V. Stalin's plan to defeat the enemy in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction in two stages.

At the first stage, the troops of the 53rd Army with the 1st Mechanized Corps were to advance along the Belgorod-Kharkov highway, delivering the main blow in the direction of Dergachi with access to the Olshany-Dergachi line, where they would replace units of the 5th Guards Army. The 69th Army was entrusted with the task of advancing in the direction of Cheremoshny, capturing this settlement and then moving into the reserve of the Steppe Front. The formations of the 7th Guards Army were ordered to advance from the Pushkarny area to Brodok and Bochkovka, to capture the line of Cherkasskoye, Lozovoye, Tsirkuny, Klyuchkin. Part of the army's forces were to advance on Murom and Ternovaya in order to help the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front cross the river. Seversky Donets in the Rubezhnoye area, Stary Saltov. This army was ordered to strike in the direction of Nepokrytaya, state farm named after. Frunze. At the same time, it was proposed to transfer the army to the Steppe Front.

To carry out the second stage (Kharkov operation), it was planned to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army to the Steppe Front, which was supposed to reach the Olshany, Stary Merchik, Ogultsy area. The operation was planned to be carried out as follows. The troops of the 53rd Army, in cooperation with the 5th Guards Tank Army, were supposed to cover Kharkov from the west and southwest. The 7th Guards Army was to advance from north to south from the Tsirkuna and Dergachi lines, from the east from the State Farm line. Frunze, Rogan, covering Kharkov from the south - the 57th Army. The troops of the 69th Army were planned to be deployed at the junction between the 5th Guards and 53rd armies in the Olshany area with the task of advancing south to support the Kharkov operation from the south. The left flank of the Voronezh Front was to be brought to the line of Otrada, Kolomak, Snezhkov Kut. This task was to be completed by the 5th Guards Army and the left flank of the 27th Army. The 1st Tank Army was planned to be concentrated in the area of ​​​​Kovyagi, Alekseevka, Merefa.

At the same time, it was proposed that the forces of the Southwestern Front strike from the Zamosc region on both banks of the river. Mzha na Merefu. Part of the forces of the front was to advance through Chuguev to Osnova, as well as clear the forest south of Zamosc from the enemy and reach the line of Novoselovka, Okhochaya, Verkhniy Bishkin, Geevka.

To carry out the second stage of the operation, Marshal Zhukov and General Konev asked to allocate 35 thousand reinforcements, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KB tanks, four regiments of self-propelled artillery, two engineering brigades and 190 aircraft to strengthen the troops.

Stalin approved the presented plan. According to his decision, from 24 hours on August 8, the 57th Army was transferred to the Steppe Front from the Southwestern Front with the task of assisting the main group of the Steppe Front in capturing the city by attacking Kharkov from the south. The main task of the Southwestern Front is to deliver the main blow to the south in the general direction of Golaya Dolina, Krasnoarmeyskoye, defeat the Donbass enemy group in cooperation with the Southern Front and capture the Gorlovka, Stalino (Donetsk) region. The Southern Front was to deliver the main blow in the general direction of Kuibyshevo and Stalino with the aim of connecting with the strike group of the Southwestern Front. Readiness for the offensive of the Southwestern and Southern fronts - August 13–14. Marshal Zhukov was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, and Marshal Vasilevsky - the Southwestern and Southern fronts.

The troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army, transferred to the Steppe Front on August 9, began regrouping in the Bogodukhov area the next day. The main forces of the 1st Tank Army by this time had reached the river. Merchik. Troops of the 6th Guards Army reached the Krasnokutsk region, and formations of the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. The troops of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive perimeter of the city and hung over it from the north. Units of the 57th Army, transferred to the Steppe Front on August 8, approached Kharkov from the southeast.

On August 10, Stalin sent directive No. 30163 to the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Zhukov, on the use of tank armies to isolate the Kharkov enemy group:

“The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considers it necessary to isolate Kharkov by quickly intercepting the main railway and highway routes in the directions to Poltava, Krasnograd, Lozovaya and thereby speed up the liberation of Kharkov.

For this purpose, Katukov’s 1st Tank Army cut the main routes in the area of ​​Kovyaga, Valka, and the 5th Guards. Rotmistrov's tank army, bypassing Kharkov from the southwest, cut the tracks in the Merefa area" .

Field Marshal E. von Manstein, trying to eliminate the breakthrough of the Soviet troops, pulled up the 3rd Panzer Corps (about 360 tanks) to Kharkov, which he intended to use together with the Kempf task force to strike the eastern flank of the wedged Soviet troops. “At the same time,” writes Manstein, “the 4th Tank Army was supposed to strike the western flank with the forces of two tank divisions returned by the Center group and one motorized division. But it was clear that these forces and the group’s forces in general could no longer hold the front line.”

On August 11, a counter battle took place between the enemy’s 1st Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps, during which he managed to stop the army’s troops. On the same day, the Supreme High Command Headquarters, by its directive No. 30164, ordered the commander of the Steppe Front troops to take all measures to ensure that the 5th Guards Tank Army, without expecting complete concentration, marches along the route Kovyagi, Valki, Novaya Vodolaga and closes the enemy’s escape routes from the area Merefa. Part of the forces needed to take crossings on the river. Mzha on the Sokolovo, Merefa site.

On the morning of August 12, a counter battle broke out again between the 1st Tank Army (134 tanks) and the 3rd Tank Corps (about 400 tanks), during which the enemy forced the army to go on the defensive and then pushed it back 3–4 km. In the middle of the day, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps came to the aid of the 1st Tank Army. Together they stopped the enemy. The next day, formations of the 6th and 5th Guards armies entered the battle. With the support of front-line aviation, ground troops inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and then threw them back to their original position.

After this, the troops of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies went on the defensive. It was carried out in those combat formations in which they conducted offensive operations, trying to concentrate the main efforts on consolidating the occupied line. Therefore, the second echelons and reserves of the corps were located at a distance of 2–3 km from the front edge, and then the depth of defense gradually increased. The defense was focal in nature with the creation of a system of tank ambushes, anti-tank areas and mine-explosive barriers. The ambushes were located in a checkerboard pattern at a depth of 2–3 km, together with submachine gunners and anti-tank artillery units. Anti-tank areas (an anti-tank artillery division or regiment in each) were created in the corps and army units in the most important directions.

Tank armies had a single-echelon formation and rather low density of forces and means. They carried out defensive actions together with suitable rifle formations of combined arms armies: the 1st Tank Army with the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 6th Guards Army; 5th Guards Tank Army with the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army.

A quick transition to the defensive and its skillful conduct allowed the 5th Guards Tank Army to repel enemy counterattacks. At the same time, she suffered minor losses over the course of three days - only 38 tanks and self-propelled guns.

On August 12, the Supreme Command Headquarters, by directive No. 10165, assigned new tasks to the troops of the Voronezh, Steppe and Southwestern Fronts. They are described in detail in the chapter “The First Guards Tank Army”. Let us only recall that the Voronezh Front was ordered to strike the 1st Tank Army in the general direction of Valki, Novaya Vodolaga, together with the 5th Guards Tank Army, to cut off the retreat routes of the Kharkov group to the south and southwest. After its defeat and capture of the city of Kharkov, it was prescribed to continue the offensive in the general direction of Poltava, Kremenchug and by August 23-24 to reach the line Yareski station, Poltava, (leg.) Karlovka with the main forces. In the future it was planned to go to the river. Dnieper in the Kremenchug, Orlik section, providing for the capture of river crossings by moving parts. To ensure the offensive of the strike group, it was necessary for the right wing of the front to reach the river by August 23–24. Psel, where to firmly gain a foothold.

Meanwhile, the enemy did not abandon his plan. After unsuccessful attempts to break through the defenses of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army, he decided to bypass it from the left flank. On August 15, units of the SS tank division "Reich" broke through the defenses of the 13th Guards Rifle Division, defending on the left flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, and rushed in the direction of Lozovaya, Bogodukhov. General Rotmistrov at 10 o’clock on August 16 ordered the 53rd Tank Regiment (general reserve) and the army’s artillery and anti-tank reserve to move from Bogodukhov to the area south of Lozovaya. By three o'clock in the afternoon they arrived at the designated area, took up defensive positions and, meeting the enemy with fire of all means, stopped his advance. The timely maneuver of the reserves greatly contributed to the enemy’s refusal from further offensive actions in this direction.

The enemy launched a new attack on the morning of August 18 from the Akhtyrka area with the forces of two tank and two motorized divisions and a separate tank battalion equipped with Tiger and Panther tanks. They managed to break through the defenses of the 27th Army. At the same time, from the area south of Krasnokutsk, the Totenkopf tank division attacked Kaplunovka. The attempt by the commander of the Voronezh Front to defeat the enemy’s Akhtyrka group with a counterattack was unsuccessful. He managed to stop the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and even push them back in some places. After Stalin’s intervention, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Zhukov, and the commander of the Voronezh Front took measures to localize the breakthrough of the enemy’s Akhtyrka group. The 4th Guards Army with the 3rd Guards Tank Corps and the 47th Army with the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were brought into the battle. By August 27, they, in cooperation with the troops of the 27th and 6th Guards Armies, the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, defeated the enemy’s Akhtyr group and began to advance towards the Dnieper.

During these days, the 53rd Army of the Steppe Front continued to push back the enemy in the Kharkov direction. The 1st Mechanized Corps began fighting for Peresechnaya, and rifle units cleared the forest northwest of Kharkov. The troops of the 69th Army began to flow around Kharkov from the northwest and west. To speed up the liberation of the city, the 5th Guards Tank Army (without the 29th Tank Corps) was transferred from near Bogodukhov to the area northwest of Kharkov. Breaking enemy resistance, units of the 18th Tank and 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps liberated Korotich by the end of the day on August 22, and the tank brigades of the 57th Army reached the Bezlyudovka line and further south, enveloping the Kharkov enemy group from the southeast. On the night of August 23, the assault on the city began. In the morning, Kharkov was completely cleared of the enemy.

With the liberation of Kharkov, the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation ended, and with it the entire Battle of Kursk. Their results are summarized in the chapter devoted to the 1st Guards Tank Army.